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fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel_read() instead of memcpy() 

commit d0290bc20d upstream.

Commit df04abfd18 ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext
data") added a bounce buffer to avoid hardened usercopy checks.  Copying
to the bounce buffer was implemented with a simple memcpy() assuming
that it is always valid to read from kernel memory iff the
kern_addr_valid() check passed.

A simple, but pointless, test case like "dd if=/proc/kcore of=/dev/null"
now can easily crash the kernel, since the former execption handling on
invalid kernel addresses now doesn't work anymore.

Also adding a kern_addr_valid() implementation wouldn't help here.  Most
architectures simply return 1 here, while a couple implemented a page
table walk to figure out if something is mapped at the address in
question.

With DEBUG_PAGEALLOC active mappings are established and removed all the
time, so that relying on the result of kern_addr_valid() before
executing the memcpy() also doesn't work.

Therefore simply use probe_kernel_read() to copy to the bounce buffer.
This also allows to simplify read_kcore().

At least on s390 this fixes the observed crashes and doesn't introduce
warnings that were removed with df04abfd18 ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add
bounce buffer for ktext data"), even though the generic
probe_kernel_read() implementation uses uaccess functions.

While looking into this I'm also wondering if kern_addr_valid() could be
completely removed...(?)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171202132739.99971-1-heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Fixes: df04abfd18 ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data")
Fixes: f5509cc18d ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
pull/10/head
Heiko Carstens 2018-02-06 15:37:13 -08:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent ebe2ba5385
commit 7e54b58285
1 changed files with 5 additions and 13 deletions
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18
fs/proc/kcore.c
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@ -512,23 +512,15 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
unsigned long n;
/*
* Using bounce buffer to bypass the
* hardened user copy kernel text checks.
*/
memcpy(buf, (char *) start, tsz);
n = copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz);
/*
* We cannot distinguish between fault on source
* and fault on destination. When this happens
* we clear too and hope it will trigger the
* EFAULT again.
*/
if (n) {
if (clear_user(buffer + tsz - n,
n))
if (probe_kernel_read(buf, (void *) start, tsz)) {
if (clear_user(buffer, tsz))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz))
return -EFAULT;
}
} else {