![]() Perf can generate and record a user callchain in response to a synchronous request, such as a tracepoint firing. If this happens under set_fs(KERNEL_DS), then we can end up walking the user stack (and dereferencing/saving whatever we find there) without the protections usually afforded by checks such as access_ok. Rather than play whack-a-mole with each architecture's stack unwinding implementation, fix the root of the problem by ensuring that we force USER_DS when invoking perf_callchain_user from the perf core. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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callchain.c | ||
core.c | ||
hw_breakpoint.c | ||
internal.h | ||
Makefile | ||
ring_buffer.c | ||
uprobes.c |