sunrpc: use constant time memory comparison for mac
commit 15a8b93fd5
upstream.
Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
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* WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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*/
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#include <crypto/algapi.h>
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#include <crypto/hash.h>
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#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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@ -927,7 +928,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf,
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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if (memcmp(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) {
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if (crypto_memneq(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) {
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ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
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goto out_err;
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}
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