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26039 Commits (b9659ff375cbb965bbfa3cbce1336b917aa0831e)

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jens Axboe 90f9a1ff1e blktrace: fix unlocked registration of tracepoints
commit a6da0024ff upstream.

We need to ensure that tracepoints are registered and unregistered
with the users of them. The existing atomic count isn't enough for
that. Add a lock around the tracepoints, so we serialize access
to them.

This fixes cases where we have multiple users setting up and
tearing down tracepoints, like this:

CPU: 0 PID: 2995 Comm: syzkaller857118 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc5-next-20171018+ #36
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:52
  panic+0x1e4/0x41c kernel/panic.c:183
  __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:546
  report_bug+0x211/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:183
  fixup_bug+0x40/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:177
  do_trap_no_signal arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:211 [inline]
  do_trap+0x260/0x390 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:260
  do_error_trap+0x120/0x390 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:297
  do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:310
  invalid_op+0x18/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:905
RIP: 0010:tracepoint_add_func kernel/tracepoint.c:210 [inline]
RIP: 0010:tracepoint_probe_register_prio+0x397/0x9a0 kernel/tracepoint.c:283
RSP: 0018:ffff8801d1d1f6c0 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffff8801d22e8540 RBX: 00000000ffffffef RCX: ffffffff81710f07
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff85b679c0 RDI: ffff8801d5f19818
RBP: ffff8801d1d1f7c8 R08: ffffffff81710c10 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: ffff8801d1d1f6b0 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffffff817597f0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: ffff8801d1d1f7a0
  tracepoint_probe_register+0x2a/0x40 kernel/tracepoint.c:304
  register_trace_block_rq_insert include/trace/events/block.h:191 [inline]
  blk_register_tracepoints+0x1e/0x2f0 kernel/trace/blktrace.c:1043
  do_blk_trace_setup+0xa10/0xcf0 kernel/trace/blktrace.c:542
  blk_trace_setup+0xbd/0x180 kernel/trace/blktrace.c:564
  sg_ioctl+0xc71/0x2d90 drivers/scsi/sg.c:1089
  vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:45 [inline]
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:685
  SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:700 [inline]
  SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:691
  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x444339
RSP: 002b:00007ffe05bb5b18 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006d66c0 RCX: 0000000000444339
RDX: 000000002084cf90 RSI: 00000000c0481273 RDI: 0000000000000009
RBP: 0000000000000082 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: 00000000c0481273 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

since we can now run these in parallel. Ensure that the exported helpers
for doing this are grabbing the queue trace mutex.

Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-25 11:07:47 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann ddf0936b9e bpf: mark dst unknown on inconsistent {s, u}bounds adjustments
commit 6f16101e6a upstream.

syzkaller generated a BPF proglet and triggered a warning with
the following:

  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (d5) if r0 s<= 0x0 goto pc+0
   R0=inv0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  2: (1f) r0 -= r1
   R0=inv0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  verifier internal error: known but bad sbounds

What happens is that in the first insn, r0's min/max value
are both 0 due to the immediate assignment, later in the jsle
test the bounds are updated for the min value in the false
path, meaning, they yield smin_val = 1, smax_val = 0, and when
ctx pointer is subtracted from r0, verifier bails out with the
internal error and throwing a WARN since smin_val != smax_val
for the known constant.

For min_val > max_val scenario it means that reg_set_min_max()
and reg_set_min_max_inv() (which both refine existing bounds)
demonstrated that such branch cannot be taken at runtime.

In above scenario for the case where it will be taken, the
existing [0, 0] bounds are kept intact. Meaning, the rejection
is not due to a verifier internal error, and therefore the
WARN() is not necessary either.

We could just reject such cases in adjust_{ptr,scalar}_min_max_vals()
when either known scalars have smin_val != smax_val or
umin_val != umax_val or any scalar reg with bounds
smin_val > smax_val or umin_val > umax_val. However, there
may be a small risk of breakage of buggy programs, so handle
this more gracefully and in adjust_{ptr,scalar}_min_max_vals()
just taint the dst reg as unknown scalar when we see ops with
such kind of src reg.

Reported-by: syzbot+6d362cadd45dc0a12ba4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-25 11:07:45 +01:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware) 2949758414 tracing: Fix parsing of globs with a wildcard at the beginning
commit 0723402141 upstream.

Al Viro reported:

    For substring - sure, but what about something like "*a*b" and "a*b"?
    AFAICS, filter_parse_regex() ends up with identical results in both
    cases - MATCH_GLOB and *search = "a*b".  And no way for the caller
    to tell one from another.

Testing this with the following:

 # cd /sys/kernel/tracing
 # echo '*raw*lock' > set_ftrace_filter
 bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument

With this patch:

 # echo '*raw*lock' > set_ftrace_filter
 # cat set_ftrace_filter
_raw_read_trylock
_raw_write_trylock
_raw_read_unlock
_raw_spin_unlock
_raw_write_unlock
_raw_spin_trylock
_raw_spin_lock
_raw_write_lock
_raw_read_lock

Al recommended not setting the search buffer to skip the first '*' unless we
know we are not using MATCH_GLOB. This implements his suggested logic.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180127170748.GF13338@ZenIV.linux.org.uk

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 60f1d5e3ba ("ftrace: Support full glob matching")
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Suggsted-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22 15:42:28 +01:00
Jan H. Schönherr 1f21cd46ca mm: Fix memory size alignment in devm_memremap_pages_release()
commit 10a0cd6e49 upstream.

The functions devm_memremap_pages() and devm_memremap_pages_release() use
different ways to calculate the section-aligned amount of memory. The
latter function may use an incorrect size if the memory region is small
but straddles a section border.

Use the same code for both.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 5f29a77cd9 ("mm: fix mixed zone detection in devm_memremap_pages")
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22 15:42:27 +01:00
Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin) f369f14861 kmemcheck: rip it out
commit 4675ff05de upstream.

Fix up makefiles, remove references, and git rm kmemcheck.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-4-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22 15:42:24 +01:00
Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin) ae63fd26b2 kmemcheck: stop using GFP_NOTRACK and SLAB_NOTRACK
commit 75f296d93b upstream.

Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22 15:42:23 +01:00
Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin) 2abfcdf8e7 kmemcheck: remove annotations
commit 4950276672 upstream.

Patch series "kmemcheck: kill kmemcheck", v2.

As discussed at LSF/MM, kill kmemcheck.

KASan is a replacement that is able to work without the limitation of
kmemcheck (single CPU, slow).  KASan is already upstream.

We are also not aware of any users of kmemcheck (or users who don't
consider KASan as a suitable replacement).

The only objection was that since KASAN wasn't supported by all GCC
versions provided by distros at that time we should hold off for 2
years, and try again.

Now that 2 years have passed, and all distros provide gcc that supports
KASAN, kill kmemcheck again for the very same reasons.

This patch (of 4):

Remove kmemcheck annotations, and calls to kmemcheck from the kernel.

[alexander.levin@verizon.com: correctly remove kmemcheck call from dma_map_sg_attrs]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171012192151.26531-1-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-2-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22 15:42:23 +01:00
Randy Dunlap b6f2efb864 tracing: Prevent PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES when FORTIFY_SOURCE=y
commit 68e76e034b upstream.

I regularly get 50 MB - 60 MB files during kernel randconfig builds.
These large files mostly contain (many repeats of; e.g., 124,594):

In file included from ../include/linux/string.h:6:0,
                 from ../include/linux/uuid.h:20,
                 from ../include/linux/mod_devicetable.h:13,
                 from ../scripts/mod/devicetable-offsets.c:3:
../include/linux/compiler.h:64:4: warning: '______f' is static but declared in inline function 'strcpy' which is not static [enabled by default]
    ______f = {     \
    ^
../include/linux/compiler.h:56:23: note: in expansion of macro '__trace_if'
                       ^
../include/linux/string.h:425:2: note: in expansion of macro 'if'
  if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
  ^

This only happens when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y and
CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES=y, so prevent PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES if
FORTIFY_SOURCE=y.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9199446b-a141-c0c3-9678-a3f9107f2750@infradead.org

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22 15:42:13 +01:00
Paul E. McKenney ce6faf10fd rcu: Export init_rcu_head() and destroy_rcu_head() to GPL modules
commit 156baec397 upstream.

Use of init_rcu_head() and destroy_rcu_head() from modules results in
the following build-time error with CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_RCU_HEAD=y:

	ERROR: "init_rcu_head" [drivers/scsi/scsi_mod.ko] undefined!
	ERROR: "destroy_rcu_head" [drivers/scsi/scsi_mod.ko] undefined!

This commit therefore adds EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() for each to allow them to
be used by GPL-licensed kernel modules.

Reported-by: Bart Van Assche <Bart.VanAssche@wdc.com>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16 20:23:11 +01:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware) b470fb7b79 ftrace: Remove incorrect setting of glob search field
commit 7b65865627 upstream.

__unregister_ftrace_function_probe() will incorrectly parse the glob filter
because it resets the search variable that was setup by filter_parse_regex().

Al Viro reported this:

    After that call of filter_parse_regex() we could have func_g.search not
    equal to glob only if glob started with '!' or '*'.  In the former case
    we would've buggered off with -EINVAL (not = 1).  In the latter we
    would've set func_g.search equal to glob + 1, calculated the length of
    that thing in func_g.len and proceeded to reset func_g.search back to
    glob.

    Suppose the glob is e.g. *foo*.  We end up with
	    func_g.type = MATCH_MIDDLE_ONLY;
	    func_g.len = 3;
	    func_g.search = "*foo";
    Feeding that to ftrace_match_record() will not do anything sane - we
    will be looking for names containing "*foo" (->len is ignored for that
    one).

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180127031706.GE13338@ZenIV.linux.org.uk

Fixes: 3ba0092971 ("ftrace: Introduce ftrace_glob structure")
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16 20:23:11 +01:00
Eric Biggers 75526a9bd3 kernel/relay.c: revert "kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak"
commit a1be1f3931 upstream.

This reverts commit ba62bafe94 ("kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak").

This commit introduced a double free bug, because 'chan' is already
freed by the line:

    kref_put(&chan->kref, relay_destroy_channel);

This bug was found by syzkaller, using the BLKTRACESETUP ioctl.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180127004759.101823-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: ba62bafe94 ("kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Zhouyi Zhou <yizhouzhou@ict.ac.cn>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16 20:23:05 +01:00
Rasmus Villemoes 838f9cc948 kernel/async.c: revert "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()"
commit 4f7e988e63 upstream.

This reverts commit 92266d6ef6 ("async: simplify lowest_in_progress()")
which was simply wrong: In the case where domain is NULL, we now use the
wrong offsetof() in the list_first_entry macro, so we don't actually
fetch the ->cookie value, but rather the eight bytes located
sizeof(struct list_head) further into the struct async_entry.

On 64 bit, that's the data member, while on 32 bit, that's a u64 built
from func and data in some order.

I think the bug happens to be harmless in practice: It obviously only
affects callers which pass a NULL domain, and AFAICT the only such
caller is

  async_synchronize_full() ->
  async_synchronize_full_domain(NULL) ->
  async_synchronize_cookie_domain(ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX, NULL)

and the ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX means that in practice we end up waiting for
the async_global_pending list to be empty - but it would break if
somebody happened to pass (void*)-1 as the data element to
async_schedule, and of course also if somebody ever does a
async_synchronize_cookie_domain(, NULL) with a "finite" cookie value.

Maybe the "harmless in practice" means this isn't -stable material.  But
I'm not completely confident my quick git grep'ing is enough, and there
might be affected code in one of the earlier kernels that has since been
removed, so I'll leave the decision to the stable guys.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128104938.3921-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Fixes: 92266d6ef6 "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()"
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Adam Wallis <awallis@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16 20:23:05 +01:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware) d9c3131f2a sched/rt: Up the root domain ref count when passing it around via IPIs
commit 364f566537 upstream.

When issuing an IPI RT push, where an IPI is sent to each CPU that has more
than one RT task scheduled on it, it references the root domain's rto_mask,
that contains all the CPUs within the root domain that has more than one RT
task in the runable state. The problem is, after the IPIs are initiated, the
rq->lock is released. This means that the root domain that is associated to
the run queue could be freed while the IPIs are going around.

Add a sched_get_rd() and a sched_put_rd() that will increment and decrement
the root domain's ref count respectively. This way when initiating the IPIs,
the scheduler will up the root domain's ref count before releasing the
rq->lock, ensuring that the root domain does not go away until the IPI round
is complete.

Reported-by: Pavan Kondeti <pkondeti@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 4bdced5c9a ("sched/rt: Simplify the IPI based RT balancing logic")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEU1=PkiHO35Dzna8EQqNSKW1fr1y1zRQ5y66X117MG06sQtNA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16 20:22:44 +01:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware) 9c41a8453c sched/rt: Use container_of() to get root domain in rto_push_irq_work_func()
commit ad0f1d9d65 upstream.

When the rto_push_irq_work_func() is called, it looks at the RT overloaded
bitmask in the root domain via the runqueue (rq->rd). The problem is that
during CPU up and down, nothing here stops rq->rd from changing between
taking the rq->rd->rto_lock and releasing it. That means the lock that is
released is not the same lock that was taken.

Instead of using this_rq()->rd to get the root domain, as the irq work is
part of the root domain, we can simply get the root domain from the irq work
that is passed to the routine:

 container_of(work, struct root_domain, rto_push_work)

This keeps the root domain consistent.

Reported-by: Pavan Kondeti <pkondeti@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 4bdced5c9a ("sched/rt: Simplify the IPI based RT balancing logic")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEU1=PkiHO35Dzna8EQqNSKW1fr1y1zRQ5y66X117MG06sQtNA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16 20:22:44 +01:00
Omar Sandoval e94a7de2a3 sched/wait: Fix add_wait_queue() behavioral change
commit c6b9d9a330 upstream.

The following cleanup commit:

  50816c4899 ("sched/wait: Standardize internal naming of wait-queue entries")

... unintentionally changed the behavior of add_wait_queue() from
inserting the wait entry at the head of the wait queue to the tail
of the wait queue.

Beyond a negative performance impact this change in behavior
theoretically also breaks wait queues which mix exclusive and
non-exclusive waiters, as non-exclusive waiters will not be
woken up if they are queued behind enough exclusive waiters.

Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Fixes: ("sched/wait: Standardize internal naming of wait-queue entries")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a16c8ccffd39bd08fdaa45a5192294c784b803a7.1512544324.git.osandov@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16 20:22:43 +01:00
Andrew Morton f18046f7a5 kernel/exit.c: export abort() to modules
commit dc8635b78c upstream.

gcc -fisolate-erroneous-paths-dereference can generate calls to abort()
from modular code too.

[arnd@arndb.de: drop duplicate exports of abort()]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180102103311.706364-1-arnd@arndb.de
Reported-by: Vineet Gupta <Vineet.Gupta1@synopsys.com>
Cc: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Alexey Brodkin <Alexey.Brodkin@synopsys.com>
Cc: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Evgeniy Didin <Evgeniy.Didin@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 10:19:49 +01:00
Sudip Mukherjee c5c91d8305 arch: define weak abort()
commit 7c2c11b208 upstream.

gcc toggle -fisolate-erroneous-paths-dereference (default at -O2
onwards) isolates faulty code paths such as null pointer access, divide
by zero etc.  If gcc port doesnt implement __builtin_trap, an abort() is
generated which causes kernel link error.

In this case, gcc is generating abort due to 'divide by zero' in
lib/mpi/mpih-div.c.

Currently 'frv' and 'arc' are failing.  Previously other arch was also
broken like m32r was fixed by commit d22e3d69ee ("m32r: fix build
failure").

Let's define this weak function which is common for all arch and fix the
problem permanently.  We can even remove the arch specific 'abort' after
this is done.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513118956-8718-1-git-send-email-sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexey Brodkin <Alexey.Brodkin@synopsys.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <Vineet.Gupta1@synopsys.com>
Cc: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Evgeniy Didin <Evgeniy.Didin@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-13 10:19:49 +01:00
Andi Kleen 86b5b1eb18 module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module
commit caf7501a1b

There's a risk that a kernel which has full retpoline mitigations becomes
vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been compiled with the
right compiler or the right option.

To enable detection of that mismatch at module load time, add a module info
string "retpoline" at build time when the module was compiled with
retpoline support. This only covers compiled C source, but assembler source
or prebuilt object files are not checked.

If a retpoline enabled kernel detects a non retpoline protected module at
load time, print a warning and report it in the sysfs vulnerability file.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: jeyu@kernel.org
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125235028.31211-1-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-07 11:12:18 -08:00
Vasily Averin 612959943e perf/core: Fix memory leak triggered by perf --namespace
[ Upstream commit 0e18dd1206 ]

perf with --namespace key leaks various memory objects including namespaces

  4.14.0+
  pid_namespace          1     12   2568   12    8
  user_namespace         1     39    824   39    8
  net_namespace          1      5   6272    5    8

This happen because perf_fill_ns_link_info() struct patch ns_path:
during initialization ns_path incremented counters on related mnt and dentry,
but without lost path_put nobody decremented them back.
Leaked dentry is name of related namespace,
and its leak does not allow to free unused namespace.

Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: commit e422267322 ("perf: Add PERF_RECORD_NAMESPACES to include namespaces related info")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c510711b-3904-e5e1-d296-61273d21118d@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-03 17:39:15 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra d383a4277b futex: Fix OWNER_DEAD fixup
commit a97cb0e7b3 upstream.

Both Geert and DaveJ reported that the recent futex commit:

  c1e2f0eaf0 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")

introduced a problem with setting OWNER_DEAD. We set the bit on an
uninitialized variable and then entirely optimize it away as a
dead-store.

Move the setting of the bit to where it is more useful.

Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: c1e2f0eaf0 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180122103947.GD2228@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ozkan Sezer <sezeroz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-03 17:38:47 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann a17536742b bpf: reject stores into ctx via st and xadd
[ upstream commit f37a8cb84c ]

Alexei found that verifier does not reject stores into context
via BPF_ST instead of BPF_STX. And while looking at it, we
also should not allow XADD variant of BPF_STX.

The context rewriter is only assuming either BPF_LDX_MEM- or
BPF_STX_MEM-type operations, thus reject anything other than
that so that assumptions in the rewriter properly hold. Add
test cases as well for BPF selftests.

Fixes: d691f9e8d4 ("bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-31 14:03:50 +01:00
Alexei Starovoitov ca0a096720 bpf: fix 32-bit divide by zero
[ upstream commit 68fda450a7 ]

due to some JITs doing if (src_reg == 0) check in 64-bit mode
for div/mod operations mask upper 32-bits of src register
before doing the check

Fixes: 622582786c ("net: filter: x86: internal BPF JIT")
Fixes: 7a12b5031c ("sparc64: Add eBPF JIT.")
Reported-by: syzbot+48340bb518e88849e2e3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-31 14:03:50 +01:00
Eric Dumazet 6eca013bef bpf: fix divides by zero
[ upstream commit c366287ebd ]

Divides by zero are not nice, lets avoid them if possible.

Also do_div() seems not needed when dealing with 32bit operands,
but this seems a minor detail.

Fixes: bd4cf0ed33 ("net: filter: rework/optimize internal BPF interpreter's instruction set")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-31 14:03:50 +01:00
Alexei Starovoitov 6fde36d5ce bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
[ upstream commit 290af86629 ]

The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715.

A quote from goolge project zero blog:
"At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in
the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading
from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result
appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an
attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together
and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying.
So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into
the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside
a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient
to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets."

To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode.
So far eBPF JIT is supported by:
x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64

The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only.
In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden

v2->v3:
- move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel)

v1->v2:
- fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback)
- fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback)
- add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func
- retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk.
  It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next

Considered doing:
  int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT;
but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove
bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place
and remove this jit_init() function.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-31 14:03:49 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner fdd88d753d hrtimer: Reset hrtimer cpu base proper on CPU hotplug
commit d5421ea43d upstream.

The hrtimer interrupt code contains a hang detection and mitigation
mechanism, which prevents that a long delayed hrtimer interrupt causes a
continous retriggering of interrupts which prevent the system from making
progress. If a hang is detected then the timer hardware is programmed with
a certain delay into the future and a flag is set in the hrtimer cpu base
which prevents newly enqueued timers from reprogramming the timer hardware
prior to the chosen delay. The subsequent hrtimer interrupt after the delay
clears the flag and resumes normal operation.

If such a hang happens in the last hrtimer interrupt before a CPU is
unplugged then the hang_detected flag is set and stays that way when the
CPU is plugged in again. At that point the timer hardware is not armed and
it cannot be armed because the hang_detected flag is still active, so
nothing clears that flag. As a consequence the CPU does not receive hrtimer
interrupts and no timers expire on that CPU which results in RCU stalls and
other malfunctions.

Clear the flag along with some other less critical members of the hrtimer
cpu base to ensure starting from a clean state when a CPU is plugged in.

Thanks to Paul, Sebastian and Anna-Maria for their help to get down to the
root cause of that hard to reproduce heisenbug. Once understood it's
trivial and certainly justifies a brown paperbag.

Fixes: 41d2e49493 ("hrtimer: Tune hrtimer_interrupt hang logic")
Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Sewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801261447590.2067@nanos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-31 14:03:49 +01:00
Sergey Senozhatsky a6d5930ccf workqueue: avoid hard lockups in show_workqueue_state()
commit 62635ea8c1 upstream.

show_workqueue_state() can print out a lot of messages while being in
atomic context, e.g. sysrq-t -> show_workqueue_state(). If the console
device is slow it may end up triggering NMI hard lockup watchdog.

Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-23 19:58:18 +01:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware) 7296666e93 tracing: Fix converting enum's from the map in trace_event_eval_update()
commit 1ebe1eaf2f upstream.

Since enums do not get converted by the TRACE_EVENT macro into their values,
the event format displaces the enum name and not the value. This breaks
tools like perf and trace-cmd that need to interpret the raw binary data. To
solve this, an enum map was created to convert these enums into their actual
numbers on boot up. This is done by TRACE_EVENTS() adding a
TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM() macro.

Some enums were not being converted. This was caused by an optization that
had a bug in it.

All calls get checked against this enum map to see if it should be converted
or not, and it compares the call's system to the system that the enum map
was created under. If they match, then they call is processed.

To cut down on the number of iterations needed to find the maps with a
matching system, since calls and maps are grouped by system, when a match is
made, the index into the map array is saved, so that the next call, if it
belongs to the same system as the previous call, could start right at that
array index and not have to scan all the previous arrays.

The problem was, the saved index was used as the variable to know if this is
a call in a new system or not. If the index was zero, it was assumed that
the call is in a new system and would keep incrementing the saved index
until it found a matching system. The issue arises when the first matching
system was at index zero. The next map, if it belonged to the same system,
would then think it was the first match and increment the index to one. If
the next call belong to the same system, it would begin its search of the
maps off by one, and miss the first enum that should be converted. This left
a single enum not converted properly.

Also add a comment to describe exactly what that index was for. It took me a
bit too long to figure out what I was thinking when debugging this issue.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/717BE572-2070-4C1E-9902-9F2E0FEDA4F8@oracle.com

Fixes: 0c564a538a ("tracing: Add TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM() macro to map enums to their values")
Reported-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Teste-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-23 19:58:16 +01:00
Josh Snyder 36ae2e6f5c delayacct: Account blkio completion on the correct task
commit c96f5471ce upstream.

Before commit:

  e33a9bba85 ("sched/core: move IO scheduling accounting from io_schedule_timeout() into scheduler")

delayacct_blkio_end() was called after context-switching into the task which
completed I/O.

This resulted in double counting: the task would account a delay both waiting
for I/O and for time spent in the runqueue.

With e33a9bba85, delayacct_blkio_end() is called by try_to_wake_up().
In ttwu, we have not yet context-switched. This is more correct, in that
the delay accounting ends when the I/O is complete.

But delayacct_blkio_end() relies on 'get_current()', and we have not yet
context-switched into the task whose I/O completed. This results in the
wrong task having its delay accounting statistics updated.

Instead of doing that, pass the task_struct being woken to delayacct_blkio_end(),
so that it can update the statistics of the correct task.

Signed-off-by: Josh Snyder <joshs@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <bgregg@netflix.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e33a9bba85 ("sched/core: move IO scheduling accounting from io_schedule_timeout() into scheduler")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513613712-571-1-git-send-email-joshs@netflix.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-23 19:58:13 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 4db98c5832 timers: Unconditionally check deferrable base
commit ed4bbf7910 upstream.

When the timer base is checked for expired timers then the deferrable base
must be checked as well. This was missed when making the deferrable base
independent of base::nohz_active.

Fixes: ced6d5c11d ("timers: Use deferrable base independent of base::nohz_active")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: rt@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-23 19:58:12 +01:00
Li Jinyue 17ae6ccfe5 futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
commit fbe0e839d1 upstream.

UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:

 UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
 signed integer overflow:
 0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'

Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.

Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-23 19:58:11 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra 1352130fe6 futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
commit c1e2f0eaf0 upstream.

Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:

   waiter                                  waker                                            stealer (prio > waiter)

   futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
         timeout=[N ms])
      futex_wait_requeue_pi()
         futex_wait_queue_me()
            freezable_schedule()
            <scheduled out>
                                           futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
                                           futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
                                                 uaddr2, 1, 0)
                                              /* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
                                           futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
                                                 wake_futex_pi()
                                                    cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
                                                    wake_up_q()
           <woken by waker>
           <hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
            clears sleeper->task>
                                                                                           futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
                                                                                              __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
                                                                                                 try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
                                                                                                    rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
                                                                                              <preempted>
         <scheduled in>
         rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
            __rt_mutex_slowlock()
               try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
               if (timeout && !timeout->task)
                  return -ETIMEDOUT;
            fixup_owner()
               /* lock wasn't acquired, so,
                  fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */

   return -ETIMEDOUT;

   /* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
    * futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
    * stealer as the owner */

   futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
     -> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.

And suggested that what commit:

  73d786bd04 ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")

removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:

  16ffa12d74 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")

changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:

-               if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
-                       locked = 1;
-                       goto out;
-               }

-               raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
-               owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
-               if (!owner)
-                       owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
-               raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
-               ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);

already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.

So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.

Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.

Fixes: 73d786bd04 ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-23 19:58:11 +01:00
Kirill A. Shutemov a4ae05b7bf kdump: write correct address of mem_section into vmcoreinfo
commit a0b1280368 upstream.

Depending on configuration mem_section can now be an array or a pointer
to an array allocated dynamically.  In most cases, we can continue to
refer to it as 'mem_section' regardless of what it is.

But there's one exception: '&mem_section' means "address of the array"
if mem_section is an array, but if mem_section is a pointer, it would
mean "address of the pointer".

We've stepped onto this in kdump code.  VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(mem_section)
writes down address of pointer into vmcoreinfo, not array as we wanted.

Let's introduce VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL_ARRAY() that would handle the
situation correctly for both cases.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180112162532.35896-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 83e3c48729 ("mm/sparsemem: Allocate mem_section at runtime for CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y")
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-17 09:45:27 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann a2e0b5db9b bpf: arsh is not supported in 32 bit alu thus reject it
commit 7891a87efc upstream.

The following snippet was throwing an 'unknown opcode cc' warning
in BPF interpreter:

  0: (18) r0 = 0x0
  2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0
  3: (cc) (u32) r0 s>>= (u32) r0
  4: (95) exit

Although a number of JITs do support BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_{K,X}
generation, not all of them do and interpreter does neither. We can
leave existing ones and implement it later in bpf-next for the
remaining ones, but reject this properly in verifier for the time
being.

Fixes: 17a5267067 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Reported-by: syzbot+93c4904c5c70348a6890@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-17 09:45:25 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann 67c05d9414 bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask
commit bbeb6e4323 upstream.

syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns,
and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399cc
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next
power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can
apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots.

However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore
a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass
allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original
attr->max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF
all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case.

Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used,
since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL << 32 in 32 bit
space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable.

This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers.

Fixes: b2157399cc ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-17 09:45:25 +01:00
Alexei Starovoitov a5dbaf8768 bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
commit b2157399cc upstream.

Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.

To avoid leaking kernel data round up array-based maps and mask the index
after bounds check, so speculated load with out of bounds index will load
either valid value from the array or zero from the padded area.

Unconditionally mask index for all array types even when max_entries
are not rounded to power of 2 for root user.
When map is created by unpriv user generate a sequence of bpf insns
that includes AND operation to make sure that JITed code includes
the same 'index & index_mask' operation.

If prog_array map is created by unpriv user replace
  bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
with
  if (index >= max_entries) {
    index &= map->index_mask;
    bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
  }
(along with roundup to power 2) to prevent out-of-bounds speculation.
There is secondary redundant 'if (index >= max_entries)' in the interpreter
and in all JITs, but they can be optimized later if necessary.

Other array-like maps (cpumap, devmap, sockmap, perf_event_array, cgroup_array)
cannot be used by unpriv, so no changes there.

That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)" on
all architectures with and without JIT.

v2->v3:
Daniel noticed that attack potentially can be crafted via syscall commands
without loading the program, so add masking to those paths as well.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-17 09:45:25 +01:00
Mathieu Desnoyers d01c793696 membarrier: Disable preemption when calling smp_call_function_many()
commit 541676078b upstream.

smp_call_function_many() requires disabling preemption around the call.

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maged Michael <maged.michael@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul E . McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171215192310.25293-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-17 09:45:23 +01:00
Tejun Heo 0196bdf590 cgroup: fix css_task_iter crash on CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC
commit 74d0833c65 upstream.

While teaching css_task_iter to handle skipping over tasks which
aren't group leaders, bc2fb7ed08 ("cgroup: add @flags to
css_task_iter_start() and implement CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS") introduced a
silly bug.

CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS is implemented by repeating
css_task_iter_advance() while the advanced cursor is pointing to a
non-leader thread.  However, the cursor variable, @l, wasn't updated
when the iteration has to advance to the next css_set and the
following repetition would operate on the terminal @l from the
previous iteration which isn't pointing to a valid task leading to
oopses like the following or infinite looping.

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000254
  IP: __task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  ...
  CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.14.4-200.fc26.x86_64 #1
  Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/PRIME B350M-A, BIOS 3203 11/09/2017
  task: ffff88c4baee8000 task.stack: ffff96d5c3158000
  RIP: 0010:__task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0
  RSP: 0018:ffff96d5c315bd50 EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88c4b68c6000 RCX: 0000000000000250
  RDX: ffffffffa5e47960 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88c490f6ab00
  RBP: ffff96d5c315bd50 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 0000000000000005
  R10: ffff88c4be006b80 R11: ffff88c42f1b8004 R12: ffff96d5c315bf18
  R13: ffff88c42d7dd200 R14: ffff88c490f6a510 R15: ffff88c4b68c6000
  FS:  00007f9446f8ea00(0000) GS:ffff88c4be680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000254 CR3: 00000007f956f000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
  Call Trace:
   cgroup_procs_show+0x19/0x30
   cgroup_seqfile_show+0x4c/0xb0
   kernfs_seq_show+0x21/0x30
   seq_read+0x2ec/0x3f0
   kernfs_fop_read+0x134/0x180
   __vfs_read+0x37/0x160
   ? security_file_permission+0x9b/0xc0
   vfs_read+0x8e/0x130
   SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
  RIP: 0033:0x7f94455f942d
  RSP: 002b:00007ffe81ba2d00 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005574e2233f00 RCX: 00007f94455f942d
  RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00005574e2321a90 RDI: 000000000000002b
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00005574e2321a90 R09: 00005574e231de60
  R10: 00007f94458c8b38 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f94458c8ae0
  R13: 00007ffe81ba3800 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005574e2116560
  Code: 04 74 0e 89 f6 48 8d 04 76 48 8d 04 c5 f0 05 00 00 48 8b bf b8 05 00 00 48 01 c7 31 c0 48 8b 0f 48 85 c9 74 18 8b b2 30 08 00 00 <3b> 71 04 77 0d 48 c1 e6 05 48 01 f1 48 3b 51 38 74 09 5d c3 8b
  RIP: __task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0 RSP: ffff96d5c315bd50

Fix it by moving the initialization of the cursor below the repeat
label.  While at it, rename it to @next for readability.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Fixes: bc2fb7ed08 ("cgroup: add @flags to css_task_iter_start() and implement CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS")
Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Bronek Kozicki <brok@incorrekt.com>
Reported-by: George Amanakis <gamanakis@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-17 09:45:18 +01:00
Oleg Nesterov 289b51d3c1 kernel/signal.c: remove the no longer needed SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE check in complete_signal()
commit 426915796c upstream.

complete_signal() checks SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE before it starts to destroy
the thread group, today this is wrong in many ways.

If nothing else, fatal_signal_pending() should always imply that the
whole thread group (except ->group_exit_task if it is not NULL) is
killed, this check breaks the rule.

After the previous changes we can rely on sig_task_ignored();
sig_fatal(sig) && SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE can only be true if we actually want
to kill this task and sig == SIGKILL OR it is traced and debugger can
intercept the signal.

This should hopefully fix the problem reported by Dmitry.  This
test-case

	static int init(void *arg)
	{
		for (;;)
			pause();
	}

	int main(void)
	{
		char stack[16 * 1024];

		for (;;) {
			int pid = clone(init, stack + sizeof(stack)/2,
					CLONE_NEWPID | SIGCHLD, NULL);
			assert(pid > 0);

			assert(ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0) == 0);
			assert(waitpid(-1, NULL, WSTOPPED) == pid);

			assert(ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0, SIGSTOP) == 0);
			assert(syscall(__NR_tkill, pid, SIGKILL) == 0);
			assert(pid == wait(NULL));
		}
	}

triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE(!(task->jobctl & JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING)) in
task_participate_group_stop().  do_signal_stop()->signal_group_exit()
checks SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT and return false, but task_set_jobctl_pending()
checks fatal_signal_pending() and does not set JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING.

And his should fix the minor security problem reported by Kyle,
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE can miss fatal_signal_pending() the same way if the
task is the root of a pid namespace.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171103184246.GD21036@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-10 09:31:20 +01:00
Oleg Nesterov 94429f3536 kernel/signal.c: protect the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE tasks from !sig_kernel_only() signals
commit ac25385089 upstream.

Change sig_task_ignored() to drop the SIG_DFL && !sig_kernel_only()
signals even if force == T.  This simplifies the next change and this
matches the same check in get_signal() which will drop these signals
anyway.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171103184227.GC21036@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-10 09:31:20 +01:00
Oleg Nesterov 2ebd69e8c2 kernel/signal.c: protect the traced SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE tasks from SIGKILL
commit 628c1bcba2 upstream.

The comment in sig_ignored() says "Tracers may want to know about even
ignored signals" but SIGKILL can not be reported to debugger and it is
just wrong to return 0 in this case: SIGKILL should only kill the
SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE task if it comes from the parent ns.

Change sig_ignored() to ignore ->ptrace if sig == SIGKILL and rely on
sig_task_ignored().

SISGTOP coming from within the namespace is not really right too but at
least debugger can intercept it, and we can't drop it here because this
will break "gdb -p 1": ptrace_attach() won't work.  Perhaps we will add
another ->ptrace check later, we will see.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171103184206.GB21036@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-10 09:31:20 +01:00
Oleg Nesterov ae04ca3524 kernel/acct.c: fix the acct->needcheck check in check_free_space()
commit 4d9570158b upstream.

As Tsukada explains, the time_is_before_jiffies(acct->needcheck) check
is very wrong, we need time_is_after_jiffies() to make sys_acct() work.

Ignoring the overflows, the code should "goto out" if needcheck >
jiffies, while currently it checks "needcheck < jiffies" and thus in the
likely case check_free_space() does nothing until jiffies overflow.

In particular this means that sys_acct() is simply broken, acct_on()
sets acct->needcheck = jiffies and expects that check_free_space()
should set acct->active = 1 after the free-space check, but this won't
happen if jiffies increments in between.

This was broken by commit 32dc730860 ("get rid of timer in
kern/acct.c") in 2011, then another (correct) commit 795a2f22a8
("acct() should honour the limits from the very beginning") made the
problem more visible.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171213133940.GA6554@redhat.com
Fixes: 32dc730860 ("get rid of timer in kern/acct.c")
Reported-by: TSUKADA Koutaro <tsukada@ascade.co.jp>
Suggested-by: TSUKADA Koutaro <tsukada@ascade.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-10 09:31:17 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner e798502cfb nohz: Prevent a timer interrupt storm in tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick()
commit 5d62c183f9 upstream.

The conditions in irq_exit() to invoke tick_nohz_irq_exit() which
subsequently invokes tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() are:

  if ((idle_cpu(cpu) && !need_resched()) || tick_nohz_full_cpu(cpu))

If need_resched() is not set, but a timer softirq is pending then this is
an indication that the softirq code punted and delegated the execution to
softirqd. need_resched() is not true because the current interrupted task
takes precedence over softirqd.

Invoking tick_nohz_irq_exit() in this case can cause an endless loop of
timer interrupts because the timer wheel contains an expired timer, but
softirqs are not yet executed. So it returns an immediate expiry request,
which causes the timer to fire immediately again. Lather, rinse and
repeat....

Prevent that by adding a check for a pending timer soft interrupt to the
conditions in tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() which avoid calling
get_next_timer_interrupt(). That keeps the tick sched timer on the tick and
prevents a repetitive programming of an already expired timer.

Reported-by: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.d>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1712272156050.2431@nanos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-02 20:31:16 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 6fae6de72a timers: Reinitialize per cpu bases on hotplug
commit 26456f87ac upstream.

The timer wheel bases are not (re)initialized on CPU hotplug. That leaves
them with a potentially stale clk and next_expiry valuem, which can cause
trouble then the CPU is plugged.

Add a prepare callback which forwards the clock, sets next_expiry to far in
the future and reset the control flags to a known state.

Set base->must_forward_clk so the first timer which is queued will try to
forward the clock to current jiffies.

Fixes: 500462a9de ("timers: Switch to a non-cascading wheel")
Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1712272152200.2431@nanos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-02 20:31:15 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 8f1aa64ab0 timers: Invoke timer_start_debug() where it makes sense
commit fd45bb77ad upstream.

The timer start debug function is called before the proper timer base is
set. As a consequence the trace data contains the stale CPU and flags
values.

Call the debug function after setting the new base and flags.

Fixes: 500462a9de ("timers: Switch to a non-cascading wheel")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: rt@linutronix.de
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171222145337.792907137@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-02 20:31:15 +01:00
Anna-Maria Gleixner e4fb2e7e92 timers: Use deferrable base independent of base::nohz_active
commit ced6d5c11d upstream.

During boot and before base::nohz_active is set in the timer bases, deferrable
timers are enqueued into the standard timer base. This works correctly as
long as base::nohz_active is false.

Once it base::nohz_active is set and a timer which was enqueued before that
is accessed the lock selector code choses the lock of the deferred
base. This causes unlocked access to the standard base and in case the
timer is removed it does not clear the pending flag in the standard base
bitmap which causes get_next_timer_interrupt() to return bogus values.

To prevent that, the deferrable timers must be enqueued in the deferrable
base, even when base::nohz_active is not set. Those deferrable timers also
need to be expired unconditional.

Fixes: 500462a9de ("timers: Switch to a non-cascading wheel")
Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: rt@linutronix.de
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171222145337.633328378@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-02 20:31:15 +01:00
Joel Fernandes 0c688c288f cpufreq: schedutil: Use idle_calls counter of the remote CPU
commit 466a2b42d6 upstream.

Since the recent remote cpufreq callback work, its possible that a cpufreq
update is triggered from a remote CPU. For single policies however, the current
code uses the local CPU when trying to determine if the remote sg_cpu entered
idle or is busy. This is incorrect. To remedy this, compare with the nohz tick
idle_calls counter of the remote CPU.

Fixes: 674e75411f (sched: cpufreq: Allow remote cpufreq callbacks)
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-02 20:31:05 +01:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware) 0aea6fb0e7 ring-buffer: Do no reuse reader page if still in use
commit ae415fa4c5 upstream.

To free the reader page that is allocated with ring_buffer_alloc_read_page(),
ring_buffer_free_read_page() must be called. For faster performance, this
page can be reused by the ring buffer to avoid having to free and allocate
new pages.

The issue arises when the page is used with a splice pipe into the
networking code. The networking code may up the page counter for the page,
and keep it active while sending it is queued to go to the network. The
incrementing of the page ref does not prevent it from being reused in the
ring buffer, and this can cause the page that is being sent out to the
network to be modified before it is sent by reading new data.

Add a check to the page ref counter, and only reuse the page if it is not
being used anywhere else.

Fixes: 73a757e631 ("ring-buffer: Return reader page back into existing ring buffer")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-02 20:31:03 +01:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware) 66f833dbed ring-buffer: Mask out the info bits when returning buffer page length
commit 45d8b80c2a upstream.

Two info bits were added to the "commit" part of the ring buffer data page
when returned to be consumed. This was to inform the user space readers that
events have been missed, and that the count may be stored at the end of the
page.

What wasn't handled, was the splice code that actually called a function to
return the length of the data in order to zero out the rest of the page
before sending it up to user space. These data bits were returned with the
length making the value negative, and that negative value was not checked.
It was compared to PAGE_SIZE, and only used if the size was less than
PAGE_SIZE. Luckily PAGE_SIZE is unsigned long which made the compare an
unsigned compare, meaning the negative size value did not end up causing a
large portion of memory to be randomly zeroed out.

Fixes: 66a8cb95ed ("ring-buffer: Add place holder recording of dropped events")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-02 20:31:03 +01:00
Jing Xia 9866982561 tracing: Fix crash when it fails to alloc ring buffer
commit 24f2aaf952 upstream.

Double free of the ring buffer happens when it fails to alloc new
ring buffer instance for max_buffer if TRACER_MAX_TRACE is configured.
The root cause is that the pointer is not set to NULL after the buffer
is freed in allocate_trace_buffers(), and the freeing of the ring
buffer is invoked again later if the pointer is not equal to Null,
as:

instance_mkdir()
    |-allocate_trace_buffers()
        |-allocate_trace_buffer(tr, &tr->trace_buffer...)
	|-allocate_trace_buffer(tr, &tr->max_buffer...)

          // allocate fail(-ENOMEM),first free
          // and the buffer pointer is not set to null
        |-ring_buffer_free(tr->trace_buffer.buffer)

       // out_free_tr
    |-free_trace_buffers()
        |-free_trace_buffer(&tr->trace_buffer);

	      //if trace_buffer is not null, free again
	    |-ring_buffer_free(buf->buffer)
                |-rb_free_cpu_buffer(buffer->buffers[cpu])
                    // ring_buffer_per_cpu is null, and
                    // crash in ring_buffer_per_cpu->pages

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171226071253.8968-1-chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com

Fixes: 737223fbca ("tracing: Consolidate buffer allocation code")
Signed-off-by: Jing Xia <jing.xia@spreadtrum.com>
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang <chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-02 20:30:55 +01:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware) 21a9c7346e tracing: Fix possible double free on failure of allocating trace buffer
commit 4397f04575 upstream.

Jing Xia and Chunyan Zhang reported that on failing to allocate part of the
tracing buffer, memory is freed, but the pointers that point to them are not
initialized back to NULL, and later paths may try to free the freed memory
again. Jing and Chunyan fixed one of the locations that does this, but
missed a spot.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171226071253.8968-1-chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com

Fixes: 737223fbca ("tracing: Consolidate buffer allocation code")
Reported-by: Jing Xia <jing.xia@spreadtrum.com>
Reported-by: Chunyan Zhang <chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-02 20:30:55 +01:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware) 234bc12669 tracing: Remove extra zeroing out of the ring buffer page
commit 6b7e633fe9 upstream.

The ring_buffer_read_page() takes care of zeroing out any extra data in the
page that it returns. There's no need to zero it out again from the
consumer. It was removed from one consumer of this function, but
read_buffers_splice_read() did not remove it, and worse, it contained a
nasty bug because of it.

Fixes: 2711ca237a ("ring-buffer: Move zeroing out excess in page to ring buffer code")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-02 20:30:54 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner ee8e8b2df6 arch, mm: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail
commit c10e83f598 upstream.

In order to sanitize the LDT initialization on x86 arch_dup_mmap() must be
allowed to fail. Fix up all instances.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-29 17:53:43 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann de31796c05 bpf: fix integer overflows
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit bb7f0f989c ]

There were various issues related to the limited size of integers used in
the verifier:
 - `off + size` overflow in __check_map_access()
 - `off + reg->off` overflow in check_mem_access()
 - `off + reg->var_off.value` overflow or 32-bit truncation of
   `reg->var_off.value` in check_mem_access()
 - 32-bit truncation in check_stack_boundary()

Make sure that any integer math cannot overflow by not allowing
pointer math with large values.

Also reduce the scope of "scalar op scalar" tracking.

Fixes: f1174f77b5 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:33 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann cb56cc1b29 bpf: don't prune branches when a scalar is replaced with a pointer
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 179d1c5602 ]

This could be made safe by passing through a reference to env and checking
for env->allow_ptr_leaks, but it would only work one way and is probably
not worth the hassle - not doing it will not directly lead to program
rejection.

Fixes: f1174f77b5 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:32 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann c90268f7cb bpf: force strict alignment checks for stack pointers
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

[ Upstream commit a5ec6ae161 ]

Force strict alignment checks for stack pointers because the tracking of
stack spills relies on it; unaligned stack accesses can lead to corruption
of spilled registers, which is exploitable.

Fixes: f1174f77b5 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:32 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann 2120fca0ec bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary()
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

Prevent indirect stack accesses at non-constant addresses, which would
permit reading and corrupting spilled pointers.

Fixes: f1174f77b5 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:32 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann 6c8e098d03 bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 468f6eafa6 ]

32-bit ALU ops operate on 32-bit values and have 32-bit outputs.
Adjust the verifier accordingly.

Fixes: f1174f77b5 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:32 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann bf5ee24e87 bpf: fix incorrect tracking of register size truncation
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 0c17d1d2c6 ]

Properly handle register truncation to a smaller size.

The old code first mirrors the clearing of the high 32 bits in the bitwise
tristate representation, which is correct. But then, it computes the new
arithmetic bounds as the intersection between the old arithmetic bounds and
the bounds resulting from the bitwise tristate representation. Therefore,
when coerce_reg_to_32() is called on a number with bounds
[0xffff'fff8, 0x1'0000'0007], the verifier computes
[0xffff'fff8, 0xffff'ffff] as bounds of the truncated number.
This is incorrect: The truncated number could also be in the range [0, 7],
and no meaningful arithmetic bounds can be computed in that case apart from
the obvious [0, 0xffff'ffff].

Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.

Debian assigned CVE-2017-16996 for this issue.

v2:
 - flip the mask during arithmetic bounds calculation (Ben Hutchings)
v3:
 - add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)

Fixes: b03c9f9fdc ("bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:32 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann 6e12ea4fb4 bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 95a762e2c8 ]

Distinguish between
BPF_ALU64|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, sign-extended to 64-bit)
and BPF_ALU|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, zero-padded to 64-bit);
only perform sign extension in the first case.

Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.

Debian assigned CVE-2017-16995 for this issue.

v3:
 - add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)

Fixes: 484611357c ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:32 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann 4d54f7df51 bpf/verifier: fix bounds calculation on BPF_RSH
From: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>

[ Upstream commit 4374f256ce ]

Incorrect signed bounds were being computed.
If the old upper signed bound was positive and the old lower signed bound was
negative, this could cause the new upper signed bound to be too low,
leading to security issues.

Fixes: b03c9f9fdc ("bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[jannh@google.com: changed description to reflect bug impact]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:32 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann a23244e884 bpf: fix corruption on concurrent perf_event_output calls
[ Upstream commit 283ca526a9 ]

When tracing and networking programs are both attached in the
system and both use event-output helpers that eventually call
into perf_event_output(), then we could end up in a situation
where the tracing attached program runs in user context while
a cls_bpf program is triggered on that same CPU out of softirq
context.

Since both rely on the same per-cpu perf_sample_data, we could
potentially corrupt it. This can only ever happen in a combination
of the two types; all tracing programs use a bpf_prog_active
counter to bail out in case a program is already running on
that CPU out of a different context. XDP and cls_bpf programs
by themselves don't have this issue as they run in the same
context only. Therefore, split both perf_sample_data so they
cannot be accessed from each other.

Fixes: 20b9d7ac48 ("bpf: avoid excessive stack usage for perf_sample_data")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:31 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann 2b3ea8ceb2 bpf: fix branch pruning logic
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>

[ Upstream commit c131187db2 ]

when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.

Fixes: 17a5267067 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:31 +01:00
Tom Zanussi 16e1626e54 tracing: Exclude 'generic fields' from histograms
[ Upstream commit a15f7fc203 ]

There are a small number of 'generic fields' (comm/COMM/cpu/CPU) that
are found by trace_find_event_field() but are only meant for
filtering.  Specifically, they unlike normal fields, they have a size
of 0 and thus wreak havoc when used as a histogram key.

Exclude these (return -EINVAL) when used as histogram keys.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/956154cbc3e8a4f0633d619b886c97f0f0edf7b4.1506105045.git.tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com

Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:27 +01:00
Will Deacon 5383f45db3 locking/barriers: Convert users of lockless_dereference() to READ_ONCE()
commit 3382290ed2 upstream.

[ Note, this is a Git cherry-pick of the following commit:

    506458efaf ("locking/barriers: Convert users of lockless_dereference() to READ_ONCE()")

  ... for easier x86 PTI code testing and back-porting. ]

READ_ONCE() now has an implicit smp_read_barrier_depends() call, so it
can be used instead of lockless_dereference() without any change in
semantics.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508840570-22169-4-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25 14:26:21 +01:00
Rajat Jain 32f733a8f4 PM / s2idle: Clear the events_check_enabled flag
[ Upstream commit 95b982b451 ]

Problem: This flag does not get cleared currently in the suspend or
resume path in the following cases:

 * In case some driver's suspend routine returns an error.
 * Successful s2idle case
 * etc?

Why is this a problem: What happens is that the next suspend attempt
could fail even though the user did not enable the flag by writing to
/sys/power/wakeup_count. This is 1 use case how the issue can be seen
(but similar use case with driver suspend failure can be thought of):

 1. Read /sys/power/wakeup_count
 2. echo count > /sys/power/wakeup_count
 3. echo freeze > /sys/power/wakeup_count
 4. Let the system suspend, and wakeup the system using some wake source
    that calls pm_wakeup_event() e.g. power button or something.
 5. Note that the combined wakeup count would be incremented due
    to the pm_wakeup_event() in the resume path.
 6. After resuming the events_check_enabled flag is still set.

At this point if the user attempts to freeze again (without writing to
/sys/power/wakeup_count), the suspend would fail even though there has
been no wake event since the past resume.

Address that by clearing the flag just before a resume is completed,
so that it is always cleared for the corner cases mentioned above.

Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-20 10:10:23 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 3df23f7ce7 posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
commit cef31d9af9 upstream.

timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).

The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.

This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.

Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.

Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-20 10:10:21 +01:00
Steven Rostedt 282e4b259d sched/rt: Do not pull from current CPU if only one CPU to pull
commit f73c52a5bc upstream.

Daniel Wagner reported a crash on the BeagleBone Black SoC.

This is a single CPU architecture, and does not have a functional
arch_send_call_function_single_ipi() implementation which can crash
the kernel if that is called.

As it only has one CPU, it shouldn't be called, but if the kernel is
compiled for SMP, the push/pull RT scheduling logic now calls it for
irq_work if the one CPU is overloaded, it can use that function to call
itself and crash the kernel.

Ideally, we should disable the SCHED_FEAT(RT_PUSH_IPI) if the system
only has a single CPU. But SCHED_FEAT is a constant if sched debugging
is turned off. Another fix can also be used, and this should also help
with normal SMP machines. That is, do not initiate the pull code if
there's only one RT overloaded CPU, and that CPU happens to be the
current CPU that is scheduling in a lower priority task.

Even on a system with many CPUs, if there's many RT tasks waiting to
run on a single CPU, and that CPU schedules in another RT task of lower
priority, it will initiate the PULL logic in case there's a higher
priority RT task on another CPU that is waiting to run. But if there is
no other CPU with waiting RT tasks, it will initiate the RT pull logic
on itself (as it still has RT tasks waiting to run). This is a wasted
effort.

Not only does this help with SMP code where the current CPU is the only
one with RT overloaded tasks, it should also solve the issue that
Daniel encountered, because it will prevent the PULL logic from
executing, as there's only one CPU on the system, and the check added
here will cause it to exit the RT pull code.

Reported-by: Daniel Wagner <wagi@monom.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-rt-users <linux-rt-users@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4bdced5c9 ("sched/rt: Simplify the IPI based RT balancing logic")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171202130454.4cbbfe8d@vmware.local.home
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-20 10:10:21 +01:00
Changbin Du b8582c0f79 tracing: Allocate mask_str buffer dynamically
commit 90e406f96f upstream.

The default NR_CPUS can be very large, but actual possible nr_cpu_ids
usually is very small. For my x86 distribution, the NR_CPUS is 8192 and
nr_cpu_ids is 4. About 2 pages are wasted.

Most machines don't have so many CPUs, so define a array with NR_CPUS
just wastes memory. So let's allocate the buffer dynamically when need.

With this change, the mutext tracing_cpumask_update_lock also can be
removed now, which was used to protect mask_str.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1512013183-19107-1-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.com

Fixes: 36dfe9252b ("ftrace: make use of tracing_cpumask")
Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-20 10:10:18 +01:00
Thiago Rafael Becker c5d9b78d53 kernel: make groups_sort calling a responsibility group_info allocators
commit bdcf0a423e upstream.

In testing, we found that nfsd threads may call set_groups in parallel
for the same entry cached in auth.unix.gid, racing in the call of
groups_sort, corrupting the groups for that entry and leading to
permission denials for the client.

This patch:
 - Make groups_sort globally visible.
 - Move the call to groups_sort to the modifiers of group_info
 - Remove the call to groups_sort from set_groups

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171211151420.18655-1-thiago.becker@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thiago Rafael Becker <thiago.becker@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-20 10:10:18 +01:00
Paul Moore 0ad0bb6016 audit: ensure that 'audit=1' actually enables audit for PID 1
[ Upstream commit 173743dd99 ]

Prior to this patch we enabled audit in audit_init(), which is too
late for PID 1 as the standard initcalls are run after the PID 1 task
is forked.  This means that we never allocate an audit_context (see
audit_alloc()) for PID 1 and therefore miss a lot of audit events
generated by PID 1.

This patch enables audit as early as possible to help ensure that when
PID 1 is forked it can allocate an audit_context if required.

Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-17 15:08:00 +01:00
Steve Grubb 4086f7cf0c audit: Allow auditd to set pid to 0 to end auditing
[ Upstream commit 33e8a90780 ]

The API to end auditing has historically been for auditd to set the
pid to 0. This patch restores that functionality.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/69

Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-17 15:08:00 +01:00
Jason Baron 2de359062f jump_label: Invoke jump_label_test() via early_initcall()
[ Upstream commit 92ee46efeb ]

Fengguang Wu reported that running the rcuperf test during boot can cause
the jump_label_test() to hit a WARN_ON(). The issue is that the core jump
label code relies on kernel_text_address() to detect when it can no longer
update branches that may be contained in __init sections. The
kernel_text_address() in turn assumes that if the system_state variable is
greter than or equal to SYSTEM_RUNNING then __init sections are no longer
valid (since the assumption is that they have been freed). However, when
rcuperf is setup to run in early boot it can call kernel_power_off() which
sets the system_state to SYSTEM_POWER_OFF.

Since rcuperf initialization is invoked via a module_init(), we can make
the dependency of jump_label_test() needing to complete before rcuperf
explicit by calling it via early_initcall().

Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510609727-2238-1-git-send-email-jbaron@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-14 09:53:13 +01:00
Eric Dumazet b316280c81 bpf: fix lockdep splat
[ Upstream commit 89ad2fa3f0 ]

pcpu_freelist_pop() needs the same lockdep awareness than
pcpu_freelist_populate() to avoid a false positive.

 [ INFO: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected ]

 switchto-defaul/12508 [HC0[0]:SC0[6]:HE0:SE0] is trying to acquire:
  (&htab->buckets[i].lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff9dc099cb>] __htab_percpu_map_update_elem+0x1cb/0x300

 and this task is already holding:
  (dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff9e135848>] __dev_queue_xmit+0
x868/0x1240
 which would create a new lock dependency:
  (dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2){+.-...} -> (&htab->buckets[i].lock){......}

 but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock:
  (dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2){+.-...}
 ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-safe at:
   [<ffffffff9db5931b>] __lock_acquire+0x42b/0x1f10
   [<ffffffff9db5b32c>] lock_acquire+0xbc/0x1b0
   [<ffffffff9da05e38>] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
   [<ffffffff9e135848>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x868/0x1240
   [<ffffffff9e136240>] dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
   [<ffffffff9e1965d9>] ip_finish_output2+0x439/0x590
   [<ffffffff9e197410>] ip_finish_output+0x150/0x2f0
   [<ffffffff9e19886d>] ip_output+0x7d/0x260
   [<ffffffff9e19789e>] ip_local_out+0x5e/0xe0
   [<ffffffff9e197b25>] ip_queue_xmit+0x205/0x620
   [<ffffffff9e1b8398>] tcp_transmit_skb+0x5a8/0xcb0
   [<ffffffff9e1ba152>] tcp_write_xmit+0x242/0x1070
   [<ffffffff9e1baffc>] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x3c/0xf0
   [<ffffffff9e1b3472>] tcp_rcv_established+0x312/0x700
   [<ffffffff9e1c1acc>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x11c/0x200
   [<ffffffff9e1c3dc2>] tcp_v4_rcv+0xaa2/0xc30
   [<ffffffff9e191107>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa7/0x240
   [<ffffffff9e191a36>] ip_local_deliver+0x66/0x200
   [<ffffffff9e19137d>] ip_rcv_finish+0xdd/0x560
   [<ffffffff9e191e65>] ip_rcv+0x295/0x510
   [<ffffffff9e12ff88>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x988/0x1020
   [<ffffffff9e130641>] __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
   [<ffffffff9e1306ff>] process_backlog+0x6f/0x230
   [<ffffffff9e132129>] net_rx_action+0x229/0x420
   [<ffffffff9da07ee8>] __do_softirq+0xd8/0x43d
   [<ffffffff9e282bcc>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
   [<ffffffff9dafc2f5>] do_softirq+0x55/0x60
   [<ffffffff9dafc3a8>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa8/0xb0
   [<ffffffff9db4c727>] cpu_startup_entry+0x1c7/0x500
   [<ffffffff9daab333>] start_secondary+0x113/0x140

 to a SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock:
  (&head->lock){+.+...}
 ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe at:
 ...  [<ffffffff9db5971f>] __lock_acquire+0x82f/0x1f10
   [<ffffffff9db5b32c>] lock_acquire+0xbc/0x1b0
   [<ffffffff9da05e38>] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
   [<ffffffff9dc0b7fa>] pcpu_freelist_pop+0x7a/0xb0
   [<ffffffff9dc08b2c>] htab_map_alloc+0x50c/0x5f0
   [<ffffffff9dc00dc5>] SyS_bpf+0x265/0x1200
   [<ffffffff9e28195f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x17

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2 --> &htab->buckets[i].lock --> &head->lock

  Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&head->lock);
                                local_irq_disable();
                                lock(dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2);
                                lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock);
   <Interrupt>
     lock(dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

Fixes: e19494edab ("bpf: introduce percpu_freelist")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-14 09:53:11 +01:00
Joe Lawrence 30c2f774e1 pipe: match pipe_max_size data type with procfs
[ Upstream commit 98159d977f ]

Patch series "A few round_pipe_size() and pipe-max-size fixups", v3.

While backporting Michael's "pipe: fix limit handling" patchset to a
distro-kernel, Mikulas noticed that current upstream pipe limit handling
contains a few problems:

  1 - procfs signed wrap: echo'ing a large number into
      /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size and then cat'ing it back out shows a
      negative value.

  2 - round_pipe_size() nr_pages overflow on 32bit:  this would
      subsequently try roundup_pow_of_two(0), which is undefined.

  3 - visible non-rounded pipe-max-size value: there is no mutual
      exclusion or protection between the time pipe_max_size is assigned
      a raw value from proc_dointvec_minmax() and when it is rounded.

  4 - unsigned long -> unsigned int conversion makes for potential odd
      return errors from do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv() and
      do_proc_dopipe_max_size_conv().

This version underwent the same testing as v1:
https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=150643571406022&w=2

This patch (of 4):

pipe_max_size is defined as an unsigned int:

  unsigned int pipe_max_size = 1048576;

but its procfs/sysctl representation is an integer:

  static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
          ...
          {
                  .procname       = "pipe-max-size",
                  .data           = &pipe_max_size,
                  .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                  .mode           = 0644,
                  .proc_handler   = &pipe_proc_fn,
                  .extra1         = &pipe_min_size,
          },
          ...

that is signed:

  int pipe_proc_fn(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
                   size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
  {
          ...
          ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buf, lenp, ppos)

This leads to signed results via procfs for large values of pipe_max_size:

  % echo 2147483647 >/proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
  % cat /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
  -2147483648

Use unsigned operations on this variable to avoid such negative values.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507658689-11669-2-git-send-email-joe.lawrence@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-14 09:53:08 +01:00
Daniel Thompson 425704be09 kdb: Fix handling of kallsyms_symbol_next() return value
commit c07d353380 upstream.

kallsyms_symbol_next() returns a boolean (true on success). Currently
kdb_read() tests the return value with an inequality that
unconditionally evaluates to true.

This is fixed in the obvious way and, since the conditional branch is
supposed to be unreachable, we also add a WARN_ON().

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-14 09:52:58 +01:00
Lai Jiangshan b68df97ec8 smp/hotplug: Move step CPUHP_AP_SMPCFD_DYING to the correct place
commit 46febd37f9 upstream.

Commit 31487f8328 ("smp/cfd: Convert core to hotplug state machine")
accidently put this step on the wrong place. The step should be at the
cpuhp_ap_states[] rather than the cpuhp_bp_states[].

grep smpcfd /sys/devices/system/cpu/hotplug/states
 40: smpcfd:prepare
129: smpcfd:dying

"smpcfd:dying" was missing before.
So was the invocation of the function smpcfd_dying_cpu().

Fixes: 31487f8328 ("smp/cfd: Convert core to hotplug state machine")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128131954.81229-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-14 09:52:56 +01:00
Masami Hiramatsu 5715de464a kprobes: Use synchronize_rcu_tasks() for optprobe with CONFIG_PREEMPT=y
[ Upstream commit a30b85df7d ]

We want to wait for all potentially preempted kprobes trampoline
execution to have completed. This guarantees that any freed
trampoline memory is not in use by any task in the system anymore.
synchronize_rcu_tasks() gives such a guarantee, so use it.

Also, this guarantees to wait for all potentially preempted tasks
on the instructions which will be replaced with a jump.

Since this becomes a problem only when CONFIG_PREEMPT=y, enable
CONFIG_TASKS_RCU=y for synchronize_rcu_tasks() in that case.

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naveen N . Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul E . McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150845661962.5443.17724352636247312231.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-10 13:40:40 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra 4ee9572b10 perf/core: Fix __perf_read_group_add() locking
[ Upstream commit a9cd8194e1 ]

Event timestamps are serialized using ctx->lock, make sure to hold it
over reading all values.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-10 13:40:40 +01:00
Marc Zyngier c01dd3addb genirq: Track whether the trigger type has been set
commit 4f8413a3a7 upstream.

When requesting a shared interrupt, we assume that the firmware
support code (DT or ACPI) has called irqd_set_trigger_type
already, so that we can retrieve it and check that the requester
is being reasonnable.

Unfortunately, we still have non-DT, non-ACPI systems around,
and these guys won't call irqd_set_trigger_type before requesting
the interrupt. The consequence is that we fail the request that
would have worked before.

We can either chase all these use cases (boring), or address it
in core code (easier). Let's have a per-irq_desc flag that
indicates whether irqd_set_trigger_type has been called, and
let's just check it when checking for a shared interrupt.
If it hasn't been set, just take whatever the interrupt
requester asks.

Fixes: 382bd4de61 ("genirq: Use irqd_get_trigger_type to compare the trigger type for shared IRQs")
Reported-and-tested-by: Petr Cvek <petrcvekcz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-30 08:40:52 +00:00
Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) f17c786b28 sched/rt: Simplify the IPI based RT balancing logic
commit 4bdced5c9a upstream.

When a CPU lowers its priority (schedules out a high priority task for a
lower priority one), a check is made to see if any other CPU has overloaded
RT tasks (more than one). It checks the rto_mask to determine this and if so
it will request to pull one of those tasks to itself if the non running RT
task is of higher priority than the new priority of the next task to run on
the current CPU.

When we deal with large number of CPUs, the original pull logic suffered
from large lock contention on a single CPU run queue, which caused a huge
latency across all CPUs. This was caused by only having one CPU having
overloaded RT tasks and a bunch of other CPUs lowering their priority. To
solve this issue, commit:

  b6366f048e ("sched/rt: Use IPI to trigger RT task push migration instead of pulling")

changed the way to request a pull. Instead of grabbing the lock of the
overloaded CPU's runqueue, it simply sent an IPI to that CPU to do the work.

Although the IPI logic worked very well in removing the large latency build
up, it still could suffer from a large number of IPIs being sent to a single
CPU. On a 80 CPU box, I measured over 200us of processing IPIs. Worse yet,
when I tested this on a 120 CPU box, with a stress test that had lots of
RT tasks scheduling on all CPUs, it actually triggered the hard lockup
detector! One CPU had so many IPIs sent to it, and due to the restart
mechanism that is triggered when the source run queue has a priority status
change, the CPU spent minutes! processing the IPIs.

Thinking about this further, I realized there's no reason for each run queue
to send its own IPI. As all CPUs with overloaded tasks must be scanned
regardless if there's one or many CPUs lowering their priority, because
there's no current way to find the CPU with the highest priority task that
can schedule to one of these CPUs, there really only needs to be one IPI
being sent around at a time.

This greatly simplifies the code!

The new approach is to have each root domain have its own irq work, as the
rto_mask is per root domain. The root domain has the following fields
attached to it:

  rto_push_work	 - the irq work to process each CPU set in rto_mask
  rto_lock	 - the lock to protect some of the other rto fields
  rto_loop_start - an atomic that keeps contention down on rto_lock
		    the first CPU scheduling in a lower priority task
		    is the one to kick off the process.
  rto_loop_next	 - an atomic that gets incremented for each CPU that
		    schedules in a lower priority task.
  rto_loop	 - a variable protected by rto_lock that is used to
		    compare against rto_loop_next
  rto_cpu	 - The cpu to send the next IPI to, also protected by
		    the rto_lock.

When a CPU schedules in a lower priority task and wants to make sure
overloaded CPUs know about it. It increments the rto_loop_next. Then it
atomically sets rto_loop_start with a cmpxchg. If the old value is not "0",
then it is done, as another CPU is kicking off the IPI loop. If the old
value is "0", then it will take the rto_lock to synchronize with a possible
IPI being sent around to the overloaded CPUs.

If rto_cpu is greater than or equal to nr_cpu_ids, then there's either no
IPI being sent around, or one is about to finish. Then rto_cpu is set to the
first CPU in rto_mask and an IPI is sent to that CPU. If there's no CPUs set
in rto_mask, then there's nothing to be done.

When the CPU receives the IPI, it will first try to push any RT tasks that is
queued on the CPU but can't run because a higher priority RT task is
currently running on that CPU.

Then it takes the rto_lock and looks for the next CPU in the rto_mask. If it
finds one, it simply sends an IPI to that CPU and the process continues.

If there's no more CPUs in the rto_mask, then rto_loop is compared with
rto_loop_next. If they match, everything is done and the process is over. If
they do not match, then a CPU scheduled in a lower priority task as the IPI
was being passed around, and the process needs to start again. The first CPU
in rto_mask is sent the IPI.

This change removes this duplication of work in the IPI logic, and greatly
lowers the latency caused by the IPIs. This removed the lockup happening on
the 120 CPU machine. It also simplifies the code tremendously. What else
could anyone ask for?

Thanks to Peter Zijlstra for simplifying the rto_loop_start atomic logic and
supplying me with the rto_start_trylock() and rto_start_unlock() helper
functions.

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Scott Wood <swood@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170424114732.1aac6dc4@gandalf.local.home
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-30 08:40:43 +00:00
Paul E. McKenney 9f088f6a67 sched: Make resched_cpu() unconditional
commit 7c2102e56a upstream.

The current implementation of synchronize_sched_expedited() incorrectly
assumes that resched_cpu() is unconditional, which it is not.  This means
that synchronize_sched_expedited() can hang when resched_cpu()'s trylock
fails as follows (analysis by Neeraj Upadhyay):

o	CPU1 is waiting for expedited wait to complete:

	sync_rcu_exp_select_cpus
	     rdp->exp_dynticks_snap & 0x1   // returns 1 for CPU5
	     IPI sent to CPU5

	synchronize_sched_expedited_wait
		 ret = swait_event_timeout(rsp->expedited_wq,
					   sync_rcu_preempt_exp_done(rnp_root),
					   jiffies_stall);

	expmask = 0x20, CPU 5 in idle path (in cpuidle_enter())

o	CPU5 handles IPI and fails to acquire rq lock.

	Handles IPI
	     sync_sched_exp_handler
		 resched_cpu
		     returns while failing to try lock acquire rq->lock
		 need_resched is not set

o	CPU5 calls  rcu_idle_enter() and as need_resched is not set, goes to
	idle (schedule() is not called).

o	CPU 1 reports RCU stall.

Given that resched_cpu() is now used only by RCU, this commit fixes the
assumption by making resched_cpu() unconditional.

Reported-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-30 08:40:39 +00:00
Viresh Kumar b79974945e cpufreq: schedutil: Reset cached_raw_freq when not in sync with next_freq
commit 07458f6a51 upstream.

'cached_raw_freq' is used to get the next frequency quickly but should
always be in sync with sg_policy->next_freq. There is a case where it is
not and in such cases it should be reset to avoid switching to incorrect
frequencies.

Consider this case for example:

 - policy->cur is 1.2 GHz (Max)
 - New request comes for 780 MHz and we store that in cached_raw_freq.
 - Based on 780 MHz, we calculate the effective frequency as 800 MHz.
 - We then see the CPU wasn't idle recently and choose to keep the next
   freq as 1.2 GHz.
 - Now we have cached_raw_freq is 780 MHz and sg_policy->next_freq is
   1.2 GHz.
 - Now if the utilization doesn't change in then next request, then the
   next target frequency will still be 780 MHz and it will match with
   cached_raw_freq. But we will choose 1.2 GHz instead of 800 MHz here.

Fixes: b7eaf1aab9 (cpufreq: schedutil: Avoid reducing frequency of busy CPUs prematurely)
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-30 08:40:39 +00:00
Neeraj Upadhyay 3594216fc6 rcu: Fix up pending cbs check in rcu_prepare_for_idle
commit 135bd1a230 upstream.

The pending-callbacks check in rcu_prepare_for_idle() is backwards.
It should accelerate if there are pending callbacks, but the check
rather uselessly accelerates only if there are no callbacks.  This commit
therefore inverts this check.

Fixes: 15fecf89e4 ("srcu: Abstract multi-tail callback list handling")
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-24 08:37:04 +01:00
Linus Torvalds 3fefc31843 Final power management fixes for v4.14
- Prevent the schedutil cpufreq governor from using the
    utilization of a wrong CPU in some cases which started to
    happen after one of the recent changes in it (Chris Redpath).
 
  - Blacklist Dell XPS13 9360 from using the Low Power S0 Idle _DSM
    interface as that causes serious issue (related to NVMe) to
    appear on one of these machines, even though the other Dells
    XPS13 9360 in somewhat different HW configurations behave
    correctly (Rafael Wysocki).
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Merge tag 'pm-final-4.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm

Pull final power management fixes from Rafael Wysocki:
 "These fix a regression in the schedutil cpufreq governor introduced by
  a recent change and blacklist Dell XPS13 9360 from using the Low Power
  S0 Idle _DSM interface which triggers serious problems on one of these
  machines.

  Specifics:

   - Prevent the schedutil cpufreq governor from using the utilization
     of a wrong CPU in some cases which started to happen after one of
     the recent changes in it (Chris Redpath).

   - Blacklist Dell XPS13 9360 from using the Low Power S0 Idle _DSM
     interface as that causes serious issue (related to NVMe) to appear
     on one of these machines, even though the other Dells XPS13 9360 in
     somewhat different HW configurations behave correctly (Rafael
     Wysocki)"

* tag 'pm-final-4.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm:
  ACPI / PM: Blacklist Low Power S0 Idle _DSM for Dell XPS13 9360
  cpufreq: schedutil: Examine the correct CPU when we update util
2017-11-09 11:16:28 -08:00
Rafael J. Wysocki e029b9bf12 Merge branch 'pm-cpufreq-sched'
* pm-cpufreq-sched:
  cpufreq: schedutil: Examine the correct CPU when we update util
2017-11-09 00:07:56 +01:00
Linus Torvalds e4880bc5df Merge branch 'for-4.14-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq
Pull workqueue fix from Tejun Heo:
 "Another fix for a really old bug.

  It only affects drain_workqueue() which isn't used often and even then
  triggers only during a pretty small race window, so it isn't too
  surprising that it stayed hidden for so long.

  The fix is straight-forward and low-risk. Kudos to Li Bin for
  reporting and fixing the bug"

* 'for-4.14-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq:
  workqueue: Fix NULL pointer dereference
2017-11-06 12:26:49 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 9d9cc4aa00 Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Various fixes:

   - synchronize kernel and tooling headers

   - cgroup support fix

   - two tooling fixes"

* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  tools/headers: Synchronize kernel ABI headers
  perf/cgroup: Fix perf cgroup hierarchy support
  perf tools: Unwind properly location after REJECT
  perf symbols: Fix memory corruption because of zero length symbols
2017-11-05 11:44:39 -08:00
Chris Redpath d62d813c0d cpufreq: schedutil: Examine the correct CPU when we update util
After commit 674e75411f (sched: cpufreq: Allow remote cpufreq
callbacks) we stopped to always read the utilization for the CPU we
are running the governor on, and instead we read it for the CPU
which we've been told has updated utilization.  This is stored in
sugov_cpu->cpu.

The value is set in sugov_register() but we clear it in sugov_start()
which leads to always looking at the utilization of CPU0 instead of
the correct one.

Fix this by consolidating the initialization code into sugov_start().

Fixes: 674e75411f (sched: cpufreq: Allow remote cpufreq callbacks)
Signed-off-by: Chris Redpath <chris.redpath@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Bellasi <patrick.bellasi@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <brendan.jackman@arm.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2017-11-04 17:44:28 +01:00
Ingo Molnar 649e441f49 Merge branch 'linus' into core/urgent, to pick up dependent commits
We want to fix an objtool build warning that got introduced in the latest upstream kernel.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-04 08:53:04 +01:00
Ingo Molnar 294cbd05e3 Merge branch 'linus' into perf/urgent, to pick up dependent commits
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-03 12:30:12 +01:00
Linus Torvalds ead751507d License cleanup: add SPDX license identifiers to some files
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
 makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
 
 By default all files without license information are under the default
 license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
 
 Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
 SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
 shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
 
 This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
 Philippe Ombredanne.
 
 How this work was done:
 
 Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
 the use cases:
  - file had no licensing information it it.
  - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
  - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
 
 Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
 where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
 had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
 
 The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
 a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
 output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
 tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
 base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
 
 The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
 assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
 results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
 to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
 immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
 
 Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
  - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
  - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
    lines of source
  - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
    lines).
 
 All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
 
 The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
 identifiers to apply.
 
  - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
    considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
    COPYING file license applied.
 
    For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
 
    SPDX license identifier                            # files
    ---------------------------------------------------|-------
    GPL-2.0                                              11139
 
    and resulted in the first patch in this series.
 
    If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
    Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:
 
    SPDX license identifier                            # files
    ---------------------------------------------------|-------
    GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930
 
    and resulted in the second patch in this series.
 
  - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
    of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
    any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
    it (per prior point).  Results summary:
 
    SPDX license identifier                            # files
    ---------------------------------------------------|------
    GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
    GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
    LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
    GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
    ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
    LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
    LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1
 
    and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
 
  - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
    the concluded license(s).
 
  - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
    license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
    licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
 
  - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
    resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
    which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
 
  - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
    confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
 
  - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
    the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
    in time.
 
 In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
 spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
 source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
 by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
 
 Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
 FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
 disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
 Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
 they are related.
 
 Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
 for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
 files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
 in about 15000 files.
 
 In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
 copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
 correct identifier.
 
 Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
 inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
 version early this week with:
  - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
    license ids and scores
  - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
    files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
  - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
    was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
    SPDX license was correct
 
 This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
 worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
 different types of files to be modified.
 
 These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
 parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
 format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
 based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
 distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
 comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
 generate the patches.
 
 Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
 Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
 Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core

Pull initial SPDX identifiers from Greg KH:
 "License cleanup: add SPDX license identifiers to some files

  Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
  makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

  By default all files without license information are under the default
  license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

  Update the files which contain no license information with the
  'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally
  binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate
  text.

  This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart
  and Philippe Ombredanne.

  How this work was done:

  Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset
  of the use cases:

   - file had no licensing information it it.

   - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,

   - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

  Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
  where non-standard license headers were used, and references to
  license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

  The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied
  to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of
  the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver)
  producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.
  Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review
  of a few 1000 files.

  The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537
  files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the
  scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license
  identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any
  determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with
  the Linux Foundation.

  Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:

   - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.

   - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained
     >5 lines of source

   - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
     lines).

  All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

  The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
  identifiers to apply.

   - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
     considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
     COPYING file license applied.

     For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

       SPDX license identifier                            # files
       ---------------------------------------------------|-------
       GPL-2.0                                              11139

     and resulted in the first patch in this series.

     If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
     Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that
     was:

       SPDX license identifier                            # files
       ---------------------------------------------------|-------
       GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

     and resulted in the second patch in this series.

   - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
     of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
     any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
     it (per prior point). Results summary:

       SPDX license identifier                            # files
       ---------------------------------------------------|------
       GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
       GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
       LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
       GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
       ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
       LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
       LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

     and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

   - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that
     became the concluded license(s).

   - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected
     a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
     licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

   - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
     resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply
     (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

   - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
     confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

   - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
     the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
     in time.

  In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
  spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
  source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases,
  confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

  Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
  FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
  disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.
  The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in
  part, so they are related.

  Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
  for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
  files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot
  checks in about 15000 files.

  In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
  copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect
  the correct identifier.

  Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
  inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial
  patch version early this week with:

   - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
     license ids and scores

   - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
     files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct

   - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch
     license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the
     applied SPDX license was correct

  This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
  worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
  different types of files to be modified.

  These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
  parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
  format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
  based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
  distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
  comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
  generate the patches.

  Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
  Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
  Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
  Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>"

* tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
  License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with a license
  License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license
  License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
2017-11-02 10:04:46 -07:00
Jiri Slaby e78c38f6bd futex: futex_wake_op, do not fail on invalid op
In commit 30d6e0a419 ("futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined
behaviour"), I let FUTEX_WAKE_OP to fail on invalid op.  Namely when op
should be considered as shift and the shift is out of range (< 0 or > 31).

But strace's test suite does this madness:

  futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xa0caffee);
  futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xbadfaced);
  futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xffffffff);

When I pick the first 0xa0caffee, it decodes as:

  0x80000000 & 0xa0caffee: oparg is shift
  0x70000000 & 0xa0caffee: op is FUTEX_OP_OR
  0x0f000000 & 0xa0caffee: cmp is FUTEX_OP_CMP_EQ
  0x00fff000 & 0xa0caffee: oparg is sign-extended 0xcaf = -849
  0x00000fff & 0xa0caffee: cmparg is sign-extended 0xfee = -18

That means the op tries to do this:

  (futex |= (1 << (-849))) == -18

which is completely bogus. The new check of op in the code is:

        if (encoded_op & (FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT << 28)) {
                if (oparg < 0 || oparg > 31)
                        return -EINVAL;
                oparg = 1 << oparg;
        }

which results obviously in the "Invalid argument" errno:

  FAIL: futex
  ===========

  futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xa0caffee) = -1: Invalid argument
  futex.test: failed test: ../futex failed with code 1

So let us soften the failure to print only a (ratelimited) message, crop
the value and continue as if it were right.  When userspace keeps up, we
can switch this to return -EINVAL again.

[v2] Do not return 0 immediatelly, proceed with the cropped value.

Fixes: 30d6e0a419 ("futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-02 07:41:50 -07:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman b24413180f License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
Linus Torvalds 3a99df9a3d Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull signal bugfix from Eric Biederman:
 "When making the generic support for SIGEMT conditional on the presence
  of SIGEMT I made a typo that causes it to fail to activate. It was
  noticed comparatively quickly but the bug report just made it to me
  today"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  signal: Fix name of SIGEMT in #if defined() check
2017-11-01 16:04:27 -07:00
Andrew Clayton c3aff086ea signal: Fix name of SIGEMT in #if defined() check
Commit cc731525f2 ("signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic")
added a check for SIGMET and NSIGEMT being defined. That SIGMET should
in fact be SIGEMT, with SIGEMT being defined in
arch/{alpha,mips,sparc}/include/uapi/asm/signal.h

This was actually pointed out by BenHutchings in a lwn.net comment
here https://lwn.net/Comments/734608/

Fixes: cc731525f2 ("signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <andrew@digital-domain.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-11-01 17:04:57 -05:00
Don Zickus 42f930da7f watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Use atomics to track in-use cpu counter
Guenter reported:
  There is still a problem. When running 
    echo 6 > /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog_thresh
    echo 5 > /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog_thresh
  repeatedly, the message
 
   NMI watchdog: Enabled. Permanently consumes one hw-PMU counter.
 
  stops after a while (after ~10-30 iterations, with fluctuations).
  Maybe watchdog_cpus needs to be atomic ?

That's correct as this again is affected by the asynchronous nature of the
smpboot thread unpark mechanism.

CPU 0				CPU1			CPU2
write(watchdog_thresh, 6)	
  stop()
    park()
  update()
  start()
    unpark()
				thread->unpark()
				  cnt++;
write(watchdog_thresh, 5)				thread->unpark()
  stop()
    park()			thread->park()
				   cnt--;		  cnt++;
  update()
  start()
    unpark()

That's not a functional problem, it just affects the informational message.

Convert watchdog_cpus to atomic_t to prevent the problem

Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171101181126.j727fqjmdthjz4xk@redhat.com
2017-11-01 21:18:40 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 9c388a5ed1 watchdog/harclockup/perf: Revert a33d44843d ("watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Simplify deferred event destroy")
Guenter reported a crash in the watchdog/perf code, which is caused by
cleanup() and enable() running concurrently. The reason for this is:

The watchdog functions are serialized via the watchdog_mutex and cpu
hotplug locking, but the enable of the perf based watchdog happens in
context of the unpark callback of the smpboot thread. But that unpark
function is not synchronous inside the locking. The unparking of the thread
just wakes it up and leaves so there is no guarantee when the thread is
executing.

If it starts running _before_ the cleanup happened then it will create a
event and overwrite the dead event pointer. The new event is then cleaned
up because the event is marked dead.

    lock(watchdog_mutex);
    lockup_detector_reconfigure();
        cpus_read_lock();
	stop();
	   park()
	update();
	start();
	   unpark()
	cpus_read_unlock();		thread runs()
					  overwrite dead event ptr
	cleanup();
	  free new event, which is active inside perf....
    unlock(watchdog_mutex);

The park side is safe as that actually waits for the thread to reach
parked state.

Commit a33d44843d removed the protection against this kind of scenario
under the stupid assumption that the hotplug serialization and the
watchdog_mutex cover everything. 

Bring it back.

Reverts: a33d44843d ("watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Simplify deferred event destroy")
Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Feels-stupid Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1710312145190.1942@nanos
2017-11-01 21:18:39 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra 153fbd1226 futex: Fix more put_pi_state() vs. exit_pi_state_list() races
Dmitry (through syzbot) reported being able to trigger the WARN in
get_pi_state() and a use-after-free on:

	raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);

Both are due to this race:

  exit_pi_state_list()				put_pi_state()

  lock(&curr->pi_lock)
  while() {
	pi_state = list_first_entry(head);
	hb = hash_futex(&pi_state->key);
	unlock(&curr->pi_lock);

						dec_and_test(&pi_state->refcount);

	lock(&hb->lock)
	lock(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock)	// uaf if pi_state free'd
	lock(&curr->pi_lock);

	....

	unlock(&curr->pi_lock);
	get_pi_state();				// WARN; refcount==0

The problem is we take the reference count too late, and don't allow it
being 0. Fix it by using inc_not_zero() and simply retrying the loop
when we fail to get a refcount. In that case put_pi_state() should
remove the entry from the list.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: syzbot <bot+2af19c9e1ffe4d4ee1d16c56ae7580feaee75765@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: c74aef2d06 ("futex: Fix pi_state->owner serialization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171031101853.xpfh72y643kdfhjs@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-01 09:05:00 +01:00
John Fastabend 04686ef299 bpf: remove SK_REDIRECT from UAPI
Now that SK_REDIRECT is no longer a valid return code. Remove it
from the UAPI completely. Then do a namespace remapping internal
to sockmap so SK_REDIRECT is no longer externally visible.

Patchs primary change is to do a namechange from SK_REDIRECT to
__SK_REDIRECT

Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-01 11:43:50 +09:00
Li Bin cef572ad9b workqueue: Fix NULL pointer dereference
When queue_work() is used in irq (not in task context), there is
a potential case that trigger NULL pointer dereference.
----------------------------------------------------------------
worker_thread()
|-spin_lock_irq()
|-process_one_work()
	|-worker->current_pwq = pwq
	|-spin_unlock_irq()
	|-worker->current_func(work)
	|-spin_lock_irq()
 	|-worker->current_pwq = NULL
|-spin_unlock_irq()

				//interrupt here
				|-irq_handler
					|-__queue_work()
						//assuming that the wq is draining
						|-is_chained_work(wq)
							|-current_wq_worker()
							//Here, 'current' is the interrupted worker!
								|-current->current_pwq is NULL here!
|-schedule()
----------------------------------------------------------------

Avoid it by checking for task context in current_wq_worker(), and
if not in task context, we shouldn't use the 'current' to check the
condition.

Reported-by: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Bin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Fixes: 8d03ecfe47 ("workqueue: reimplement is_chained_work() using current_wq_worker()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
2017-10-30 07:56:01 -07:00