usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists
This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive. If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists immediately. Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ struct mem_cgroup;
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void __init kmem_cache_init(void);
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bool slab_is_available(void);
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extern bool usercopy_fallback;
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struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache_create(const char *name, size_t size,
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size_t align, slab_flags_t flags,
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void (*ctor)(void *));
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@ -4426,7 +4426,8 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
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* to be a temporary method to find any missing usercopy
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* whitelists.
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*/
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if (offset <= cachep->object_size &&
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if (usercopy_fallback &&
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offset <= cachep->object_size &&
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n <= cachep->object_size - offset) {
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usercopy_warn("SLAB object", cachep->name, to_user, offset, n);
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return;
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@ -31,6 +31,14 @@ LIST_HEAD(slab_caches);
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DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex);
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struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache;
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#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
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bool usercopy_fallback __ro_after_init =
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IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK);
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module_param(usercopy_fallback, bool, 0400);
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MODULE_PARM_DESC(usercopy_fallback,
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"WARN instead of reject usercopy whitelist violations");
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#endif
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static LIST_HEAD(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy);
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static void slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_workfn(struct work_struct *work);
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static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work,
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@ -3859,7 +3859,8 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
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* whitelists.
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*/
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object_size = slab_ksize(s);
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if (offset <= object_size && n <= object_size - offset) {
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if (usercopy_fallback &&
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offset <= object_size && n <= object_size - offset) {
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usercopy_warn("SLUB object", s->name, to_user, offset, n);
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return;
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}
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@ -152,6 +152,20 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
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or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
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of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
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config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK
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bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size"
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depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
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default y
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help
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This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists
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to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of
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rejecting the copy, falling back to non-whitelisted hardened
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usercopy that checks the slab allocation size instead of the
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whitelist size. This option will be removed once it seems like
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all missing usercopy whitelists have been identified and fixed.
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Booting with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=Y/N" can change
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this setting.
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config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
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bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
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depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
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