remarkable-linux/security/keys/dh.c
David Howells 0837e49ab3 KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload()
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:

 (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
     to protect the key.

 (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
     used to protect the key and the may be being modified.

Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:

 (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:

	dereference_key_locked()
	user_key_payload_locked()

 (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:

	dereference_key_rcu()
	user_key_payload_rcu()

This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper

  ===============================
  [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
  4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G        W
  -------------------------------
  ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
  other info that might help us debug this:
  rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
  1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
    #0:  (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G        W       4.10.0 #1
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
    lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
    nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
    nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
    decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
    decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
    rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
    call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
    __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
    rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
    nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
    _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
    mount_fs+0x74/0x210
    vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
    nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
    nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
    mount_fs+0x74/0x210
    vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
    do_mount+0x254/0xf70
    SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
    system_call+0x38/0xe0

Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-02 10:09:00 +11:00

167 lines
3.3 KiB
C

/* Crypto operations using stored keys
*
* Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
#include <linux/mpi.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include "internal.h"
/*
* Public key or shared secret generation function [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
*
* ya = g^xa mod p;
* or
* ZZ = yb^xa mod p;
*
* where xa is the local private key, ya is the local public key, g is
* the generator, p is the prime, yb is the remote public key, and ZZ
* is the shared secret.
*
* Both are the same calculation, so g or yb are the "base" and ya or
* ZZ are the "result".
*/
static int do_dh(MPI result, MPI base, MPI xa, MPI p)
{
return mpi_powm(result, base, xa, p);
}
static ssize_t mpi_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, size_t maxlen, MPI *mpi)
{
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long status;
ssize_t ret;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, KEY_NEED_READ);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = -ENOKEY;
goto error;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (key->type == &key_type_user) {
down_read(&key->sem);
status = key_validate(key);
if (status == 0) {
const struct user_key_payload *payload;
payload = user_key_payload_locked(key);
if (maxlen == 0) {
*mpi = NULL;
ret = payload->datalen;
} else if (payload->datalen <= maxlen) {
*mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(payload->data,
payload->datalen);
if (*mpi)
ret = payload->datalen;
} else {
ret = -EINVAL;
}
}
up_read(&key->sem);
}
key_put(key);
error:
return ret;
}
long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
void __user *reserved)
{
long ret;
MPI base, private, prime, result;
unsigned nbytes;
struct keyctl_dh_params pcopy;
uint8_t *kbuf;
ssize_t keylen;
size_t resultlen;
if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (copy_from_user(&pcopy, params, sizeof(pcopy)) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (reserved) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, buflen, &prime);
if (keylen < 0 || !prime) {
/* buflen == 0 may be used to query the required buffer size,
* which is the prime key length.
*/
ret = keylen;
goto out;
}
/* The result is never longer than the prime */
resultlen = keylen;
keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.base, SIZE_MAX, &base);
if (keylen < 0 || !base) {
ret = keylen;
goto error1;
}
keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.private, SIZE_MAX, &private);
if (keylen < 0 || !private) {
ret = keylen;
goto error2;
}
result = mpi_alloc(0);
if (!result) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error3;
}
kbuf = kmalloc(resultlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kbuf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error4;
}
ret = do_dh(result, base, private, prime);
if (ret)
goto error5;
ret = mpi_read_buffer(result, kbuf, resultlen, &nbytes, NULL);
if (ret != 0)
goto error5;
ret = nbytes;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
error5:
kfree(kbuf);
error4:
mpi_free(result);
error3:
mpi_free(private);
error2:
mpi_free(base);
error1:
mpi_free(prime);
out:
return ret;
}