1
0
Fork 0

This is the 4.9.84 stable release

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAlqSio0ACgkQONu9yGCS
 aT7v/w/+OTmWpuavTV+sJz34t8UfnYtl7MnJhubkaCpaTryLXUDeWr5XGzjYRQTh
 2OhvqDqoFqrKeKsMSl9x5ZBzA4CUcl5b/Umr8bqMH2iLeVr159qHoqttJ7lMwhX4
 JR0avL4rZZlg/6Vbr8PjwNRn/6KF5UOQnTe4Yfpk89nDojeP5+tIZqhq7d6BFRis
 Bcsb3BZg4UuJZYlJXARoXyPb4kCSEpJ6TPRM5Z1OlqbBLSCecjyqhYzW32Yj3HhT
 FvV4pJLs/YBkD3GQTrWpNPmLIP/4anu+0geCviCV3SVC7UQJI46yzYLZFSaW1kg0
 ol7pNONRGFNxihk4jiKMi5ON3pOMKq3qfY9KDIjGa6R8OIiQLCmC09TFFdzUjCJE
 E9Q4av+KmUsCvrYtgpRTPjo/v2KGJRz8ZTuXdF9QjEIOdOomU4PMNNrXKx014goZ
 r7mlxK3qW9HToBp60AAinRvNRJyFr3QH9gXjLU8fZvTVJ45eQkIwIqm5Q40Nk/IL
 GrpCYkMcFouIYcpnYdurxYcaAeqwA/R4Df5WRHTaOzNXWZ5gsLRkS/muPVOL23cV
 kCmlZytacE6R4TDkXzrEVfnN+n3QJWybyrx8sQbhBkT7NiEuPcqU/iGZe3uWSPS8
 N2CVTW+keaPJijWeAPDqs+JEn6I/ARNq1gzw8tKjKWpEwyBa25g=
 =FVgu
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'v4.9.84' into 4.9-1.0.x-imx-stable-merge

This is the 4.9.84 stable release
steinar/wifi_calib_4_9_kernel
Fabio Estevam 2018-02-26 21:54:02 -03:00
commit 20ebb9fb81
717 changed files with 8776 additions and 3513 deletions

View File

@ -350,3 +350,19 @@ Contact: Linux ARM Kernel Mailing list <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Description: AArch64 CPU registers
'identification' directory exposes the CPU ID registers for
identifying model and revision of the CPU.
What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
The files are named after the code names of CPU
vulnerabilities. The output of those files reflects the
state of the CPUs in the system. Possible output values:
"Not affected" CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
"Vulnerable" CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
"Mitigation: $M" CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect

View File

@ -63,6 +63,6 @@ Example:
interrupts = <0 35 0x4>;
status = "disabled";
dmas = <&dmahost 12 0 1>,
<&dmahost 13 0 1 0>;
<&dmahost 13 1 0>;
dma-names = "rx", "rx";
};

View File

@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ data_err=ignore(*) Just print an error message if an error occurs
data_err=abort Abort the journal if an error occurs in a file
data buffer in ordered mode.
grpid Give objects the same group ID as their creator.
grpid New objects have the group ID of their parent.
bsdgroups
nogrpid (*) New objects have the group ID of their creator.

View File

@ -2691,6 +2691,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
nosmt [KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
Equivalent to smt=1.
nospectre_v2 [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
to spectre_v2=off.
noxsave [BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@ -2763,8 +2768,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
nojitter [IA-64] Disables jitter checking for ITC timers.
nopti [X86-64] Disable KAISER isolation of kernel from user.
no-kvmclock [X86,KVM] Disable paravirtualized KVM clock driver
no-kvmapf [X86,KVM] Disable paravirtualized asynchronous page
@ -2802,8 +2805,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
norandmaps Don't use address space randomization. Equivalent to
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
noreplace-paravirt [X86,IA-64,PV_OPS] Don't patch paravirt_ops
noreplace-smp [X86-32,SMP] Don't replace SMP instructions
with UP alternatives
@ -3327,11 +3328,20 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
pt. [PARIDE]
See Documentation/blockdev/paride.txt.
pti= [X86_64]
Control KAISER user/kernel address space isolation:
on - enable
off - disable
auto - default setting
pti= [X86_64] Control Page Table Isolation of user and
kernel address spaces. Disabling this feature
removes hardening, but improves performance of
system calls and interrupts.
on - unconditionally enable
off - unconditionally disable
auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
vulnerable to issues that PTI mitigates
Not specifying this option is equivalent to pti=auto.
nopti [X86_64]
Equivalent to pti=off
pty.legacy_count=
[KNL] Number of legacy pty's. Overwrites compiled-in
@ -3937,6 +3947,29 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
sonypi.*= [HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver
See Documentation/laptops/sonypi.txt
spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
on - unconditionally enable
off - unconditionally disable
auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
vulnerable
Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
mitigation method at run time according to the
CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
compiler with which the kernel was built.
Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
retpoline - replace indirect branches
retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
retpoline,amd - AMD-specific minimal thunk
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
spia_io_base= [HW,MTD]
spia_fio_base=
spia_pedr=

View File

@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
This document explains potential effects of speculation, and how undesirable
effects can be mitigated portably using common APIs.
===========
Speculation
===========
To improve performance and minimize average latencies, many contemporary CPUs
employ speculative execution techniques such as branch prediction, performing
work which may be discarded at a later stage.
Typically speculative execution cannot be observed from architectural state,
such as the contents of registers. However, in some cases it is possible to
observe its impact on microarchitectural state, such as the presence or
absence of data in caches. Such state may form side-channels which can be
observed to extract secret information.
For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds
checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the
following code:
int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)
{
if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS)
return 0;
else
return array[index];
}
Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as:
CMP <index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS
B.LT less
MOV <returnval>, #0
RET
less:
LDR <returnval>, [<array>, <index>]
RET
It is possible that a CPU mis-predicts the conditional branch, and
speculatively loads array[index], even if index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS. This
value will subsequently be discarded, but the speculated load may affect
microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured.
More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may
result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following
code, building on the prior example:
int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index)
{
int val1, val2,
val1 = load_array(arr1, index);
val2 = load_array(arr2, val1);
return val2;
}
Under speculation, the first call to load_array() may return the value
of an out-of-bounds address, while the second call will influence
microarchitectural state dependent on this value. This may provide an
arbitrary read primitive.
====================================
Mitigating speculation side-channels
====================================
The kernel provides a generic API to ensure that bounds checks are
respected even under speculation. Architectures which are affected by
speculation-based side-channels are expected to implement these
primitives.
The array_index_nospec() helper in <linux/nospec.h> can be used to
prevent information from being leaked via side-channels.
A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index
value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation
conditions.
This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example:
int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)
{
if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS)
return 0;
else {
index = array_index_nospec(index, MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS);
return array[index];
}
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
Overview
========
Page Table Isolation (pti, previously known as KAISER[1]) is a
countermeasure against attacks on the shared user/kernel address
space such as the "Meltdown" approach[2].
To mitigate this class of attacks, we create an independent set of
page tables for use only when running userspace applications. When
the kernel is entered via syscalls, interrupts or exceptions, the
page tables are switched to the full "kernel" copy. When the system
switches back to user mode, the user copy is used again.
The userspace page tables contain only a minimal amount of kernel
data: only what is needed to enter/exit the kernel such as the
entry/exit functions themselves and the interrupt descriptor table
(IDT). There are a few strictly unnecessary things that get mapped
such as the first C function when entering an interrupt (see
comments in pti.c).
This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging
the paging structures do not function when PTI is enabled. It can be
enabled by setting CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile time.
Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with the
'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
Page Table Management
=====================
When PTI is enabled, the kernel manages two sets of page tables.
The first set is very similar to the single set which is present in
kernels without PTI. This includes a complete mapping of userspace
that the kernel can use for things like copy_to_user().
Although _complete_, the user portion of the kernel page tables is
crippled by setting the NX bit in the top level. This ensures
that any missed kernel->user CR3 switch will immediately crash
userspace upon executing its first instruction.
The userspace page tables map only the kernel data needed to enter
and exit the kernel. This data is entirely contained in the 'struct
cpu_entry_area' structure which is placed in the fixmap which gives
each CPU's copy of the area a compile-time-fixed virtual address.
For new userspace mappings, the kernel makes the entries in its
page tables like normal. The only difference is when the kernel
makes entries in the top (PGD) level. In addition to setting the
entry in the main kernel PGD, a copy of the entry is made in the
userspace page tables' PGD.
This sharing at the PGD level also inherently shares all the lower
layers of the page tables. This leaves a single, shared set of
userspace page tables to manage. One PTE to lock, one set of
accessed bits, dirty bits, etc...
Overhead
========
Protection against side-channel attacks is important. But,
this protection comes at a cost:
1. Increased Memory Use
a. Each process now needs an order-1 PGD instead of order-0.
(Consumes an additional 4k per process).
b. The 'cpu_entry_area' structure must be 2MB in size and 2MB
aligned so that it can be mapped by setting a single PMD
entry. This consumes nearly 2MB of RAM once the kernel
is decompressed, but no space in the kernel image itself.
2. Runtime Cost
a. CR3 manipulation to switch between the page table copies
must be done at interrupt, syscall, and exception entry
and exit (it can be skipped when the kernel is interrupted,
though.) Moves to CR3 are on the order of a hundred
cycles, and are required at every entry and exit.
b. A "trampoline" must be used for SYSCALL entry. This
trampoline depends on a smaller set of resources than the
non-PTI SYSCALL entry code, so requires mapping fewer
things into the userspace page tables. The downside is
that stacks must be switched at entry time.
c. Global pages are disabled for all kernel structures not
mapped into both kernel and userspace page tables. This
feature of the MMU allows different processes to share TLB
entries mapping the kernel. Losing the feature means more
TLB misses after a context switch. The actual loss of
performance is very small, however, never exceeding 1%.
d. Process Context IDentifiers (PCID) is a CPU feature that
allows us to skip flushing the entire TLB when switching page
tables by setting a special bit in CR3 when the page tables
are changed. This makes switching the page tables (at context
switch, or kernel entry/exit) cheaper. But, on systems with
PCID support, the context switch code must flush both the user
and kernel entries out of the TLB. The user PCID TLB flush is
deferred until the exit to userspace, minimizing the cost.
See intel.com/sdm for the gory PCID/INVPCID details.
e. The userspace page tables must be populated for each new
process. Even without PTI, the shared kernel mappings
are created by copying top-level (PGD) entries into each
new process. But, with PTI, there are now *two* kernel
mappings: one in the kernel page tables that maps everything
and one for the entry/exit structures. At fork(), we need to
copy both.
f. In addition to the fork()-time copying, there must also
be an update to the userspace PGD any time a set_pgd() is done
on a PGD used to map userspace. This ensures that the kernel
and userspace copies always map the same userspace
memory.
g. On systems without PCID support, each CR3 write flushes
the entire TLB. That means that each syscall, interrupt
or exception flushes the TLB.
h. INVPCID is a TLB-flushing instruction which allows flushing
of TLB entries for non-current PCIDs. Some systems support
PCIDs, but do not support INVPCID. On these systems, addresses
can only be flushed from the TLB for the current PCID. When
flushing a kernel address, we need to flush all PCIDs, so a
single kernel address flush will require a TLB-flushing CR3
write upon the next use of every PCID.
Possible Future Work
====================
1. We can be more careful about not actually writing to CR3
unless its value is actually changed.
2. Allow PTI to be enabled/disabled at runtime in addition to the
boot-time switching.
Testing
========
To test stability of PTI, the following test procedure is recommended,
ideally doing all of these in parallel:
1. Set CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY=y
2. Run several copies of all of the tools/testing/selftests/x86/ tests
(excluding MPX and protection_keys) in a loop on multiple CPUs for
several minutes. These tests frequently uncover corner cases in the
kernel entry code. In general, old kernels might cause these tests
themselves to crash, but they should never crash the kernel.
3. Run the 'perf' tool in a mode (top or record) that generates many
frequent performance monitoring non-maskable interrupts (see "NMI"
in /proc/interrupts). This exercises the NMI entry/exit code which
is known to trigger bugs in code paths that did not expect to be
interrupted, including nested NMIs. Using "-c" boosts the rate of
NMIs, and using two -c with separate counters encourages nested NMIs
and less deterministic behavior.
while true; do perf record -c 10000 -e instructions,cycles -a sleep 10; done
4. Launch a KVM virtual machine.
5. Run 32-bit binaries on systems supporting the SYSCALL instruction.
This has been a lightly-tested code path and needs extra scrutiny.
Debugging
=========
Bugs in PTI cause a few different signatures of crashes
that are worth noting here.
* Failures of the selftests/x86 code. Usually a bug in one of the
more obscure corners of entry_64.S
* Crashes in early boot, especially around CPU bringup. Bugs
in the trampoline code or mappings cause these.
* Crashes at the first interrupt. Caused by bugs in entry_64.S,
like screwing up a page table switch. Also caused by
incorrectly mapping the IRQ handler entry code.
* Crashes at the first NMI. The NMI code is separate from main
interrupt handlers and can have bugs that do not affect
normal interrupts. Also caused by incorrectly mapping NMI
code. NMIs that interrupt the entry code must be very
careful and can be the cause of crashes that show up when
running perf.
* Kernel crashes at the first exit to userspace. entry_64.S
bugs, or failing to map some of the exit code.
* Crashes at first interrupt that interrupts userspace. The paths
in entry_64.S that return to userspace are sometimes separate
from the ones that return to the kernel.
* Double faults: overflowing the kernel stack because of page
faults upon page faults. Caused by touching non-pti-mapped
data in the entry code, or forgetting to switch to kernel
CR3 before calling into C functions which are not pti-mapped.
* Userspace segfaults early in boot, sometimes manifesting
as mount(8) failing to mount the rootfs. These have
tended to be TLB invalidation issues. Usually invalidating
the wrong PCID, or otherwise missing an invalidation.
1. https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf
2. https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 9
SUBLEVEL = 76
SUBLEVEL = 84
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Roaring Lionus
@ -87,10 +87,12 @@ endif
ifneq ($(filter 4.%,$(MAKE_VERSION)),) # make-4
ifneq ($(filter %s ,$(firstword x$(MAKEFLAGS))),)
quiet=silent_
tools_silent=s
endif
else # make-3.8x
ifneq ($(filter s% -s%,$(MAKEFLAGS)),)
quiet=silent_
tools_silent=-s
endif
endif
@ -1614,11 +1616,11 @@ image_name:
# Clear a bunch of variables before executing the submake
tools/: FORCE
$(Q)mkdir -p $(objtree)/tools
$(Q)$(MAKE) LDFLAGS= MAKEFLAGS="$(filter --j% -j,$(MAKEFLAGS))" O=$(shell cd $(objtree) && /bin/pwd) subdir=tools -C $(src)/tools/
$(Q)$(MAKE) LDFLAGS= MAKEFLAGS="$(tools_silent) $(filter --j% -j,$(MAKEFLAGS))" O=$(shell cd $(objtree) && /bin/pwd) subdir=tools -C $(src)/tools/
tools/%: FORCE
$(Q)mkdir -p $(objtree)/tools
$(Q)$(MAKE) LDFLAGS= MAKEFLAGS="$(filter --j% -j,$(MAKEFLAGS))" O=$(shell cd $(objtree) && /bin/pwd) subdir=tools -C $(src)/tools/ $*
$(Q)$(MAKE) LDFLAGS= MAKEFLAGS="$(tools_silent) $(filter --j% -j,$(MAKEFLAGS))" O=$(shell cd $(objtree) && /bin/pwd) subdir=tools -C $(src)/tools/ $*
# Single targets
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

View File

@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ struct pci_iommu_arena
};
#if defined(CONFIG_ALPHA_SRM) && \
(defined(CONFIG_ALPHA_CIA) || defined(CONFIG_ALPHA_LCA))
(defined(CONFIG_ALPHA_CIA) || defined(CONFIG_ALPHA_LCA) || \
defined(CONFIG_ALPHA_AVANTI))
# define NEED_SRM_SAVE_RESTORE
#else
# undef NEED_SRM_SAVE_RESTORE

View File

@ -265,12 +265,13 @@ copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long usp,
application calling fork. */
if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
childti->pcb.unique = regs->r20;
else
regs->r20 = 0; /* OSF/1 has some strange fork() semantics. */
childti->pcb.usp = usp ?: rdusp();
*childregs = *regs;
childregs->r0 = 0;
childregs->r19 = 0;
childregs->r20 = 1; /* OSF/1 has some strange fork() semantics. */
regs->r20 = 0;
stack = ((struct switch_stack *) regs) - 1;
*childstack = *stack;
childstack->r26 = (unsigned long) ret_from_fork;

View File

@ -158,11 +158,16 @@ void show_stack(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *sp)
for(i=0; i < kstack_depth_to_print; i++) {
if (((long) stack & (THREAD_SIZE-1)) == 0)
break;
if (i && ((i % 4) == 0))
printk("\n ");
printk("%016lx ", *stack++);
if ((i % 4) == 0) {
if (i)
pr_cont("\n");
printk(" ");
} else {
pr_cont(" ");
}
pr_cont("%016lx", *stack++);
}
printk("\n");
pr_cont("\n");
dik_show_trace(sp);
}

View File

@ -926,7 +926,8 @@
reg = <0x48038000 0x2000>,
<0x46000000 0x400000>;
reg-names = "mpu", "dat";
interrupts = <80>, <81>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 80 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 81 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
interrupt-names = "tx", "rx";
status = "disabled";
dmas = <&edma 8 2>,
@ -940,7 +941,8 @@
reg = <0x4803C000 0x2000>,
<0x46400000 0x400000>;
reg-names = "mpu", "dat";
interrupts = <82>, <83>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 82 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 83 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
interrupt-names = "tx", "rx";
status = "disabled";
dmas = <&edma 10 2>,

View File

@ -301,8 +301,8 @@
status = "okay";
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&spi0_pins>;
dmas = <&edma 16
&edma 17>;
dmas = <&edma 16 0
&edma 17 0>;
dma-names = "tx0", "rx0";
flash: w25q64cvzpig@0 {

View File

@ -150,11 +150,6 @@
interrupts = <0 8 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
};
&charlcd {
interrupt-parent = <&intc>;
interrupts = <0 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
};
&serial0 {
interrupt-parent = <&intc>;
interrupts = <0 4 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;

View File

@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
timer@20200 {
compatible = "arm,cortex-a9-global-timer";
reg = <0x20200 0x100>;
interrupts = <GIC_PPI 11 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
interrupts = <GIC_PPI 11 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>;
clocks = <&periph_clk>;
};
@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
compatible = "arm,cortex-a9-twd-timer";
reg = <0x20600 0x20>;
interrupts = <GIC_PPI 13 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) |
IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>;
IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING)>;
clocks = <&periph_clk>;
};

View File

@ -274,7 +274,6 @@
&rtc {
clocks = <&clock CLK_RTC>;
clock-names = "rtc";
interrupt-parent = <&pmu_system_controller>;
status = "disabled";
};

View File

@ -53,7 +53,8 @@
};
pinctrl: pin-controller@10000 {
pinctrl-0 = <&pmx_dip_switches &pmx_gpio_header>;
pinctrl-0 = <&pmx_dip_switches &pmx_gpio_header
&pmx_gpio_header_gpo>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pmx_uart0: pmx-uart0 {
@ -85,11 +86,16 @@
* ground.
*/
pmx_gpio_header: pmx-gpio-header {
marvell,pins = "mpp17", "mpp7", "mpp29", "mpp28",
marvell,pins = "mpp17", "mpp29", "mpp28",
"mpp35", "mpp34", "mpp40";
marvell,function = "gpio";
};
pmx_gpio_header_gpo: pxm-gpio-header-gpo {
marvell,pins = "mpp7";
marvell,function = "gpo";
};
pmx_gpio_init: pmx-init {
marvell,pins = "mpp38";
marvell,function = "gpio";

View File

@ -72,7 +72,8 @@
};
&gpmc {
ranges = <1 0 0x08000000 0x1000000>; /* CS1: 16MB for LAN9221 */
ranges = <0 0 0x30000000 0x1000000 /* CS0: 16MB for NAND */
1 0 0x2c000000 0x1000000>; /* CS1: 16MB for LAN9221 */
ethernet@gpmc {
pinctrl-names = "default";

View File

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
};
&gpmc {
ranges = <0 0 0x00000000 0x1000000>; /* CS0: 16MB for NAND */
ranges = <0 0 0x30000000 0x1000000>; /* CS0: 16MB for NAND */
nand@0,0 {
compatible = "ti,omap2-nand";
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
&mmc3 {
interrupts-extended = <&intc 94 &omap3_pmx_core2 0x46>;
pinctrl-0 = <&mmc3_pins>;
pinctrl-0 = <&mmc3_pins &wl127x_gpio>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
vmmc-supply = <&wl12xx_vmmc>;
non-removable;
@ -132,8 +132,8 @@
wlcore: wlcore@2 {
compatible = "ti,wl1273";
reg = <2>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio5>;
interrupts = <24 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; /* gpio 152 */
interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
interrupts = <2 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; /* gpio 2 */
ref-clock-frequency = <26000000>;
};
};
@ -157,8 +157,6 @@
OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x2166, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP | MUX_MODE3) /* sdmmc2_dat5.sdmmc3_dat1 */
OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x2168, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP | MUX_MODE3) /* sdmmc2_dat6.sdmmc3_dat2 */
OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x216a, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP | MUX_MODE3) /* sdmmc2_dat6.sdmmc3_dat3 */
OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x2184, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP | MUX_MODE4) /* mcbsp4_clkx.gpio_152 */
OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x2a0c, PIN_OUTPUT | MUX_MODE4) /* sys_boot1.gpio_3 */
OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x21d0, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP | MUX_MODE3) /* mcspi1_cs1.sdmmc3_cmd */
OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x21d2, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP | MUX_MODE3) /* mcspi1_cs2.sdmmc_clk */
>;
@ -228,6 +226,12 @@
OMAP3_WKUP_IOPAD(0x2a0e, PIN_OUTPUT | MUX_MODE4) /* sys_boot2.gpio_4 */
>;
};
wl127x_gpio: pinmux_wl127x_gpio_pin {
pinctrl-single,pins = <
OMAP3_WKUP_IOPAD(0x2a0c, PIN_INPUT | MUX_MODE4) /* sys_boot0.gpio_2 */
OMAP3_WKUP_IOPAD(0x2a0c, PIN_OUTPUT | MUX_MODE4) /* sys_boot1.gpio_3 */
>;
};
};
&omap3_pmx_core2 {

View File

@ -156,8 +156,8 @@
uda1380: uda1380@18 {
compatible = "nxp,uda1380";
reg = <0x18>;
power-gpio = <&gpio 0x59 0>;
reset-gpio = <&gpio 0x51 0>;
power-gpio = <&gpio 3 10 0>;
reset-gpio = <&gpio 3 2 0>;
dac-clk = "wspll";
};

View File

@ -81,8 +81,8 @@
uda1380: uda1380@18 {
compatible = "nxp,uda1380";
reg = <0x18>;
power-gpio = <&gpio 0x59 0>;
reset-gpio = <&gpio 0x51 0>;
power-gpio = <&gpio 3 10 0>;
reset-gpio = <&gpio 3 2 0>;
dac-clk = "wspll";
};

View File

@ -197,12 +197,14 @@
compatible = "mediatek,mt2701-hifsys", "syscon";
reg = <0 0x1a000000 0 0x1000>;
#clock-cells = <1>;
#reset-cells = <1>;
};
ethsys: syscon@1b000000 {
compatible = "mediatek,mt2701-ethsys", "syscon";
reg = <0 0x1b000000 0 0x1000>;
#clock-cells = <1>;
#reset-cells = <1>;
};
bdpsys: syscon@1c000000 {

View File

@ -352,7 +352,7 @@
elm: elm@48078000 {
compatible = "ti,am3352-elm";
reg = <0x48078000 0x2000>;
interrupts = <4>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 4 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
ti,hwmods = "elm";
status = "disabled";
};
@ -859,14 +859,12 @@
usbhsohci: ohci@4a064800 {
compatible = "ti,ohci-omap3";
reg = <0x4a064800 0x400>;
interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 76 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
};
usbhsehci: ehci@4a064c00 {
compatible = "ti,ehci-omap";
reg = <0x4a064c00 0x400>;
interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 77 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
};
};

View File

@ -463,6 +463,7 @@
compatible = "samsung,exynos4210-ohci";
reg = <0xec300000 0x100>;
interrupts = <23>;
interrupt-parent = <&vic1>;
clocks = <&clocks CLK_USB_HOST>;
clock-names = "usbhost";
#address-cells = <1>;

View File

@ -349,7 +349,7 @@
spi0: spi@e0100000 {
status = "okay";
num-cs = <3>;
cs-gpios = <&gpio1 7 0>, <&spics 0>, <&spics 1>;
cs-gpios = <&gpio1 7 0>, <&spics 0 0>, <&spics 1 0>;
stmpe610@0 {
compatible = "st,stmpe610";

View File

@ -141,8 +141,8 @@
reg = <0xb4100000 0x1000>;
interrupts = <0 105 0x4>;
status = "disabled";
dmas = <&dwdma0 0x600 0 0 1>, /* 0xC << 11 */
<&dwdma0 0x680 0 1 0>; /* 0xD << 7 */
dmas = <&dwdma0 12 0 1>,
<&dwdma0 13 1 0>;
dma-names = "tx", "rx";
};

View File

@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
reg = <0xb2800000 0x1000>;
interrupts = <0 29 0x4>;
status = "disabled";
dmas = <&dwdma0 0 0 0 0>;
dmas = <&dwdma0 0 0 0>;
dma-names = "data";
};
@ -288,8 +288,8 @@
#size-cells = <0>;
interrupts = <0 31 0x4>;
status = "disabled";
dmas = <&dwdma0 0x2000 0 0 0>, /* 0x4 << 11 */
<&dwdma0 0x0280 0 0 0>; /* 0x5 << 7 */
dmas = <&dwdma0 4 0 0>,
<&dwdma0 5 0 0>;
dma-names = "tx", "rx";
};

View File

@ -194,6 +194,7 @@
rtc@fc900000 {
compatible = "st,spear600-rtc";
reg = <0xfc900000 0x1000>;
interrupt-parent = <&vic0>;
interrupts = <10>;
status = "disabled";
};

View File

@ -749,6 +749,7 @@
reg = <0x10120000 0x1000>;
interrupt-names = "combined";
interrupts = <14>;
interrupt-parent = <&vica>;
clocks = <&clcdclk>, <&hclkclcd>;
clock-names = "clcdclk", "apb_pclk";
status = "disabled";

View File

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
*/
#include "stih407-clock.dtsi"
#include "stih407-family.dtsi"
#include <dt-bindings/gpio/gpio.h>
/ {
soc {
sti-display-subsystem {
@ -122,7 +123,7 @@
<&clk_s_d2_quadfs 0>,
<&clk_s_d2_quadfs 1>;
hdmi,hpd-gpio = <&pio5 3>;
hdmi,hpd-gpio = <&pio5 3 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
reset-names = "hdmi";
resets = <&softreset STIH407_HDMI_TX_PHY_SOFTRESET>;
ddc = <&hdmiddc>;

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include "stih410-clock.dtsi"
#include "stih407-family.dtsi"
#include "stih410-pinctrl.dtsi"
#include <dt-bindings/gpio/gpio.h>
/ {
aliases {
bdisp0 = &bdisp0;
@ -213,7 +214,7 @@
<&clk_s_d2_quadfs 0>,
<&clk_s_d2_quadfs 1>;
hdmi,hpd-gpio = <&pio5 3>;
hdmi,hpd-gpio = <&pio5 3 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
reset-names = "hdmi";
resets = <&softreset STIH407_HDMI_TX_PHY_SOFTRESET>;
ddc = <&hdmiddc>;

View File

@ -57,3 +57,7 @@ static struct miscdevice bL_switcher_device = {
&bL_switcher_fops
};
module_misc_device(bL_switcher_device);
MODULE_AUTHOR("Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("big.LITTLE switcher dummy user interface");

View File

@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ CONFIG_SMP=y
CONFIG_NR_CPUS=8
CONFIG_AEABI=y
CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y
CONFIG_CMA=y
CONFIG_ARM_APPENDED_DTB=y
CONFIG_ARM_ATAG_DTB_COMPAT=y
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ=y
@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ CONFIG_CAN_SUN4I=y
# CONFIG_WIRELESS is not set
CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT=y
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SD=y
CONFIG_ATA=y
CONFIG_AHCI_SUNXI=y

View File

@ -1165,6 +1165,7 @@ static int hyp_init_cpu_pm_notifier(struct notifier_block *self,
cpu_hyp_reset();
return NOTIFY_OK;
case CPU_PM_ENTER_FAILED:
case CPU_PM_EXIT:
if (__this_cpu_read(kvm_arm_hardware_enabled))
/* The hardware was enabled before suspend. */

View File

@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static int handle_hvc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
ret = kvm_psci_call(vcpu);
if (ret < 0) {
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, 0, ~0UL);
return 1;
}
@ -47,7 +47,16 @@ static int handle_hvc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
static int handle_smc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
{
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
/*
* "If an SMC instruction executed at Non-secure EL1 is
* trapped to EL2 because HCR_EL2.TSC is 1, the exception is a
* Trap exception, not a Secure Monitor Call exception [...]"
*
* We need to advance the PC after the trap, as it would
* otherwise return to the same address...
*/
vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, 0, ~0UL);
kvm_skip_instr(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_trap_il_is32bit(vcpu));
return 1;
}

View File

@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int kvm_handle_mmio_return(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
}
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, len, run->mmio.phys_addr,
data);
&data);
data = vcpu_data_host_to_guest(vcpu, data, len);
vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmio_decode.rt, data);
}
@ -182,14 +182,14 @@ int io_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run,
data = vcpu_data_guest_to_host(vcpu, vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, rt),
len);
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, len, fault_ipa, data);
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, len, fault_ipa, &data);
kvm_mmio_write_buf(data_buf, len, data);
ret = kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, fault_ipa, len,
data_buf);
} else {
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, len,
fault_ipa, 0);
fault_ipa, NULL);
ret = kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, fault_ipa, len,
data_buf);

View File

@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
return -EFAULT;
}
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) && !logging_active) {
if (vma_kernel_pagesize(vma) && !logging_active) {
hugetlb = true;
gfn = (fault_ipa & PMD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
} else {

View File

@ -73,6 +73,25 @@ phys_addr_t omap_secure_ram_mempool_base(void)
return omap_secure_memblock_base;
}
u32 omap3_save_secure_ram(void __iomem *addr, int size)
{
u32 ret;
u32 param[5];
if (size != OMAP3_SAVE_SECURE_RAM_SZ)
return OMAP3_SAVE_SECURE_RAM_SZ;
param[0] = 4; /* Number of arguments */
param[1] = __pa(addr); /* Physical address for saving */
param[2] = 0;
param[3] = 1;
param[4] = 1;
ret = save_secure_ram_context(__pa(param));
return ret;
}
/**
* rx51_secure_dispatcher: Routine to dispatch secure PPA API calls
* @idx: The PPA API index

View File

@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
/* Maximum Secure memory storage size */
#define OMAP_SECURE_RAM_STORAGE (88 * SZ_1K)
#define OMAP3_SAVE_SECURE_RAM_SZ 0x803F
/* Secure low power HAL API index */
#define OMAP4_HAL_SAVESECURERAM_INDEX 0x1a
#define OMAP4_HAL_SAVEHW_INDEX 0x1b
@ -65,6 +67,8 @@ extern u32 omap_smc2(u32 id, u32 falg, u32 pargs);
extern u32 omap_smc3(u32 id, u32 process, u32 flag, u32 pargs);
extern phys_addr_t omap_secure_ram_mempool_base(void);
extern int omap_secure_ram_reserve_memblock(void);
extern u32 save_secure_ram_context(u32 args_pa);
extern u32 omap3_save_secure_ram(void __iomem *save_regs, int size);
extern u32 rx51_secure_dispatcher(u32 idx, u32 process, u32 flag, u32 nargs,
u32 arg1, u32 arg2, u32 arg3, u32 arg4);

View File

@ -81,10 +81,6 @@ extern unsigned int omap3_do_wfi_sz;
/* ... and its pointer from SRAM after copy */
extern void (*omap3_do_wfi_sram)(void);
/* save_secure_ram_context function pointer and size, for copy to SRAM */
extern int save_secure_ram_context(u32 *addr);
extern unsigned int save_secure_ram_context_sz;
extern void omap3_save_scratchpad_contents(void);
#define PM_RTA_ERRATUM_i608 (1 << 0)

View File

@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
#include "prm3xxx.h"
#include "pm.h"
#include "sdrc.h"
#include "omap-secure.h"
#include "sram.h"
#include "control.h"
#include "vc.h"
@ -66,7 +67,6 @@ struct power_state {
static LIST_HEAD(pwrst_list);
static int (*_omap_save_secure_sram)(u32 *addr);
void (*omap3_do_wfi_sram)(void);
static struct powerdomain *mpu_pwrdm, *neon_pwrdm;
@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ static void omap3_save_secure_ram_context(void)
* will hang the system.
*/
pwrdm_set_next_pwrst(mpu_pwrdm, PWRDM_POWER_ON);
ret = _omap_save_secure_sram((u32 *)(unsigned long)
__pa(omap3_secure_ram_storage));
ret = omap3_save_secure_ram(omap3_secure_ram_storage,
OMAP3_SAVE_SECURE_RAM_SZ);
pwrdm_set_next_pwrst(mpu_pwrdm, mpu_next_state);
/* Following is for error tracking, it should not happen */
if (ret) {
@ -434,15 +434,10 @@ static int __init pwrdms_setup(struct powerdomain *pwrdm, void *unused)
*
* The minimum set of functions is pushed to SRAM for execution:
* - omap3_do_wfi for erratum i581 WA,
* - save_secure_ram_context for security extensions.
*/
void omap_push_sram_idle(void)
{
omap3_do_wfi_sram = omap_sram_push(omap3_do_wfi, omap3_do_wfi_sz);
if (omap_type() != OMAP2_DEVICE_TYPE_GP)
_omap_save_secure_sram = omap_sram_push(save_secure_ram_context,
save_secure_ram_context_sz);
}
static void __init pm_errata_configure(void)
@ -554,7 +549,7 @@ int __init omap3_pm_init(void)
clkdm_add_wkdep(neon_clkdm, mpu_clkdm);
if (omap_type() != OMAP2_DEVICE_TYPE_GP) {
omap3_secure_ram_storage =
kmalloc(0x803F, GFP_KERNEL);
kmalloc(OMAP3_SAVE_SECURE_RAM_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!omap3_secure_ram_storage)
pr_err("Memory allocation failed when allocating for secure sram context\n");

View File

@ -176,17 +176,6 @@ static int am33xx_pwrdm_read_pwrst(struct powerdomain *pwrdm)
return v;
}
static int am33xx_pwrdm_read_prev_pwrst(struct powerdomain *pwrdm)
{
u32 v;
v = am33xx_prm_read_reg(pwrdm->prcm_offs, pwrdm->pwrstst_offs);
v &= AM33XX_LASTPOWERSTATEENTERED_MASK;
v >>= AM33XX_LASTPOWERSTATEENTERED_SHIFT;
return v;
}
static int am33xx_pwrdm_set_lowpwrstchange(struct powerdomain *pwrdm)
{
am33xx_prm_rmw_reg_bits(AM33XX_LOWPOWERSTATECHANGE_MASK,
@ -357,7 +346,6 @@ struct pwrdm_ops am33xx_pwrdm_operations = {
.pwrdm_set_next_pwrst = am33xx_pwrdm_set_next_pwrst,
.pwrdm_read_next_pwrst = am33xx_pwrdm_read_next_pwrst,
.pwrdm_read_pwrst = am33xx_pwrdm_read_pwrst,
.pwrdm_read_prev_pwrst = am33xx_pwrdm_read_prev_pwrst,
.pwrdm_set_logic_retst = am33xx_pwrdm_set_logic_retst,
.pwrdm_read_logic_pwrst = am33xx_pwrdm_read_logic_pwrst,
.pwrdm_read_logic_retst = am33xx_pwrdm_read_logic_retst,

View File

@ -93,20 +93,13 @@ ENTRY(enable_omap3630_toggle_l2_on_restore)
ENDPROC(enable_omap3630_toggle_l2_on_restore)
/*
* Function to call rom code to save secure ram context. This gets
* relocated to SRAM, so it can be all in .data section. Otherwise
* we need to initialize api_params separately.
* Function to call rom code to save secure ram context.
*
* r0 = physical address of the parameters
*/
.data
.align 3
ENTRY(save_secure_ram_context)
stmfd sp!, {r4 - r11, lr} @ save registers on stack
adr r3, api_params @ r3 points to parameters
str r0, [r3,#0x4] @ r0 has sdram address
ldr r12, high_mask
and r3, r3, r12
ldr r12, sram_phy_addr_mask
orr r3, r3, r12
mov r3, r0 @ physical address of parameters
mov r0, #25 @ set service ID for PPA
mov r12, r0 @ copy secure service ID in r12
mov r1, #0 @ set task id for ROM code in r1
@ -120,18 +113,7 @@ ENTRY(save_secure_ram_context)
nop
nop
ldmfd sp!, {r4 - r11, pc}
.align
sram_phy_addr_mask:
.word SRAM_BASE_P
high_mask:
.word 0xffff
api_params:
.word 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x1
ENDPROC(save_secure_ram_context)
ENTRY(save_secure_ram_context_sz)
.word . - save_secure_ram_context
.text
/*
* ======================

View File

@ -132,3 +132,7 @@ static struct platform_driver tosa_bt_driver = {
},
};
module_platform_driver(tosa_bt_driver);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Dmitry Baryshkov");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Bluetooth built-in chip control");

View File

@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ source "fs/Kconfig.binfmt"
config COMPAT
bool "Kernel support for 32-bit EL0"
depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES || EXPERT
select COMPAT_BINFMT_ELF
select COMPAT_BINFMT_ELF if BINFMT_ELF
select HAVE_UID16
select OLD_SIGSUSPEND3
select COMPAT_OLD_SIGACTION

View File

@ -2,9 +2,11 @@ menu "Platform selection"
config ARCH_SUNXI
bool "Allwinner sunxi 64-bit SoC Family"
select ARCH_HAS_RESET_CONTROLLER
select GENERIC_IRQ_CHIP
select PINCTRL
select PINCTRL_SUN50I_A64
select RESET_CONTROLLER
help
This enables support for Allwinner sunxi based SoCs like the A64.

View File

@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
reg = <0x000>;
enable-method = "psci";
cpu-idle-states = <&CPU_SLEEP_0>;
#cooling-cells = <2>;
};
cpu1: cpu@1 {
@ -89,6 +90,7 @@
reg = <0x100>;
enable-method = "psci";
cpu-idle-states = <&CPU_SLEEP_0>;
#cooling-cells = <2>;
};
cpu3: cpu@101 {

View File

@ -796,6 +796,7 @@
"dsi_phy_regulator";
#clock-cells = <1>;
#phy-cells = <0>;
clocks = <&gcc GCC_MDSS_AHB_CLK>;
clock-names = "iface_clk";
@ -906,8 +907,8 @@
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
qcom,ipc-1 = <&apcs 0 13>;
qcom,ipc-6 = <&apcs 0 19>;
qcom,ipc-1 = <&apcs 8 13>;
qcom,ipc-3 = <&apcs 8 19>;
apps_smsm: apps@0 {
reg = <0>;

View File

@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ static struct shash_alg crc32_alg = {
.cra_name = "crc32",
.cra_driver_name = "crc32-arm64-hw",
.cra_priority = 300,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.cra_blocksize = CHKSUM_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_alignmask = 0,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chksum_ctx),
@ -253,6 +254,7 @@ static struct shash_alg crc32c_alg = {
.cra_name = "crc32c",
.cra_driver_name = "crc32c-arm64-hw",
.cra_priority = 300,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.cra_blocksize = CHKSUM_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_alignmask = 0,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chksum_ctx),

View File

@ -20,9 +20,6 @@
#include <asm/brk-imm.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG
#define HAVE_ARCH_BUG
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
#define _BUGVERBOSE_LOCATION(file, line) __BUGVERBOSE_LOCATION(file, line)
#define __BUGVERBOSE_LOCATION(file, line) \
@ -36,28 +33,36 @@
#define _BUGVERBOSE_LOCATION(file, line)
#endif
#define _BUG_FLAGS(flags) __BUG_FLAGS(flags)
#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG
#define __BUG_FLAGS(flags) asm volatile ( \
#define __BUG_ENTRY(flags) \
".pushsection __bug_table,\"a\"\n\t" \
".align 2\n\t" \
"0: .long 1f - 0b\n\t" \
_BUGVERBOSE_LOCATION(__FILE__, __LINE__) \
".short " #flags "\n\t" \
".popsection\n" \
\
"1: brk %[imm]" \
:: [imm] "i" (BUG_BRK_IMM) \
)
"1: "
#else
#define __BUG_ENTRY(flags) ""
#endif
#define BUG() do { \
_BUG_FLAGS(0); \
unreachable(); \
#define __BUG_FLAGS(flags) \
asm volatile ( \
__BUG_ENTRY(flags) \
"brk %[imm]" :: [imm] "i" (BUG_BRK_IMM) \
);
#define BUG() do { \
__BUG_FLAGS(0); \
unreachable(); \
} while (0)
#define __WARN_TAINT(taint) _BUG_FLAGS(BUGFLAG_TAINT(taint))
#define __WARN_TAINT(taint) \
__BUG_FLAGS(BUGFLAG_TAINT(taint))
#endif /* ! CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
#define HAVE_ARCH_BUG
#include <asm-generic/bug.h>

View File

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int handle_hvc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
ret = kvm_psci_call(vcpu);
if (ret < 0) {
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, 0, ~0UL);
return 1;
}
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static int handle_hvc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
static int handle_smc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
{
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, 0, ~0UL);
return 1;
}

View File

@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ void __init paging_init(void)
* To do this we need to go via a temporary pgd.
*/
cpu_replace_ttbr1(__va(pgd_phys));
memcpy(swapper_pg_dir, pgd, PAGE_SIZE);
memcpy(swapper_pg_dir, pgd, PGD_SIZE);
cpu_replace_ttbr1(swapper_pg_dir);
pgd_clear_fixmap();

View File

@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ SECTIONS {
.text : {
HEAD_TEXT
TEXT_TEXT
IRQENTRY_TEXT
SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
SCHED_TEXT
CPUIDLE_TEXT
LOCK_TEXT

View File

@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ SECTIONS
.text : {
HEAD_TEXT
TEXT_TEXT
IRQENTRY_TEXT
SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
SCHED_TEXT
CPUIDLE_TEXT
LOCK_TEXT

View File

@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ SECTIONS
.text : {
HEAD_TEXT
TEXT_TEXT
IRQENTRY_TEXT
SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
SCHED_TEXT
CPUIDLE_TEXT
LOCK_TEXT

View File

@ -112,12 +112,12 @@ config MIPS_GENERIC
select SYS_SUPPORTS_MULTITHREADING
select SYS_SUPPORTS_RELOCATABLE
select SYS_SUPPORTS_SMARTMIPS
select USB_EHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_DESC if BIG_ENDIAN
select USB_EHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_MMIO if BIG_ENDIAN
select USB_OHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_DESC if BIG_ENDIAN
select USB_OHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_MMIO if BIG_ENDIAN
select USB_UHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_DESC if BIG_ENDIAN
select USB_UHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_MMIO if BIG_ENDIAN
select USB_EHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_DESC if CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
select USB_EHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_MMIO if CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
select USB_OHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_DESC if CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
select USB_OHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_MMIO if CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
select USB_UHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_DESC if CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
select USB_UHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_MMIO if CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
select USE_OF
help
Select this to build a kernel which aims to support multiple boards,

View File

@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static int __init ar7_register_uarts(void)
uart_port.type = PORT_AR7;
uart_port.uartclk = clk_get_rate(bus_clk) / 2;
uart_port.iotype = UPIO_MEM32;
uart_port.flags = UPF_FIXED_TYPE;
uart_port.flags = UPF_FIXED_TYPE | UPF_BOOT_AUTOCONF;
uart_port.regshift = 2;
uart_port.line = 0;

View File

@ -683,6 +683,18 @@ int mips_set_process_fp_mode(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int value)
struct task_struct *t;
int max_users;
/* If nothing to change, return right away, successfully. */
if (value == mips_get_process_fp_mode(task))
return 0;
/* Only accept a mode change if 64-bit FP enabled for o32. */
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MIPS_O32_FP64_SUPPORT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* And only for o32 tasks. */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && !test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT_REGS))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Check the value is valid */
if (value & ~known_bits)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;

View File

@ -439,25 +439,38 @@ static int gpr64_set(struct task_struct *target,
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
/*
* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
* !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. FP context's general register slots
* correspond 1:1 to buffer slots. Only general registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_get_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
void **kbuf, void __user **ubuf)
{
unsigned i;
int err;
return user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&target->thread.fpu,
0, NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
}
/*
* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
* CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Only lower 64 bits of FP context's
* general register slots are copied to buffer slots. Only general
* registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
void **kbuf, void __user **ubuf)
{
unsigned int i;
u64 fpr_val;
int err;
/* XXX fcr31 */
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
return user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.fpu,
0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS; i++) {
fpr_val = get_fpr64(&target->thread.fpu.fpr[i], 0);
err = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
err = user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
(i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
if (err)
@ -467,27 +480,64 @@ static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
return 0;
}
static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
/*
* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer.
* Choose the appropriate helper for general registers, and then copy
* the FCSR register separately.
*/
static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
unsigned i;
const int fcr31_pos = NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t);
int err;
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
err = fpr_get_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
else
err = fpr_get_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
if (err)
return err;
err = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.fpu.fcr31,
fcr31_pos, fcr31_pos + sizeof(u32));
return err;
}
/*
* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
* !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots correspond 1:1 to FP
* context's general register slots. Only general registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_set_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
const void **kbuf, const void __user **ubuf)
{
return user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&target->thread.fpu,
0, NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
}
/*
* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
* CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots are copied to lower 64
* bits only of FP context's general register slots. Only general
* registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
const void **kbuf, const void __user **ubuf)
{
unsigned int i;
u64 fpr_val;
/* XXX fcr31 */
init_fp_ctx(target);
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.fpu,
0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
int err;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
err = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count > 0; i++) {
err = user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
(i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
if (err)
@ -498,6 +548,53 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
return 0;
}
/*
* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context.
* Choose the appropriate helper for general registers, and then copy
* the FCSR register separately.
*
* We optimize for the case where `count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t) == 0',
* which is supposed to have been guaranteed by the kernel before
* calling us, e.g. in `ptrace_regset'. We enforce that requirement,
* so that we can safely avoid preinitializing temporaries for
* partial register writes.
*/
static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
const int fcr31_pos = NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t);
u32 fcr31;
int err;
BUG_ON(count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
if (pos + count > sizeof(elf_fpregset_t))
return -EIO;
init_fp_ctx(target);
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
err = fpr_set_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
else
err = fpr_set_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
if (err)
return err;
if (count > 0) {
err = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&fcr31,
fcr31_pos, fcr31_pos + sizeof(u32));
if (err)
return err;
ptrace_setfcr31(target, fcr31);
}
return err;
}
enum mips_regset {
REGSET_GPR,
REGSET_FPR,

View File

@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ transfer_failed:
info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = 0;
info.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
info.si_addr = (void *) regs->pc;
force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, current);
return;

View File

@ -302,12 +302,12 @@ asmlinkage void do_unaligned_access(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
siginfo_t info;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
/* Send a SIGSEGV */
info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
/* Send a SIGBUS */
info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
info.si_errno = 0;
/* info.si_code has been set above */
info.si_addr = (void *)address;
force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, current);
info.si_code = BUS_ADRALN;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)address;
force_sig_info(SIGBUS, &info, current);
} else {
printk("KERNEL: Unaligned Access 0x%.8lx\n", address);
show_registers(regs);

View File

@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ config PPC
select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE
select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES if PPC_BOOK3S_64
select GENERIC_TIME_VSYSCALL_OLD
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST if SMP

View File

@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ static struct shash_alg alg = {
.cra_name = "crc32c",
.cra_driver_name = "crc32c-vpmsum",
.cra_priority = 200,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.cra_blocksize = CHKSUM_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(u32),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,

View File

@ -209,5 +209,11 @@ exc_##label##_book3e:
ori r3,r3,vector_offset@l; \
mtspr SPRN_IVOR##vector_number,r3;
#define RFI_TO_KERNEL \
rfi
#define RFI_TO_USER \
rfi
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_EXCEPTION_64E_H */

View File

@ -51,6 +51,59 @@
#define EX_PPR 88 /* SMT thread status register (priority) */
#define EX_CTR 96
/*
* Macros for annotating the expected destination of (h)rfid
*
* The nop instructions allow us to insert one or more instructions to flush the
* L1-D cache when returning to userspace or a guest.
*/
#define RFI_FLUSH_SLOT \
RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION; \
nop; \
nop; \
nop
#define RFI_TO_KERNEL \
rfid
#define RFI_TO_USER \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
rfid; \
b rfi_flush_fallback
#define RFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
rfid; \
b rfi_flush_fallback
#define RFI_TO_GUEST \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
rfid; \
b rfi_flush_fallback
#define HRFI_TO_KERNEL \
hrfid
#define HRFI_TO_USER \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
hrfid; \
b hrfi_flush_fallback
#define HRFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
hrfid; \
b hrfi_flush_fallback
#define HRFI_TO_GUEST \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
hrfid; \
b hrfi_flush_fallback
#define HRFI_TO_UNKNOWN \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
hrfid; \
b hrfi_flush_fallback
#ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
#define __EXCEPTION_RELON_PROLOG_PSERIES_1(label, h) \
mfspr r11,SPRN_##h##SRR0; /* save SRR0 */ \
@ -189,7 +242,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_NESTED(ftr,ftr,943)
mtspr SPRN_##h##SRR0,r12; \
mfspr r12,SPRN_##h##SRR1; /* and SRR1 */ \
mtspr SPRN_##h##SRR1,r10; \
h##rfid; \
h##RFI_TO_KERNEL; \
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
#define EXCEPTION_PROLOG_PSERIES_1(label, h) \
__EXCEPTION_PROLOG_PSERIES_1(label, h)

View File

@ -189,4 +189,19 @@ void apply_feature_fixups(void);
void setup_feature_keys(void);
#endif
#define RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \
951: \
.pushsection __rfi_flush_fixup,"a"; \
.align 2; \
952: \
FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 951b-952b; \
.popsection;
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup;
#endif
#endif /* __ASM_POWERPC_FEATURE_FIXUPS_H */

View File

@ -240,6 +240,7 @@
#define H_GET_HCA_INFO 0x1B8
#define H_GET_PERF_COUNT 0x1BC
#define H_MANAGE_TRACE 0x1C0
#define H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS 0x1C8
#define H_FREE_LOGICAL_LAN_BUFFER 0x1D4
#define H_QUERY_INT_STATE 0x1E4
#define H_POLL_PENDING 0x1D8
@ -306,7 +307,19 @@
#define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_ADDR_TRANS_MODE 3
#define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_LE 4
/* H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS return values */
#define H_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 (1ull << 63) // IBM bit 0
#define H_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED (1ull << 62) // IBM bit 1
#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 (1ull << 61) // IBM bit 2
#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 (1ull << 60) // IBM bit 3
#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV (1ull << 59) // IBM bit 4
#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY (1ull << 63) // IBM bit 0
#define H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR (1ull << 62) // IBM bit 1
#define H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR (1ull << 61) // IBM bit 2
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <linux/types.h>
/**
* plpar_hcall_norets: - Make a pseries hypervisor call with no return arguments
@ -433,6 +446,11 @@ static inline unsigned long cmo_get_page_size(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */
struct h_cpu_char_result {
u64 character;
u64 behaviour;
};
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_HVCALL_H */

View File

@ -205,6 +205,15 @@ struct paca_struct {
struct sibling_subcore_state *sibling_subcore_state;
#endif
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
/*
* rfi fallback flush must be in its own cacheline to prevent
* other paca data leaking into the L1d
*/
u64 exrfi[13] __aligned(0x80);
void *rfi_flush_fallback_area;
u64 l1d_flush_size;
#endif
};
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S

View File

@ -340,4 +340,18 @@ static inline long plapr_set_watchpoint0(unsigned long dawr0, unsigned long dawr
return plpar_set_mode(0, H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_SET_DAWR, dawr0, dawrx0);
}
static inline long plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(struct h_cpu_char_result *p)
{
unsigned long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE];
long rc;
rc = plpar_hcall(H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS, retbuf);
if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
p->character = retbuf[0];
p->behaviour = retbuf[1];
}
return rc;
}
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_PLPAR_WRAPPERS_H */

View File

@ -38,6 +38,19 @@ static inline void pseries_big_endian_exceptions(void) {}
static inline void pseries_little_endian_exceptions(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */
void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable);
/* These are bit flags */
enum l1d_flush_type {
L1D_FLUSH_NONE = 0x1,
L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK = 0x2,
L1D_FLUSH_ORI = 0x4,
L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG = 0x8,
};
void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type, bool enable);
void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SETUP_H */

View File

@ -240,6 +240,9 @@ int main(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
DEFINE(PACAMCEMERGSP, offsetof(struct paca_struct, mc_emergency_sp));
DEFINE(PACA_IN_MCE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, in_mce));
DEFINE(PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA, offsetof(struct paca_struct, rfi_flush_fallback_area));
DEFINE(PACA_EXRFI, offsetof(struct paca_struct, exrfi));
DEFINE(PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, l1d_flush_size));
#endif
DEFINE(PACAHWCPUID, offsetof(struct paca_struct, hw_cpu_id));
DEFINE(PACAKEXECSTATE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, kexec_state));

View File

@ -39,6 +39,11 @@
#include <asm/tm.h>
#include <asm/ppc-opcode.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S
#include <asm/exception-64s.h>
#else
#include <asm/exception-64e.h>
#endif
/*
* System calls.
@ -251,13 +256,23 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
ld r13,GPR13(r1) /* only restore r13 if returning to usermode */
ld r2,GPR2(r1)
ld r1,GPR1(r1)
mtlr r4
mtcr r5
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r7
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r8
RFI_TO_USER
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
/* exit to kernel */
1: ld r2,GPR2(r1)
ld r1,GPR1(r1)
mtlr r4
mtcr r5
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r7
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r8
RFI
RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
syscall_error:
@ -386,8 +401,7 @@ tabort_syscall:
mtmsrd r10, 1
mtspr SPRN_SRR0, r11
mtspr SPRN_SRR1, r12
rfid
RFI_TO_USER
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
#endif
@ -859,7 +873,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
ACCOUNT_CPU_USER_EXIT(r13, r2, r4)
REST_GPR(13, r1)
1:
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r3
ld r2,_CCR(r1)
@ -872,8 +886,22 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
ld r3,GPR3(r1)
ld r4,GPR4(r1)
ld r1,GPR1(r1)
RFI_TO_USER
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
rfid
1: mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r3
ld r2,_CCR(r1)
mtcrf 0xFF,r2
ld r2,_NIP(r1)
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r2
ld r0,GPR0(r1)
ld r2,GPR2(r1)
ld r3,GPR3(r1)
ld r4,GPR4(r1)
ld r1,GPR1(r1)
RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E */
@ -1049,7 +1077,7 @@ _GLOBAL(enter_rtas)
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r5
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r6
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
rtas_return_loc:
@ -1074,7 +1102,7 @@ rtas_return_loc:
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r3
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r4
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
.align 3
@ -1145,7 +1173,7 @@ _GLOBAL(enter_prom)
LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r12, MSR_SF | MSR_ISF | MSR_LE)
andc r11,r11,r12
mtsrr1 r11
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E */
1: /* Return from OF */

View File

@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
LOAD_HANDLER(r12, machine_check_handle_early)
1: mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r12
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r11
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
2:
/* Stack overflow. Stay on emergency stack and panic.
@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ machine_check_pSeries_0:
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r12
mfspr r12,SPRN_SRR1
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r10
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
TRAMP_KVM_SKIP(PACA_EXMC, 0x200)
@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(machine_check_handle_early)
li r3,MSR_ME
andc r10,r10,r3 /* Turn off MSR_ME */
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r10
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
b .
2:
/*
@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(machine_check_handle_early)
*/
bl machine_check_queue_event
MACHINE_CHECK_HANDLER_WINDUP
rfid
RFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL
9:
/* Deliver the machine check to host kernel in V mode. */
MACHINE_CHECK_HANDLER_WINDUP
@ -655,6 +655,8 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
andi. r10,r12,MSR_RI /* check for unrecoverable exception */
beq- 2f
andi. r10,r12,MSR_PR /* check for user mode (PR != 0) */
bne 1f
/* All done -- return from exception. */
@ -671,7 +673,24 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
ld r11,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R11(r13)
ld r12,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R12(r13)
ld r13,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R13(r13)
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
1:
.machine push
.machine "power4"
mtcrf 0x80,r9
mtcrf 0x02,r9 /* I/D indication is in cr6 */
mtcrf 0x01,r9 /* slb_allocate uses cr0 and cr7 */
.machine pop
RESTORE_PPR_PACA(PACA_EXSLB, r9)
ld r9,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R9(r13)
ld r10,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R10(r13)
ld r11,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R11(r13)
ld r12,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R12(r13)
ld r13,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R13(r13)
RFI_TO_USER
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
2: mfspr r11,SPRN_SRR0
@ -679,7 +698,7 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r10
ld r10,PACAKMSR(r13)
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r10
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
b .
8: mfspr r11,SPRN_SRR0
@ -687,7 +706,7 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r10
ld r10,PACAKMSR(r13)
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r10
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
b .
EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(unrecov_slb)
@ -874,7 +893,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_REAL_LE) \
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r10 ; \
ld r10,PACAKMSR(r13) ; \
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r10 ; \
rfid ; \
RFI_TO_KERNEL ; \
b . ; /* prevent speculative execution */
#define SYSCALL_PSERIES_3 \
@ -882,7 +901,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_REAL_LE) \
1: mfspr r12,SPRN_SRR1 ; \
xori r12,r12,MSR_LE ; \
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r12 ; \
rfid ; /* return to userspace */ \
RFI_TO_USER ; /* return to userspace */ \
b . ; /* prevent speculative execution */
#if defined(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE)
@ -1257,7 +1276,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_CFAR)
ld r11,PACA_EXGEN+EX_R11(r13)
ld r12,PACA_EXGEN+EX_R12(r13)
ld r13,PACA_EXGEN+EX_R13(r13)
HRFID
HRFI_TO_UNKNOWN
b .
#endif
@ -1331,7 +1350,7 @@ masked_##_H##interrupt: \
ld r10,PACA_EXGEN+EX_R10(r13); \
ld r11,PACA_EXGEN+EX_R11(r13); \
GET_SCRATCH0(r13); \
##_H##rfid; \
##_H##RFI_TO_KERNEL; \
b .
/*
@ -1353,7 +1372,7 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(kvmppc_skip_interrupt)
addi r13, r13, 4
mtspr SPRN_SRR0, r13
GET_SCRATCH0(r13)
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
b .
TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(kvmppc_skip_Hinterrupt)
@ -1365,7 +1384,7 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(kvmppc_skip_Hinterrupt)
addi r13, r13, 4
mtspr SPRN_HSRR0, r13
GET_SCRATCH0(r13)
hrfid
HRFI_TO_KERNEL
b .
#endif
@ -1576,6 +1595,88 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_CFAR)
bl kernel_bad_stack
b 1b
.globl rfi_flush_fallback
rfi_flush_fallback:
SET_SCRATCH0(r13);
GET_PACA(r13);
std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
mfctr r9
ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13)
srdi r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */
mtctr r11
DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */
/* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */
sync
/*
* The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines,
* which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not
* hurt).
*/
1:
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*0(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*1(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*2(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*3(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*4(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*5(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*6(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10)
addi r10,r10,0x80*8
bdnz 1b
mtctr r9
ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
GET_SCRATCH0(r13);
rfid
.globl hrfi_flush_fallback
hrfi_flush_fallback:
SET_SCRATCH0(r13);
GET_PACA(r13);
std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
mfctr r9
ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13)
srdi r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */
mtctr r11
DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */
/* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */
sync
/*
* The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines,
* which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not
* hurt).
*/
1:
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*0(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*1(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*2(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*3(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*4(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*5(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*6(r10)
ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10)
addi r10,r10,0x80*8
bdnz 1b
mtctr r9
ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
GET_SCRATCH0(r13);
hrfid
/*
* Called from arch_local_irq_enable when an interrupt needs
* to be resent. r3 contains 0x500, 0x900, 0xa00 or 0xe80 to indicate

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/threads.h>
#include <asm/exception-64s.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/cputable.h>
@ -178,7 +179,7 @@ _GLOBAL(pnv_powersave_common)
mtmsrd r6, 1 /* clear RI before setting SRR0/1 */
mtspr SPRN_SRR0, r5
mtspr SPRN_SRR1, r7
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
.globl pnv_enter_arch207_idle_mode
pnv_enter_arch207_idle_mode:
@ -668,7 +669,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)
mtcr r6
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r4
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r5
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL
/*
* R3 here contains the value that will be returned to the caller
@ -689,4 +690,4 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)
mtcr r6
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r4
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r5
rfid
RFI_TO_KERNEL

View File

@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/kdump.h>
@ -678,4 +679,131 @@ static int __init disable_hardlockup_detector(void)
return 0;
}
early_initcall(disable_hardlockup_detector);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
static enum l1d_flush_type enabled_flush_types;
static void *l1d_flush_fallback_area;
static bool no_rfi_flush;
bool rfi_flush;
static int __init handle_no_rfi_flush(char *p)
{
pr_info("rfi-flush: disabled on command line.");
no_rfi_flush = true;
return 0;
}
early_param("no_rfi_flush", handle_no_rfi_flush);
/*
* The RFI flush is not KPTI, but because users will see doco that says to use
* nopti we hijack that option here to also disable the RFI flush.
*/
static int __init handle_no_pti(char *p)
{
pr_info("rfi-flush: disabling due to 'nopti' on command line.\n");
handle_no_rfi_flush(NULL);
return 0;
}
early_param("nopti", handle_no_pti);
static void do_nothing(void *unused)
{
/*
* We don't need to do the flush explicitly, just enter+exit kernel is
* sufficient, the RFI exit handlers will do the right thing.
*/
}
void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable)
{
if (rfi_flush == enable)
return;
if (enable) {
do_rfi_flush_fixups(enabled_flush_types);
on_each_cpu(do_nothing, NULL, 1);
} else
do_rfi_flush_fixups(L1D_FLUSH_NONE);
rfi_flush = enable;
}
static void init_fallback_flush(void)
{
u64 l1d_size, limit;
int cpu;
l1d_size = ppc64_caches.dsize;
limit = min(safe_stack_limit(), ppc64_rma_size);
/*
* Align to L1d size, and size it at 2x L1d size, to catch possible
* hardware prefetch runoff. We don't have a recipe for load patterns to
* reliably avoid the prefetcher.
*/
l1d_flush_fallback_area = __va(memblock_alloc_base(l1d_size * 2, l1d_size, limit));
memset(l1d_flush_fallback_area, 0, l1d_size * 2);
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
paca[cpu].rfi_flush_fallback_area = l1d_flush_fallback_area;
paca[cpu].l1d_flush_size = l1d_size;
}
}
void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
{
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) {
pr_info("rfi-flush: Using fallback displacement flush\n");
init_fallback_flush();
}
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI)
pr_info("rfi-flush: Using ori type flush\n");
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
pr_info("rfi-flush: Using mttrig type flush\n");
enabled_flush_types = types;
if (!no_rfi_flush)
rfi_flush_enable(enable);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
static int rfi_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
if (val == 1)
rfi_flush_enable(true);
else if (val == 0)
rfi_flush_enable(false);
else
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static int rfi_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
{
*val = rfi_flush ? 1 : 0;
return 0;
}
DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_rfi_flush, rfi_flush_get, rfi_flush_set, "%llu\n");
static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init(void)
{
debugfs_create_file("rfi_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_rfi_flush);
return 0;
}
device_initcall(rfi_flush_debugfs_init);
#endif
ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (rfi_flush)
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: RFI Flush\n");
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
#endif

View File

@ -132,6 +132,15 @@ SECTIONS
/* Read-only data */
RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
. = ALIGN(8);
__rfi_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__rfi_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__start___rfi_flush_fixup = .;
*(__rfi_flush_fixup)
__stop___rfi_flush_fixup = .;
}
#endif
EXCEPTION_TABLE(0)
NOTES :kernel :notes

View File

@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ _GLOBAL_TOC(kvmppc_hv_entry_trampoline)
mtmsrd r0,1 /* clear RI in MSR */
mtsrr0 r5
mtsrr1 r6
RFI
RFI_TO_KERNEL
kvmppc_call_hv_entry:
ld r4, HSTATE_KVM_VCPU(r13)
@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S)
mtsrr0 r8
mtsrr1 r7
beq cr1, 13f /* machine check */
RFI
RFI_TO_KERNEL
/* On POWER7, we have external interrupts set to use HSRR0/1 */
11: mtspr SPRN_HSRR0, r8
@ -1018,8 +1018,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
ld r0, VCPU_GPR(R0)(r4)
ld r4, VCPU_GPR(R4)(r4)
hrfid
HRFI_TO_GUEST
b .
secondary_too_late:

View File

@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
#define FUNC(name) name
#define RFI_TO_KERNEL RFI
#define RFI_TO_GUEST RFI
.macro INTERRUPT_TRAMPOLINE intno
.global kvmppc_trampoline_\intno
@ -141,7 +144,7 @@ kvmppc_handler_skip_ins:
GET_SCRATCH0(r13)
/* And get back into the code */
RFI
RFI_TO_KERNEL
#endif
/*
@ -164,6 +167,6 @@ _GLOBAL_TOC(kvmppc_entry_trampoline)
ori r5, r5, MSR_EE
mtsrr0 r7
mtsrr1 r6
RFI
RFI_TO_KERNEL
#include "book3s_segment.S"

View File

@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ no_dcbz32_on:
PPC_LL r9, SVCPU_R9(r3)
PPC_LL r3, (SVCPU_R3)(r3)
RFI
RFI_TO_GUEST
kvmppc_handler_trampoline_enter_end:
@ -389,5 +389,5 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)
cmpwi r12, BOOK3S_INTERRUPT_DOORBELL
beqa BOOK3S_INTERRUPT_DOORBELL
RFI
RFI_TO_KERNEL
kvmppc_handler_trampoline_exit_end:

View File

@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/firmware.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
struct fixup_entry {
unsigned long mask;
@ -115,6 +116,47 @@ void do_feature_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end)
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
{
unsigned int instrs[3], *dest;
long *start, *end;
int i;
start = PTRRELOC(&__start___rfi_flush_fixup),
end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___rfi_flush_fixup);
instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK)
/* b .+16 to fallback flush */
instrs[0] = 0x48000010;
i = 0;
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) {
instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
instrs[i++] = 0x63de0000; /* ori 30,30,0 L1d flush*/
}
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
instrs[i++] = 0x7c12dba6; /* mtspr TRIG2,r0 (SPR #882) */
for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
dest = (void *)start + *start;
pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
patch_instruction(dest, instrs[0]);
patch_instruction(dest + 1, instrs[1]);
patch_instruction(dest + 2, instrs[2]);
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "rfi-flush: patched %d locations\n", i);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
void do_lwsync_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end)
{
long *start, *end;

View File

@ -1381,7 +1381,7 @@ static int collect_events(struct perf_event *group, int max_count,
int n = 0;
struct perf_event *event;
if (!is_software_event(group)) {
if (group->pmu->task_ctx_nr == perf_hw_context) {
if (n >= max_count)
return -1;
ctrs[n] = group;
@ -1389,7 +1389,7 @@ static int collect_events(struct perf_event *group, int max_count,
events[n++] = group->hw.config;
}
list_for_each_entry(event, &group->sibling_list, group_entry) {
if (!is_software_event(event) &&
if (event->pmu->task_ctx_nr == perf_hw_context &&
event->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF) {
if (n >= max_count)
return -1;

View File

@ -35,13 +35,63 @@
#include <asm/opal.h>
#include <asm/kexec.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/tm.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include "powernv.h"
static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)
{
struct device_node *np, *fw_features;
enum l1d_flush_type type;
int enable;
/* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */
type = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK;
enable = 1;
np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal");
fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-features");
of_node_put(np);
if (fw_features) {
np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "inst-l1d-flush-trig2");
if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "enabled"))
type = L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG;
of_node_put(np);
np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "inst-l1d-flush-ori30,30,0");
if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "enabled"))
type = L1D_FLUSH_ORI;
of_node_put(np);
/* Enable unless firmware says NOT to */
enable = 2;
np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "needs-l1d-flush-msr-hv-1-to-0");
if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "disabled"))
enable--;
of_node_put(np);
np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "needs-l1d-flush-msr-pr-0-to-1");
if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "disabled"))
enable--;
of_node_put(np);
of_node_put(fw_features);
}
setup_rfi_flush(type, enable > 0);
}
static void __init pnv_setup_arch(void)
{
set_arch_panic_timeout(10, ARCH_PANIC_TIMEOUT);
pnv_setup_rfi_flush();
/* Initialize SMP */
pnv_smp_init();

View File

@ -450,6 +450,39 @@ static void __init find_and_init_phbs(void)
of_pci_check_probe_only();
}
static void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void)
{
struct h_cpu_char_result result;
enum l1d_flush_type types;
bool enable;
long rc;
/* Enable by default */
enable = true;
rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&result);
if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
types = L1D_FLUSH_NONE;
if (result.character & H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2)
types |= L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG;
if (result.character & H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30)
types |= L1D_FLUSH_ORI;
/* Use fallback if nothing set in hcall */
if (types == L1D_FLUSH_NONE)
types = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK;
if (!(result.behaviour & H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR))
enable = false;
} else {
/* Default to fallback if case hcall is not available */
types = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK;
}
setup_rfi_flush(types, enable);
}
static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void)
{
set_arch_panic_timeout(10, ARCH_PANIC_TIMEOUT);
@ -467,6 +500,8 @@ static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void)
fwnmi_init();
pseries_setup_rfi_flush();
/* By default, only probe PCI (can be overridden by rtas_pci) */
pci_add_flags(PCI_PROBE_ONLY);

View File

@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ static struct shash_alg crc32_vx_algs[] = {
.cra_name = "crc32",
.cra_driver_name = "crc32-vx",
.cra_priority = 200,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.cra_blocksize = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
@ -258,6 +259,7 @@ static struct shash_alg crc32_vx_algs[] = {
.cra_name = "crc32be",
.cra_driver_name = "crc32be-vx",
.cra_priority = 200,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.cra_blocksize = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
@ -278,6 +280,7 @@ static struct shash_alg crc32_vx_algs[] = {
.cra_name = "crc32c",
.cra_driver_name = "crc32c-vx",
.cra_priority = 200,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.cra_blocksize = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,

View File

@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(s390_setregid16, u16, rgid, u16, egid)
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(s390_setgid16, u16, gid)
{
return sys_setgid((gid_t)gid);
return sys_setgid(low2highgid(gid));
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(s390_setreuid16, u16, ruid, u16, euid)
@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(s390_setreuid16, u16, ruid, u16, euid)
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(s390_setuid16, u16, uid)
{
return sys_setuid((uid_t)uid);
return sys_setuid(low2highuid(uid));
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(s390_setresuid16, u16, ruid, u16, euid, u16, suid)
@ -173,12 +173,12 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(s390_getresgid16, u16 __user *, rgidp,
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(s390_setfsuid16, u16, uid)
{
return sys_setfsuid((uid_t)uid);
return sys_setfsuid(low2highuid(uid));
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(s390_setfsgid16, u16, gid)
{
return sys_setfsgid((gid_t)gid);
return sys_setfsgid(low2highgid(gid));
}
static int groups16_to_user(u16 __user *grouplist, struct group_info *group_info)

View File

@ -607,7 +607,8 @@ asmlinkage void do_divide_error(unsigned long r4)
break;
}
force_sig_info(SIGFPE, &info, current);
info.si_signo = SIGFPE;
force_sig_info(info.si_signo, &info, current);
}
#endif

View File

@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ static struct shash_alg alg = {
.cra_name = "crc32c",
.cra_driver_name = "crc32c-sparc64",
.cra_priority = SPARC_CR_OPCODE_PRIORITY,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.cra_blocksize = CHKSUM_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(u32),
.cra_alignmask = 7,

View File

@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ archheaders:
archprepare: include/generated/user_constants.h
LINK-$(CONFIG_LD_SCRIPT_STATIC) += -static
LINK-$(CONFIG_LD_SCRIPT_DYN) += -Wl,-rpath,/lib
LINK-$(CONFIG_LD_SCRIPT_DYN) += -Wl,-rpath,/lib $(call cc-option, -no-pie)
CFLAGS_NO_HARDENING := $(call cc-option, -fno-PIC,) $(call cc-option, -fno-pic,) \
$(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector,) \

View File

@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ config X86
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_MIN_ADJUST
select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE
select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
select GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT
select GENERIC_IOMAP
@ -407,6 +408,19 @@ config GOLDFISH
def_bool y
depends on X86_GOLDFISH
config RETPOLINE
bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
default y
---help---
Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against
kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect
branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
Without compiler support, at least indirect branches in assembler
code are eliminated. Since this includes the syscall entry path,
it is not entirely pointless.
if X86_32
config X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM
bool "Support for extended (non-PC) x86 platforms"
@ -1043,7 +1057,7 @@ config X86_MCE_THRESHOLD
def_bool y
config X86_MCE_INJECT
depends on X86_MCE
depends on X86_MCE && X86_LOCAL_APIC
tristate "Machine check injector support"
---help---
Provide support for injecting machine checks for testing purposes.

View File

@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ config X86_DEBUG_FPU
config PUNIT_ATOM_DEBUG
tristate "ATOM Punit debug driver"
depends on PCI
select DEBUG_FS
select IOSF_MBI
---help---

View File

@ -182,6 +182,14 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(mflags-y)
KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(mflags-y)
# Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre
ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register)
ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE
endif
endif
archscripts: scripts_basic
$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/x86/tools relocs

View File

@ -73,12 +73,13 @@ UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
$(obj)/bzImage: asflags-y := $(SVGA_MODE)
quiet_cmd_image = BUILD $@
silent_redirect_image = >/dev/null
cmd_image = $(obj)/tools/build $(obj)/setup.bin $(obj)/vmlinux.bin \
$(obj)/zoffset.h $@
$(obj)/zoffset.h $@ $($(quiet)redirect_image)
$(obj)/bzImage: $(obj)/setup.bin $(obj)/vmlinux.bin $(obj)/tools/build FORCE
$(call if_changed,image)
@echo 'Kernel: $@ is ready' ' (#'`cat .version`')'
@$(kecho) 'Kernel: $@ is ready' ' (#'`cat .version`')'
OBJCOPYFLAGS_vmlinux.bin := -O binary -R .note -R .comment -S
$(obj)/vmlinux.bin: $(obj)/compressed/vmlinux FORCE

View File

@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/inst.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
/*
* The following macros are used to move an (un)aligned 16 byte value to/from
@ -2734,7 +2735,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8)
pxor INC, STATE4
movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP)
call *%r11
CALL_NOSPEC %r11
movdqu 0x00(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE1
@ -2779,7 +2780,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8)
_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
movups IV, (IVP)
call *%r11
CALL_NOSPEC %r11
movdqu 0x40(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE1

View File

@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE &&
sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
+ sg_is_last(req->dst) && req->dst->length &&
req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE) {
one_entry_in_sg = 1;
scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);

View File

@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272
@ -1224,7 +1225,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_16way:
vpxor 14 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm14;
vpxor 15 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm15;
call *%r9;
CALL_NOSPEC %r9;
addq $(16 * 16), %rsp;

View File

@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272
@ -1337,7 +1338,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_32way:
vpxor 14 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm14;
vpxor 15 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm15;
call *%r9;
CALL_NOSPEC %r9;
addq $(16 * 32), %rsp;

View File

@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static struct shash_alg alg = {
.cra_name = "crc32",
.cra_driver_name = "crc32-pclmul",
.cra_priority = 200,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.cra_blocksize = CHKSUM_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(u32),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,

View File

@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ static struct shash_alg alg = {
.cra_name = "crc32c",
.cra_driver_name = "crc32c-intel",
.cra_priority = 200,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.cra_blocksize = CHKSUM_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(u32),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,

View File

@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <asm/inst.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
## ISCSI CRC 32 Implementation with crc32 and pclmulqdq Instruction
@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ continue_block:
movzxw (bufp, %rax, 2), len
lea crc_array(%rip), bufp
lea (bufp, len, 1), bufp
jmp *bufp
JMP_NOSPEC bufp
################################################################
## 2a) PROCESS FULL BLOCKS:

View File

@ -164,7 +164,6 @@ static struct shash_alg alg = {
.init = poly1305_simd_init,
.update = poly1305_simd_update,
.final = crypto_poly1305_final,
.setkey = crypto_poly1305_setkey,
.descsize = sizeof(struct poly1305_simd_desc_ctx),
.base = {
.cra_name = "poly1305",

View File

@ -57,10 +57,12 @@ void sha512_mb_mgr_init_avx2(struct sha512_mb_mgr *state)
{
unsigned int j;
state->lens[0] = 0;
state->lens[1] = 1;
state->lens[2] = 2;
state->lens[3] = 3;
/* initially all lanes are unused */
state->lens[0] = 0xFFFFFFFF00000000;
state->lens[1] = 0xFFFFFFFF00000001;
state->lens[2] = 0xFFFFFFFF00000002;
state->lens[3] = 0xFFFFFFFF00000003;
state->unused_lanes = 0xFF03020100;
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
state->ldata[j].job_in_lane = NULL;

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More