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random: fix bound check ordering (CVE-2007-3105) 

If root raised the default wakeup threshold over the size of the
output pool, the pool transfer function could overflow the stack with
RNG bytes, causing a DoS or potential privilege escalation.

(Bug reported by the PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>)

Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
wifi-calibration
Matt Mackall 2007-07-19 11:30:14 -07:00 committed by Linus Torvalds
parent f745bb1c73
commit 5a021e9ffd
1 changed files with 7 additions and 2 deletions
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9
drivers/char/random.c
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@ -693,9 +693,14 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
if (r->pull && r->entropy_count < nbytes * 8 &&
r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo->POOLBITS) {
int bytes = max_t(int, random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8,
min_t(int, nbytes, sizeof(tmp)));
/* If we're limited, always leave two wakeup worth's BITS */
int rsvd = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_thresh/4;
int bytes = nbytes;
/* pull at least as many as BYTES as wakeup BITS */
bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8);
/* but never more than the buffer size */
bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
DEBUG_ENT("going to reseed %s with %d bits "
"(%d of %d requested)\n",