Bluetooth: Fix tracking local SSP authentication requirement
When we need to make the decision whether to perform just-works or real user confirmation we need to know the exact local authentication requirement that was passed to the controller. So far conn->auth_type (the local requirement) wasn't in one case updated appropriately in fear of the user confirmation being rejected later. The real problem however was not really that conn->auth_type couldn't represent the true value but that we were checking the local MITM requirement in an incorrect way. It's perfectly fine to let auth_type follow what we tell the controller since we're still tracking the target security level with conn->pending_sec_level. This patch updates the check for local MITM requirement in the hci_user_confirm_request_evt function to use the locally requested security level and ensures that auth_type always represents what we tell the controller. All other code in hci_user_confirm_request_evt still uses the auth_type instead of pending_sec_level for determining whether to do just-works or not, since that's the only value that's in sync with what the remote device knows. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Tested-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.16
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@ -3664,18 +3664,14 @@ static void hci_io_capa_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
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/* If we are initiators, there is no remote information yet */
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if (conn->remote_auth == 0xff) {
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cp.authentication = conn->auth_type;
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/* Request MITM protection if our IO caps allow it
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* except for the no-bonding case.
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* conn->auth_type is not updated here since
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* that might cause the user confirmation to be
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* rejected in case the remote doesn't have the
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* IO capabilities for MITM.
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*/
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if (conn->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT &&
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cp.authentication != HCI_AT_NO_BONDING)
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cp.authentication |= 0x01;
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conn->auth_type |= 0x01;
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cp.authentication = conn->auth_type;
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} else {
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conn->auth_type = hci_get_auth_req(conn);
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cp.authentication = conn->auth_type;
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@ -3747,9 +3743,12 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
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rem_mitm = (conn->remote_auth & 0x01);
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/* If we require MITM but the remote device can't provide that
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* (it has NoInputNoOutput) then reject the confirmation request
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* (it has NoInputNoOutput) then reject the confirmation
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* request. We check the security level here since it doesn't
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* necessarily match conn->auth_type.
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*/
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if (loc_mitm && conn->remote_cap == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) {
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if (conn->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM &&
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conn->remote_cap == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) {
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BT_DBG("Rejecting request: remote device can't provide MITM");
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hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY,
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sizeof(ev->bdaddr), &ev->bdaddr);
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