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/dev/mem: Add bounce buffer for copy-out 

[ Upstream commit 22ec1a2aea ]

As done for /proc/kcore in

  commit df04abfd18 ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data")

this adds a bounce buffer when reading memory via /dev/mem. This
is needed to allow kernel text memory to be read out when built with
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY (which refuses to read out kernel text) and
without CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM (which would have refused to read any RAM
contents at all).

Since this build configuration isn't common (most systems with
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY also have CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM), this also tries
to inform Kconfig about the recommended settings.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's changes to /dev/mem
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Reported-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fixes: f5509cc18d ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
pull/10/head
Kees Cook 2017-12-01 13:19:39 -08:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 79a49fcc07
commit ea60e54b22
2 changed files with 23 additions and 5 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

27
drivers/char/mem.c
View File

@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ static ssize_t read_mem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
phys_addr_t p = *ppos;
ssize_t read, sz;
void *ptr;
char *bounce;
int err;
if (p != *ppos)
return 0;
@ -129,15 +131,22 @@ static ssize_t read_mem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
}
#endif
bounce = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bounce)
return -ENOMEM;
while (count > 0) {
unsigned long remaining;
int allowed;
sz = size_inside_page(p, count);
err = -EPERM;
allowed = page_is_allowed(p >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (!allowed)
return -EPERM;
goto failed;
err = -EFAULT;
if (allowed == 2) {
/* Show zeros for restricted memory. */
remaining = clear_user(buf, sz);
@ -149,24 +158,32 @@ static ssize_t read_mem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
*/
ptr = xlate_dev_mem_ptr(p);
if (!ptr)
return -EFAULT;
remaining = copy_to_user(buf, ptr, sz);
goto failed;
err = probe_kernel_read(bounce, ptr, sz);
unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr);
if (err)
goto failed;
remaining = copy_to_user(buf, bounce, sz);
}
if (remaining)
return -EFAULT;
goto failed;
buf += sz;
p += sz;
count -= sz;
read += sz;
}
kfree(bounce);
*ppos += read;
return read;
failed:
kfree(bounce);
return err;
}
static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,

1
security/Kconfig
View File

@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
select BUG
imply STRICT_DEVMEM
help
This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and