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x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD 

commit 9f65fb2937 upstream

Intel collateral will reference the SSB mitigation bit in IA32_SPEC_CTL[2]
as SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable).

Hence changing it.

It is unclear yet what the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (0x10a) Bit(4) name
is going to be. Following the rename it would be SSBD_NO but that rolls out
to Speculative Store Bypass Disable No.

Also fixed the missing space in X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD.

[ tglx: Fixup x86_amd_rds_enable() and rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg() as well ]

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
pull/10/head
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-05-09 21:41:38 +02:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 0f18f44ce0
commit 89ba80e61a
11 changed files with 51 additions and 51 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
View File

@ -213,7 +213,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS (7*32+24) /* "" AMD RDS implementation */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD ( 7*32+24) /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@ -333,7 +333,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
#define X86_FEATURE_RDS (18*32+31) /* Reduced Data Speculation */
#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD (18*32+31) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
/*
* BUG word(s)

10
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
View File

@ -42,8 +42,8 @@
#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT 2 /* Reduced Data Speculation bit */
#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS (1 << SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT) /* Reduced Data Speculation */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@ -70,10 +70,10 @@
#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
#define ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO (1 << 4) /*
#define ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO (1 << 4) /*
* Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
* attack, so no Reduced Data Speculation control
* required.
* attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
* control required.
*/
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119

12
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
View File

@ -17,20 +17,20 @@ extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64);
/* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
static inline u64 rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_RDS < SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) >> (TIF_RDS - SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
}
static inline u64 rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
{
return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask : 0ULL;
return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
}
extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(void);

6
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
View File

@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ struct thread_info {
#define TIF_SIGPENDING 2 /* signal pending */
#define TIF_NEED_RESCHED 3 /* rescheduling necessary */
#define TIF_SINGLESTEP 4 /* reenable singlestep on user return*/
#define TIF_RDS 5 /* Reduced data speculation */
#define TIF_SSBD 5 /* Reduced data speculation */
#define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU 6 /* syscall emulation active */
#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */
#define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */
@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ struct thread_info {
#define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
#define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP (1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
#define _TIF_RDS (1 << TIF_RDS)
#define _TIF_SSBD (1 << TIF_SSBD)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ struct thread_info {
/* flags to check in __switch_to() */
#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW \
(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_RDS)
(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_SSBD)
#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW)

14
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
View File

@ -567,12 +567,12 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
/*
* Try to cache the base value so further operations can
* avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable RDS.
* avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD.
*/
if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask = 1ULL << bit;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << bit;
}
}
}
@ -894,9 +894,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDS);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
}
}

36
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
View File

@ -45,10 +45,10 @@ static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
/*
* AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
* x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
* x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
*/
u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
u64 msrval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
msrval |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
msrval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
return msrval;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
return;
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl);
@ -174,18 +174,18 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
return;
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, host);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);
static void x86_amd_rds_enable(void)
static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
{
u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS))
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
}
@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDS))
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
return mode;
cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
/*
* We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
* - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
* - X86_FEATURE_RDS - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
* - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
* - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
*/
if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
@ -518,12 +518,12 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
*/
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS);
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
break;
case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
x86_amd_rds_enable();
x86_amd_ssb_disable();
break;
}
}
@ -556,16 +556,16 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
return -EPERM;
task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
break;
case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
break;
case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
break;
default:
return -ERANGE;
@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask);
if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
x86_amd_rds_enable();
x86_amd_ssb_disable();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS

2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
View File

@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO))
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))

2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
View File

@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
}
/*

8
arch/x86/kernel/process.c
View File

@ -284,11 +284,11 @@ static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn
{
u64 msr;
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
} else {
msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
}
}
@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOCPUID)
set_cpuid_faulting(!!(tifn & _TIF_NOCPUID));
if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_RDS)
if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD)
__speculative_store_bypass_update(tifn);
}

2
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
View File

@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(RDS) |
F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(SSBD) |
F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */

6
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
View File

@ -3295,7 +3295,7 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDS))
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
return 1;
msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
@ -3417,11 +3417,11 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDS))
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
return 1;
/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_RDS))
if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
return 1;
vmx->spec_ctrl = data;