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atm: zatm: Fix potential Spectre v1 

commit 2be147f745 upstream.

pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/atm/zatm.c:1462 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'zatm_dev->pool_info' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index
zatm_dev->pool_info

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
pull/10/head
Gustavo A. R. Silva 2018-05-03 13:17:12 -05:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent cc21a60327
commit e2023117b8
1 changed files with 3 additions and 0 deletions
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3
drivers/atm/zatm.c
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@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "uPD98401.h"
#include "uPD98402.h"
@ -1458,6 +1459,8 @@ static int zatm_ioctl(struct atm_dev *dev,unsigned int cmd,void __user *arg)
return -EFAULT;
if (pool < 0 || pool > ZATM_LAST_POOL)
return -EINVAL;
pool = array_index_nospec(pool,
ZATM_LAST_POOL + 1);
spin_lock_irqsave(&zatm_dev->lock, flags);
info = zatm_dev->pool_info[pool];
if (cmd == ZATM_GETPOOLZ) {