Backport fix for crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
commit dd50458957
upstream.
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
[backported to 4.1 by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
wifi-calibration
parent
09b09ced1e
commit
762330b161
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@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ struct skcipher_sg_list {
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struct scatterlist sg[0];
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};
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struct skcipher_tfm {
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struct crypto_ablkcipher *skcipher;
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bool has_key;
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};
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struct skcipher_ctx {
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struct list_head tsgl;
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struct af_alg_sgl rsgl;
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@ -752,17 +757,41 @@ static struct proto_ops algif_skcipher_ops = {
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static void *skcipher_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
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{
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return crypto_alloc_ablkcipher(name, type, mask);
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struct skcipher_tfm *tfm;
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struct crypto_ablkcipher *skcipher;
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tfm = kzalloc(sizeof(*tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!tfm)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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skcipher = crypto_alloc_ablkcipher(name, type, mask);
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if (IS_ERR(skcipher)) {
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kfree(tfm);
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return ERR_CAST(skcipher);
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}
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tfm->skcipher = skcipher;
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return tfm;
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}
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static void skcipher_release(void *private)
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{
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crypto_free_ablkcipher(private);
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struct skcipher_tfm *tfm = private;
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crypto_free_ablkcipher(tfm->skcipher);
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kfree(tfm);
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}
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static int skcipher_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
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{
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return crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(private, key, keylen);
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struct skcipher_tfm *tfm = private;
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int err;
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err = crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(tfm->skcipher, key, keylen);
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tfm->has_key = !err;
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return err;
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}
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static void skcipher_wait(struct sock *sk)
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@ -794,20 +823,25 @@ static int skcipher_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
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{
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struct skcipher_ctx *ctx;
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struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
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unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(private);
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struct skcipher_tfm *tfm = private;
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struct crypto_ablkcipher *skcipher = tfm->skcipher;
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unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(skcipher);
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if (!tfm->has_key)
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return -ENOKEY;
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ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!ctx)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ctx->iv = sock_kmalloc(sk, crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(private),
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ctx->iv = sock_kmalloc(sk, crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(skcipher),
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!ctx->iv) {
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sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, len);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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memset(ctx->iv, 0, crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(private));
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memset(ctx->iv, 0, crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(skcipher));
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INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->tsgl);
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ctx->len = len;
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@ -820,7 +854,7 @@ static int skcipher_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
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ask->private = ctx;
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ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, private);
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ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, skcipher);
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ablkcipher_request_set_callback(&ctx->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
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af_alg_complete, &ctx->completion);
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