Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Add 'cross-release' support to lockdep, which allows APIs like
completions, where it's not the 'owner' who releases the lock, to be
tracked. It's all activated automatically under
CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y.
- Clean up (restructure) the x86 atomics op implementation to be more
readable, in preparation of KASAN annotations. (Dmitry Vyukov)
- Fix static keys (Paolo Bonzini)
- Add killable versions of down_read() et al (Kirill Tkhai)
- Rework and fix jump_label locking (Marc Zyngier, Paolo Bonzini)
- Rework (and fix) tlb_flush_pending() barriers (Peter Zijlstra)
- Remove smp_mb__before_spinlock() and convert its usages, introduce
smp_mb__after_spinlock() (Peter Zijlstra)
* 'locking-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (56 commits)
locking/lockdep/selftests: Fix mixed read-write ABBA tests
sched/completion: Avoid unnecessary stack allocation for COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK()
acpi/nfit: Fix COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK() abuse
locking/pvqspinlock: Relax cmpxchg's to improve performance on some architectures
smp: Avoid using two cache lines for struct call_single_data
locking/lockdep: Untangle xhlock history save/restore from task independence
locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Disable CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT for the time being
futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour
Documentation/locking/atomic: Finish the document...
locking/lockdep: Fix workqueue crossrelease annotation
workqueue/lockdep: 'Fix' flush_work() annotation
locking/lockdep/selftests: Add mixed read-write ABBA tests
mm, locking/barriers: Clarify tlb_flush_pending() barriers
locking/lockdep: Make CONFIG_LOCKDEP_CROSSRELEASE and CONFIG_LOCKDEP_COMPLETIONS truly non-interactive
locking/lockdep: Explicitly initialize wq_barrier::done::map
locking/lockdep: Rename CONFIG_LOCKDEP_COMPLETE to CONFIG_LOCKDEP_COMPLETIONS
locking/lockdep: Reword title of LOCKDEP_CROSSRELEASE config
locking/lockdep: Make CONFIG_LOCKDEP_CROSSRELEASE part of CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
locking/lockdep: Fix the rollback and overwrite detection logic in crossrelease
...
This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable
performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL.
This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation
but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount
has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected,
the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow
protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back
to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow
use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely.
Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since
it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to
be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements,
and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would
be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free
conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require
the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more
common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection
provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount
overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been
rendered unexploitable:
http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016
This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero
(i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it
resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will
have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a
use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely
avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free
vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such
conditions to remain universally silent.
On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2
(which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are
produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as
changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no
notification is performed (since the value was already saturated).
On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before
0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no
overflow-only race condition.
As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction
to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount
operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon
in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction
to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by
default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch
prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable
change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path,
located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0
to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles
reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to
.text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the
error reporting routine.
Example assembly comparison:
refcount_inc() before:
.text:
ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
refcount_inc() after:
.text:
ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
ffffffff8154614d: 0f 88 80 d5 17 00 js ffffffff816c36d3
...
.text.unlikely:
ffffffff816c36d3: 48 8d 4d f4 lea -0xc(%rbp),%rcx
ffffffff816c36d7: 0f ff (bad)
These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1
to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between
unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL
(refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast):
2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s:
cycles protections
atomic_t 82249267387 none
refcount_t-fast 82211446892 overflow, untested dec-to-zero
refcount_t-full 144814735193 overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero
This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t
overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based
on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks
to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this
code to be a refcount-only protection.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Now that pt_regs properly defines segment fields as 16-bit on 32-bit
CPUs, there's no need to mask off the high word.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Hans managed to trigger a WARN very early in the boot which killed his
(Virtual) box.
The reason is that the recent rework of WARN() to use UD0 forgot to add the
fixup_bug() call to early_fixup_exception(). As a result the kernel does
not handle the WARN_ON injected UD0 exception and panics.
Add the missing fixup call, so early UD's injected by WARN() get handled.
Fixes: 9a93848fe7 ("x86/debug: Implement __WARN() using UD0")
Reported-and-tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Frank Mehnert <frank.mehnert@oracle.com>
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Thayer <michael.thayer@oracle.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170612180108.w4vgu2ckucmllf3a@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
We are going to split <linux/sched/debug.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/debug.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On the 80486 DX, it seems that some exceptions may leave garbage in
the high bits of CS. This causes sporadic failures in which
early_fixup_exception() refuses to fix up an exception.
As far as I can tell, this has been buggy for a long time, but the
problem seems to have been exacerbated by commits:
1e02ce4ccc ("x86: Store a per-cpu shadow copy of CR4")
e1bfc11c5a ("x86/init: Fix cr4_init_shadow() on CR4-less machines")
This appears to have broken for as long as we've had early
exception handling.
[ Note to stable maintainers: This patch is needed all the way back to 3.4,
but it will only apply to 4.6 and up, as it depends on commit:
0e861fbb5b ("x86/head: Move early exception panic code into early_fixup_exception()")
If you want to backport to kernels before 4.6, please don't backport the
prerequisites (there was a big chain of them that rewrote a lot of the
early exception machinery); instead, ask me and I can send you a one-liner
that will apply. ]
Reported-by: Matthew Whitehead <tedheadster@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4c5023a3fa ("x86-32: Handle exception table entries during early boot")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cb32c69920e58a1a58e7b5cad975038a69c0ce7d.1479609510.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
These files were only including module.h for exception table related
functions. We've now separated that content out into its own file
"extable.h" so now move over to that and avoid all the extra header content
in module.h that we don't really need to compile these files.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160919210418.30243-1-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Pull x86 stackdump update from Ingo Molnar:
"A number of stackdump enhancements"
* 'x86-debug-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/dumpstack: Add show_stack_regs() and use it
printk: Make the printk*once() variants return a value
x86/dumpstack: Honor supplied @regs arg
struct thread_info is a legacy mess. To prepare for its partial removal,
move the uaccess control fields out -- they're straightforward.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d0ac4d01c8e4d4d756264604e47445d5acc7900e.1468527351.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add a helper to dump supplied pt_regs and use it in the MSR exception
handling code to have precise stack traces pointing to the actual
function causing the MSR access exception and not the stack frame of the
exception handler itself.
The new output looks like this:
unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0xdeadbeef at rIP: 0xffffffff8102ddb6 (early_init_intel+0x16/0x3a0)
00000000756e6547 ffffffff81c03f68 ffffffff81dd0940 ffffffff81c03f10
ffffffff81d42e65 0000000001000000 ffffffff81c03f58 ffffffff81d3e5a3
0000800000000000 ffffffff81800080 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d42e65>] early_cpu_init+0xe7/0x136
[<ffffffff81d3e5a3>] setup_arch+0xa5/0x9df
[<ffffffff81d38bb9>] start_kernel+0x9f/0x43a
[<ffffffff81d38294>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2f/0x31
[<ffffffff81d383fe>] x86_64_start_kernel+0x168/0x176
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1467671487-10344-4-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
On AMD CPUs, a failed loadsegment currently may not clear the FS
base. Fix it.
While we're at it, prevent loadsegment(gs, xyz) from even compiling
on 64-bit kernels. It shouldn't be used.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a084c1b93b7b1408b58d3fd0b5d6e47da8e7d7cf.1461698311.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Borislav asked for a comment explaining why all exception handlers are
allowed early.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel <Xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5f1dcd6919f4a5923959a8065cb2c04d9dac1412.1459784772.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This demotes an OOPS and likely panic due to a failed non-"safe" MSR
access to a WARN_ONCE() and, for RDMSR, a return value of zero.
To be clear, this type of failure should *not* happen. This patch
exists to minimize the chance of nasty undebuggable failures
happening when a CONFIG_PARAVIRT=y bug in the non-"safe" MSR helpers
gets fixed.
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel <Xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/26567b216aae70e795938f4b567eace5a0eb90ba.1459605520.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Now that early_fixup_exception() has pt_regs, we can just call
fixup_exception() from it. This will make fancy exception handlers
work early.
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel <Xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20fc047d926150cb08cb9b9f2923519b07ec1a15.1459605520.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This removes a bunch of assembly and adds some C code instead. It
changes the actual printouts on both 32-bit and 64-bit kernels, but
they still seem okay.
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel <Xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4085070316fc3ab29538d3fcfe282648d1d4ee2e.1459605520.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
C is nicer than asm.
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel <Xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dd068269f8d59fe44e9e43a50d0efd67da65c2b5.1459605520.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
early_fixup_exception() is limited by the fact that it doesn't have a
real struct pt_regs. Change both the 32-bit and 64-bit asm and the
C code to pass and accept a real pt_regs.
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel <Xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e3fb680fcfd5e23e38237e8328b64a25cc121d37.1459605520.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Replace the arch specific versions of search_extable() and
sort_extable() with calls to the generic ones, which now support
relative exception tables as well.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Huge amounts of help from Andy Lutomirski and Borislav Petkov to
produce this. Andy provided the inspiration to add classes to the
exception table with a clever bit-squeezing trick, Boris pointed
out how much cleaner it would all be if we just had a new field.
Linus Torvalds blessed the expansion with:
' I'd rather not be clever in order to save just a tiny amount of space
in the exception table, which isn't really criticial for anybody. '
The third field is another relative function pointer, this one to a
handler that executes the actions.
We start out with three handlers:
1: Legacy - just jumps the to fixup IP
2: Fault - provide the trap number in %ax to the fixup code
3: Cleaned up legacy for the uaccess error hack
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f6af78fcbd348cf4939875cfda9c19689b5e50b8.1455732970.git.tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Switch to using relative exception table entries on x86. On i386,
this has the advantage that the exception table entries don't need to
be relocated; on x86-64 this means the exception table entries take up
only half the space.
In either case, a 32-bit delta is sufficient, as the range of kernel
code addresses is limited.
Since part of the goal is to avoid needing to adjust the entries when
the kernel is relocated, the old trick of using addresses in the NULL
pointer range to indicate uaccess_err no longer works (and unlike RISC
architectures we can't use a flag bit); instead use an delta just
below +2G to indicate these special entries. The reach is still
limited to a single instruction.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFyijf43qSu3N9nWHEBwaGbb7T2Oq9A=9EyR=Jtyqfq_cQ@mail.gmail.com
Add a restricted version of fixup_exception() to be used during early
boot only. In particular, this doesn't support the try..catch variant
since we may not have a thread_info set up yet.
This relies on the exception table being sorted already at build time.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1334794610-5546-1-git-send-email-hpa@zytor.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
To make this work, we teach the page fault handler how to send
signals on failed uaccess. This only works for user addresses
(kernel addresses will never hit the page fault handler in the
first place), so we need to generate signals for those
separately.
This gets the tricky case right: if the user buffer spans
multiple pages and only the second page is invalid, we set
cr2 and si_addr correctly. UML relies on this behavior to
"fault in" pages as needed.
We steal a bit from thread_info.uaccess_err to enable this.
Before this change, uaccess_err was a 32-bit boolean value.
This fixes issues with UML when vsyscall=emulate.
Reported-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4c8f91de7ec5cd2ef0f59521a04e1015f11e42b4.1320712291.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Move the handling of truncated %rip from an iret fault to the fault
entry path.
This allows x86-64 to use the standard search_extable() function.
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
LKML-Reference: <1255357103-5418-1-git-send-email-brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: introduce new uaccess exception handling framework
Introduce {get|put}_user_try and {get|put}_user_catch as new uaccess exception
handling framework.
{get|put}_user_try begins exception block and {get|put}_user_catch(err) ends
the block and gets err if an exception occured in {get|put}_user_ex() in the
block. The exception is stored thread_info->uaccess_err.
The example usage of this framework is below;
int func()
{
int err = 0;
get_user_try {
get_user_ex(...);
get_user_ex(...);
:
} get_user_catch(err);
return err;
}
Note: get_user_ex() is not clear the value when an exception occurs, it's
different from the behavior of __get_user(), but I think it doesn't matter.
Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Introduce fixup_exception() on 64-bit and use it in kprobes to
eliminate an #ifdef.
Only 64-bit needs search_extable() due to a stepping bug.
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Linus Torvalds