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This renames the (now inaccurate) CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and related config 

CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to the more sensible CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
 CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX.
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 Version: GnuPG v1
 Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
 
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Merge tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull rodata updates from Kees Cook:
 "This renames the (now inaccurate) DEBUG_RODATA and related
  SET_MODULE_RONX configs to the more sensible STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
  STRICT_MODULE_RWX"

* tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONX
  arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be common
zero-colors
Linus Torvalds 2017-02-21 17:56:45 -08:00
parent 4a0853bf88 0f5bf6d0af
commit 7bb033829e
33 changed files with 90 additions and 109 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

8
Documentation/DocBook/kgdb.tmpl
View File

@ -115,12 +115,12 @@
</para>
<para>
If the architecture that you are using supports the kernel option
CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA, you should consider turning it off. This
CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX, you should consider turning it off. This
option will prevent the use of software breakpoints because it
marks certain regions of the kernel's memory space as read-only.
If kgdb supports it for the architecture you are using, you can
use hardware breakpoints if you desire to run with the
CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA option turned on, else you need to turn off
CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX option turned on, else you need to turn off
this option.
</para>
<para>
@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
<para>Here is an example set of .config symbols to enable or
disable for kgdb:
<itemizedlist>
<listitem><para># CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA is not set</para></listitem>
<listitem><para># CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is not set</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>CONFIG_KGDB=y</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>CONFIG_KGDB_SERIAL_CONSOLE=y</para></listitem>
@ -166,7 +166,7 @@
</para>
<para>Here is an example set of .config symbols to enable/disable kdb:
<itemizedlist>
<listitem><para># CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA is not set</para></listitem>
<listitem><para># CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is not set</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>CONFIG_KGDB=y</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>CONFIG_KGDB_SERIAL_CONSOLE=y</para></listitem>

10
Documentation/security/self-protection.txt
View File

@ -51,11 +51,17 @@ kernel, they are implemented in a way where the memory is temporarily
made writable during the update, and then returned to the original
permissions.)
In support of this are (the poorly named) CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and
CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, which seek to make sure that code is not
In support of this are CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX, which seek to make sure that code is not
writable, data is not executable, and read-only data is neither writable
nor executable.
Most architectures have these options on by default and not user selectable.
For some architectures like arm that wish to have these be selectable,
the architecture Kconfig can select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX to enable
a Kconfig prompt. CONFIG_ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT determines
the default setting when ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX is enabled.
#### Function pointers and sensitive variables must not be writable
Vast areas of kernel memory contain function pointers that are looked

34
arch/Kconfig
View File

@ -781,4 +781,38 @@ config VMAP_STACK
the stack to map directly to the KASAN shadow map using a formula
that is incorrect if the stack is in vmalloc space.
config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
def_bool n
config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
def_bool n
config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
def_bool n
config STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
help
If this is set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
protection against certain security exploits (e.g. executing the heap
or modifying text)
These features are considered standard security practice these days.
You should say Y here in almost all cases.
config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
def_bool n
config STRICT_MODULE_RWX
bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX && MODULES
default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
help
If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
protection against certain security exploits (e.g. writing to text)
source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"

4
arch/arm/Kconfig
View File

@ -4,10 +4,14 @@ config ARM
select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_DATA
select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX if MMU
select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT if CPU_V7
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
select ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF

11
arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
View File

@ -1738,17 +1738,6 @@ config PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR
additional instructions during context switch. Say Y here only if you
are planning to use hardware trace tools with this kernel.
config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
depends on MODULES && MMU
---help---
This option helps catch unintended modifications to loadable
kernel module's text and read-only data. It also prevents execution
of module data. Such protection may interfere with run-time code
patching and dynamic kernel tracing - and they might also protect
against certain classes of kernel exploits.
If in doubt, say "N".
source "drivers/hwtracing/coresight/Kconfig"
endmenu

4
arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g4_defconfig
View File

@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD=y
# CONFIG_ARCH_MULTI_V7 is not set
CONFIG_ARCH_ASPEED=y
CONFIG_MACH_ASPEED_G4=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y
CONFIG_AEABI=y
CONFIG_UACCESS_WITH_MEMCPY=y
CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
@ -79,7 +78,8 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_LL_UART_8250=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_PHYS=0x1e784000
CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_VIRT=0xe8784000
CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX=y
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y
CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_X86 is not set
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_POWERPC is not set
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_IA64 is not set

4
arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g5_defconfig
View File

@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ CONFIG_ARCH_MULTI_V6=y
# CONFIG_ARCH_MULTI_V7 is not set
CONFIG_ARCH_ASPEED=y
CONFIG_MACH_ASPEED_G5=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y
CONFIG_AEABI=y
CONFIG_UACCESS_WITH_MEMCPY=y
CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
@ -81,7 +80,8 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_LL_UART_8250=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_PHYS=0x1e784000
CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_VIRT=0xe8784000
CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX=y
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y
CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_X86 is not set
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_POWERPC is not set
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_IA64 is not set

2
arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
View File

@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ static inline int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
#else

4
arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
View File

@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ static void __kprobes *patch_map(void *addr, int fixmap, unsigned long *flags)
bool module = !core_kernel_text(uintaddr);
struct page *page;
if (module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX))
if (module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX))
page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
else if (!module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA))
else if (!module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
page = virt_to_page(addr);
else
return addr;

8
arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
View File

@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ SECTIONS
HEAD_TEXT
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
. = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
#endif
@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ SECTIONS
NOTES
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
. = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
#else
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ SECTIONS
PERCPU_SECTION(L1_CACHE_BYTES)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
. = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
#else
. = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE);
@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ SECTIONS
STABS_DEBUG
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
/*
* Without CONFIG_DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA, __start_rodata_section_aligned will
* be the first section-aligned location after __start_rodata. Otherwise,

14
arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
View File

@ -1051,21 +1051,9 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_BIG_ENDIAN
This option specifies the architecture can support big endian
operation.
config DEBUG_RODATA
bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only"
depends on MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
default y if CPU_V7
help
If this is set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made
read-only, and non-text kernel memory will be made non-executable.
The tradeoff is that each region is padded to section-size (1MiB)
boundaries (because their permissions are different and splitting
the 1M pages into 4K ones causes TLB performance problems), which
can waste memory.
config DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
bool "Make rodata strictly non-executable"
depends on DEBUG_RODATA
depends on STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
default y
help
If this is set, rodata will be made explicitly non-executable. This

4
arch/arm/mm/init.c
View File

@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
struct section_perm {
const char *name;
unsigned long start;
@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ void set_kernel_text_ro(void)
#else
static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
#endif /* CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX */
void free_tcmmem(void)
{

5
arch/arm64/Kconfig
View File

@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ config ARM64
select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
@ -123,9 +125,6 @@ config ARCH_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT
config MMU
def_bool y
config DEBUG_RODATA
def_bool y
config ARM64_PAGE_SHIFT
int
default 16 if ARM64_64K_PAGES

13
arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
View File

@ -71,19 +71,8 @@ config DEBUG_WX
If in doubt, say "Y".
config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
depends on MODULES
default y
help
Is this is set, kernel module text and rodata will be made read-only.
This is to help catch accidental or malicious attempts to change the
kernel's executable code.
If in doubt, say Y.
config DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
depends on DEBUG_RODATA
depends on STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
bool "Align linker sections up to SECTION_SIZE"
help
If this option is enabled, sections that may potentially be marked as

2
arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c
View File

@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static void __kprobes *patch_map(void *addr, int fixmap)
bool module = !core_kernel_text(uintaddr);
struct page *page;
if (module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX))
if (module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX))
page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
else if (!module)
page = pfn_to_page(PHYS_PFN(__pa(addr)));

1
arch/parisc/Kconfig
View File

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config PARISC
select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
select RTC_CLASS
select RTC_DRV_GENERIC
select INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE

11
arch/parisc/Kconfig.debug
View File

@ -5,15 +5,4 @@ source "lib/Kconfig.debug"
config TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT
def_bool y
config DEBUG_RODATA
bool "Write protect kernel read-only data structures"
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
default y
help
Mark the kernel read-only data as write-protected in the pagetables,
in order to catch accidental (and incorrect) writes to such const
data. This option may have a slight performance impact because a
portion of the kernel code won't be covered by a TLB anymore.
If in doubt, say "N".
endmenu

1
arch/parisc/configs/712_defconfig
View File

@ -182,7 +182,6 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y
# CONFIG_RCU_CPU_STALL_DETECTOR is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_NULL=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC=y

1
arch/parisc/configs/c3000_defconfig
View File

@ -166,7 +166,6 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
# CONFIG_RCU_CPU_STALL_DETECTOR is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_NULL=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5=m

2
arch/parisc/mm/init.c
View File

@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ void free_initmem(void)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
void mark_rodata_ro(void)
{
/* rodata memory was already mapped with KERNEL_RO access rights by

5
arch/s390/Kconfig
View File

@ -62,9 +62,6 @@ config PCI_QUIRKS
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
def_bool y
config DEBUG_RODATA
def_bool y
config S390
def_bool y
select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
@ -73,6 +70,8 @@ config S390
select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
select ARCH_INLINE_READ_LOCK

3
arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
View File

@ -17,7 +17,4 @@ config S390_PTDUMP
kernel.
If in doubt, say "N"
config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
def_bool y
depends on MODULES
endmenu

5
arch/x86/Kconfig
View File

@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ config X86
select ARCH_HAS_MMIO_FLUSH
select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API if X86_64
select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_ACPI_PDC if ACPI
@ -309,9 +311,6 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
config FIX_EARLYCON_MEM
def_bool y
config DEBUG_RODATA
def_bool y
config PGTABLE_LEVELS
int
default 4 if X86_64

11
arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
View File

@ -109,17 +109,6 @@ config DEBUG_WX
If in doubt, say "Y".
config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
depends on MODULES
---help---
This option helps catch unintended modifications to loadable
kernel module's text and read-only data. It also prevents execution
of module data. Such protection may interfere with run-time code
patching and dynamic kernel tracing - and they might also protect
against certain classes of kernel exploits.
If in doubt, say "N".
config DOUBLEFAULT
default y
bool "Enable doublefault exception handler" if EXPERT

4
include/linux/filter.h
View File

@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ static inline bool bpf_prog_was_classic(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
#define bpf_classic_proglen(fprog) (fprog->len * sizeof(fprog->filter[0]))
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
static inline void bpf_prog_lock_ro(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
set_memory_ro((unsigned long)fp, fp->pages);
@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static inline void bpf_prog_lock_ro(struct bpf_prog *fp)
static inline void bpf_prog_unlock_ro(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
}
#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX */
#endif /* CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX */
int sk_filter_trim_cap(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int cap);
static inline int sk_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)

4
include/linux/init.h
View File

@ -126,10 +126,10 @@ void prepare_namespace(void);
void __init load_default_modules(void);
int __init init_rootfs(void);
#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX)
#if defined(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX) || defined(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX)
extern bool rodata_enabled;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
void mark_rodata_ro(void);
#endif

2
include/linux/module.h
View File

@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ extern int module_sysfs_initialized;
#define __MODULE_STRING(x) __stringify(x)
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
extern void set_all_modules_text_rw(void);
extern void set_all_modules_text_ro(void);
extern void module_enable_ro(const struct module *mod, bool after_init);

4
init/main.c
View File

@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ static int try_to_run_init_process(const char *init_filename)
static noinline void __init kernel_init_freeable(void);
#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX)
#if defined(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX) || defined(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX)
bool rodata_enabled __ro_after_init = true;
static int __init set_debug_rodata(char *str)
{
@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ static int __init set_debug_rodata(char *str)
__setup("rodata=", set_debug_rodata);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
static void mark_readonly(void)
{
if (rodata_enabled)

2
kernel/configs/android-recommended.config
View File

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM_SIZE=8192
CONFIG_COMPACTION=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y
CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y
CONFIG_DM_CRYPT=y
CONFIG_DM_UEVENT=y
CONFIG_DM_VERITY=y

6
kernel/module.c
View File

@ -76,9 +76,9 @@
/*
* Modules' sections will be aligned on page boundaries
* to ensure complete separation of code and data, but
* only when CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX=y
* only when CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
# define debug_align(X) ALIGN(X, PAGE_SIZE)
#else
# define debug_align(X) (X)
@ -1846,7 +1846,7 @@ static void mod_sysfs_teardown(struct module *mod)
mod_sysfs_fini(mod);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
/*
* LKM RO/NX protection: protect module's text/ro-data
* from modification and any data from execution.

2
kernel/power/hibernate.c
View File

@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ static int __init hibernate_setup(char *str)
} else if (!strncmp(str, "no", 2)) {
noresume = 1;
nohibernate = 1;
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX)
&& !strncmp(str, "protect_image", 13)) {
enable_restore_image_protection();
}

4
kernel/power/power.h
View File

@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ extern int hibernation_snapshot(int platform_mode);
extern int hibernation_restore(int platform_mode);
extern int hibernation_platform_enter(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
/* kernel/power/snapshot.c */
extern void enable_restore_image_protection(void);
#else
static inline void enable_restore_image_protection(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
#endif /* CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX */
#else /* !CONFIG_HIBERNATION */

4
kernel/power/snapshot.c
View File

@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
#include "power.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
static bool hibernate_restore_protection;
static bool hibernate_restore_protection_active;
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static inline void hibernate_restore_protection_begin(void) {}
static inline void hibernate_restore_protection_end(void) {}
static inline void hibernate_restore_protect_page(void *page_address) {}
static inline void hibernate_restore_unprotect_page(void *page_address) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
#endif /* CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX */
static int swsusp_page_is_free(struct page *);
static void swsusp_set_page_forbidden(struct page *);