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x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 

Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.

Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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Dan Williams 2018-01-29 17:03:21 -08:00 committed by Thomas Gleixner
parent 259d8c1e98
commit edfbae53da
1 changed files with 1 additions and 1 deletions
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2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
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@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,