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userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace. 

As the capabilites and capability bounding set are per user namespace
properties it is safe to allow changing them with just CAP_SETPCAP
permission in the user namespace.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
wifi-calibration
Eric W. Biederman 2013-07-02 10:04:54 -07:00
parent dbef0c1c4c
commit 160da84dbb
1 changed files with 1 additions and 1 deletions
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2
security/commoncap.c
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@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
*/
static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;