panda/board/safety/safety_honda.h

355 lines
12 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

2017-04-17 16:28:28 -06:00
// board enforces
// in-state
// accel set/resume
// out-state
// cancel button
// accel rising edge
// brake rising edge
// brake > 0mph
2019-12-22 19:42:46 -07:00
const AddrBus HONDA_N_TX_MSGS[] = {{0xE4, 0}, {0x194, 0}, {0x1FA, 0}, {0x200, 0}, {0x30C, 0}, {0x33D, 0}};
const AddrBus HONDA_BG_TX_MSGS[] = {{0xE4, 2}, {0x296, 0}, {0x33D, 2}}; // Bosch Giraffe
const AddrBus HONDA_BH_TX_MSGS[] = {{0xE4, 0}, {0x296, 1}, {0x33D, 0}}; // Bosch Harness
const int HONDA_GAS_INTERCEPTOR_THRESHOLD = 328; // ratio between offset and gain from dbc file
// Nidec and Bosch giraffe have pt on bus 0
AddrCheckStruct honda_rx_checks[] = {
{.addr = {0x1A6, 0x296}, .bus = 0, .check_checksum = true, .max_counter = 3U, .expected_timestep = 40000U},
{.addr = { 0x158}, .bus = 0, .check_checksum = true, .max_counter = 3U, .expected_timestep = 10000U},
{.addr = { 0x17C}, .bus = 0, .check_checksum = true, .max_counter = 3U, .expected_timestep = 10000U},
};
const int HONDA_RX_CHECKS_LEN = sizeof(honda_rx_checks) / sizeof(honda_rx_checks[0]);
// Bosch harness has pt on bus 1
AddrCheckStruct honda_bh_rx_checks[] = {
{.addr = {0x296}, .bus = 1, .check_checksum = true, .max_counter = 3U, .expected_timestep = 40000U},
{.addr = {0x158}, .bus = 1, .check_checksum = true, .max_counter = 3U, .expected_timestep = 10000U},
{.addr = {0x17C}, .bus = 1, .check_checksum = true, .max_counter = 3U, .expected_timestep = 10000U},
};
const int HONDA_BH_RX_CHECKS_LEN = sizeof(honda_bh_rx_checks) / sizeof(honda_bh_rx_checks[0]);
int honda_brake = 0;
bool honda_moving = false;
bool honda_alt_brake_msg = false;
bool honda_fwd_brake = false;
enum {HONDA_N_HW, HONDA_BG_HW, HONDA_BH_HW} honda_hw = HONDA_N_HW;
Revert commits that broke USB for openpilot. Revert "fix openpilot board flashing" This reverts commit 8ff93ad5da39f8dc4bf6fe632f26418b696fd230. Revert "Fixed output_enabled led not turning off when mode changed to no output." This reverts commit 27a8af11075d92d03c389713694a879905877cf0. Revert "Fixed loopback test for new GMLAN 'can4' behavior." This reverts commit 59592f599af01a667b4fd966e613b8f504d62dc2. Revert "GMLAN is now always mapped through CAN4 (index 3)" This reverts commit 329c09102435bfd9b1fbb60694139a5ff7bf4148. Revert "Removed compile time config for CAN loopback, implemented as usb message." This reverts commit e1a4c3298557fccf854ed5cbda448f8c0015b7ea. Revert "Change all output safety mode identifier to prevent user mistakes." This reverts commit 6b363e2e92fcd5e7f25b5458fe9008ff8f9fd664. Revert "untabify" This reverts commit 191f67b083e182323ba956c3ab75df10bec2f863. Revert "Refactor of safety to support more modular additions of safety policies." This reverts commit e5b524eddc82e53587cc47dcf15b22fd35890a92. Revert "Split up some more header files into compilation units." This reverts commit e2a78912f5b649822974fc0e974ec50d9d9c7d10. Revert "Enabled emulated control writes over USB." This reverts commit 133cfe970379d6881de26289616d1d9085bb5986. Revert "Moved CAN and USART code out of main.c and into more appropriate files." This reverts commit daad2dc0620d629e7db0dd68dee5595ed2b57160. Revert "Large Panda CAN cleanup. Restrict GMLAN to valid baud rates." This reverts commit a0616a2bc2ac2bfd99223aaa84912e6f649c9d54. Revert "Panda library now correctly sends USB direction bit." This reverts commit 1712c901d4b46b2726b3165a7cb2e91c281c662b. Revert "Board makefile now automatically calculates header file dependencies." This reverts commit 4a8d4e597b397ca6d68dd5dd2a376c8354dc3422. Revert "Loopback test works over wifi. (Disable trying to send over wifi)" This reverts commit dae636968af482e170aade1d785a1e197e9f3c04. Revert "Fix legacy board build" This reverts commit 62bf4e575686c84c672eb0d341ad41f174141c2d. Revert "Style cop" This reverts commit c439f43726feb30cf2ec486ffcad6ac94ab5e128. Revert "Untabify" This reverts commit 41e5eec6211c23836535af49380f74350a0ceb12. Revert "Fixed disabling gmlan." This reverts commit 5e1e45a4afade384b628e44587dd8e37d3dcd8cd. Revert "Removed dead code, standardized canid in more commands, better erroring behavior." This reverts commit b59aeb6d87ddd85406ec42e4ed8a74a232d506a4. Revert "loopback test works with new CAN bus ids." This reverts commit 75970861cf2b025173afb906e4e243861bed506a. Revert "Large reorganization of code and early integration of can bitrate setting." This reverts commit a1ed7b62ee66ec8f56bba488c38c67b69eead8cf.
2017-07-12 12:25:10 -06:00
static uint8_t honda_get_checksum(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) {
int checksum_byte = GET_LEN(to_push) - 1;
return (uint8_t)(GET_BYTE(to_push, checksum_byte)) & 0xFU;
}
static uint8_t honda_compute_checksum(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) {
int len = GET_LEN(to_push);
uint8_t checksum = 0U;
unsigned int addr = GET_ADDR(to_push);
while (addr > 0U) {
checksum += (addr & 0xFU); addr >>= 4;
}
for (int j = 0; j < len; j++) {
uint8_t byte = GET_BYTE(to_push, j);
checksum += (byte & 0xFU) + (byte >> 4U);
if (j == (len - 1)) {
checksum -= (byte & 0xFU); // remove checksum in message
}
}
return (8U - checksum) & 0xFU;
}
static uint8_t honda_get_counter(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) {
int counter_byte = GET_LEN(to_push) - 1;
return ((uint8_t)(GET_BYTE(to_push, counter_byte)) >> 4U) & 0x3U;
}
static int honda_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) {
bool valid;
if (honda_hw == HONDA_BH_HW) {
valid = addr_safety_check(to_push, honda_bh_rx_checks, HONDA_BH_RX_CHECKS_LEN,
honda_get_checksum, honda_compute_checksum, honda_get_counter);
} else {
valid = addr_safety_check(to_push, honda_rx_checks, HONDA_RX_CHECKS_LEN,
honda_get_checksum, honda_compute_checksum, honda_get_counter);
}
bool unsafe_allow_gas = unsafe_mode & UNSAFE_DISABLE_DISENGAGE_ON_GAS;
if (valid) {
int addr = GET_ADDR(to_push);
int len = GET_LEN(to_push);
int bus = GET_BUS(to_push);
// sample speed
if (addr == 0x158) {
// first 2 bytes
honda_moving = GET_BYTE(to_push, 0) | GET_BYTE(to_push, 1);
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
}
// state machine to enter and exit controls
// 0x1A6 for the ILX, 0x296 for the Civic Touring
if ((addr == 0x1A6) || (addr == 0x296)) {
int button = (GET_BYTE(to_push, 0) & 0xE0) >> 5;
switch (button) {
case 2: // cancel
controls_allowed = 0;
break;
case 3: // set
case 4: // resume
controls_allowed = 1;
break;
default:
break; // any other button is irrelevant
}
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
}
// user brake signal on 0x17C reports applied brake from computer brake on accord
// and crv, which prevents the usual brake safety from working correctly. these
// cars have a signal on 0x1BE which only detects user's brake being applied so
// in these cases, this is used instead.
// most hondas: 0x17C bit 53
// accord, crv: 0x1BE bit 4
// exit controls on rising edge of brake press or on brake press when speed > 0
bool is_user_brake_msg = honda_alt_brake_msg ? ((addr) == 0x1BE) : ((addr) == 0x17C);
if (is_user_brake_msg) {
bool brake_pressed = honda_alt_brake_msg ? (GET_BYTE((to_push), 0) & 0x10) : (GET_BYTE((to_push), 6) & 0x20);
if (brake_pressed && (!brake_pressed_prev || honda_moving)) {
controls_allowed = 0;
}
brake_pressed_prev = brake_pressed;
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
}
// exit controls on rising edge of gas press if interceptor (0x201 w/ len = 6)
// length check because bosch hardware also uses this id (0x201 w/ len = 8)
if ((addr == 0x201) && (len == 6)) {
gas_interceptor_detected = 1;
int gas_interceptor = GET_INTERCEPTOR(to_push);
if (!unsafe_allow_gas && (gas_interceptor > HONDA_GAS_INTERCEPTOR_THRESHOLD) &&
(gas_interceptor_prev <= HONDA_GAS_INTERCEPTOR_THRESHOLD)) {
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
controls_allowed = 0;
}
gas_interceptor_prev = gas_interceptor;
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
}
// exit controls on rising edge of gas press if no interceptor
if (!gas_interceptor_detected) {
if (addr == 0x17C) {
bool gas_pressed = GET_BYTE(to_push, 0) != 0;
if (!unsafe_allow_gas && gas_pressed && !gas_pressed_prev) {
controls_allowed = 0;
}
gas_pressed_prev = gas_pressed;
}
}
// disable stock Honda AEB in unsafe mode
if ( !(unsafe_mode & UNSAFE_DISABLE_STOCK_AEB) ) {
if ((bus == 2) && (addr == 0x1FA)) {
bool honda_stock_aeb = GET_BYTE(to_push, 3) & 0x20;
int honda_stock_brake = (GET_BYTE(to_push, 0) << 2) + ((GET_BYTE(to_push, 1) >> 6) & 0x3);
// Forward AEB when stock braking is higher than openpilot braking
// only stop forwarding when AEB event is over
if (!honda_stock_aeb) {
honda_fwd_brake = false;
} else if (honda_stock_brake >= honda_brake) {
honda_fwd_brake = true;
} else {
// Leave Honda forward brake as is
}
}
}
// if steering controls messages are received on the destination bus, it's an indication
// that the relay might be malfunctioning
int bus_rdr_car = (honda_hw == HONDA_BH_HW) ? 0 : 2; // radar bus, car side
if ((safety_mode_cnt > RELAY_TRNS_TIMEOUT) && ((addr == 0xE4) || (addr == 0x194))) {
if (((honda_hw != HONDA_N_HW) && (bus == bus_rdr_car)) ||
((honda_hw == HONDA_N_HW) && (bus == 0))) {
relay_malfunction_set();
}
}
}
return valid;
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
}
// all commands: gas, brake and steering
// if controls_allowed and no pedals pressed
// allow all commands up to limit
// else
// block all commands that produce actuation
2017-07-21 00:36:06 -06:00
static int honda_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send) {
int tx = 1;
int addr = GET_ADDR(to_send);
int bus = GET_BUS(to_send);
if (honda_hw == HONDA_BG_HW) {
tx = msg_allowed(addr, bus, HONDA_BG_TX_MSGS, sizeof(HONDA_BG_TX_MSGS)/sizeof(HONDA_BG_TX_MSGS[0]));
} else if (honda_hw == HONDA_BH_HW) {
tx = msg_allowed(addr, bus, HONDA_BH_TX_MSGS, sizeof(HONDA_BH_TX_MSGS)/sizeof(HONDA_BH_TX_MSGS[0]));
} else {
tx = msg_allowed(addr, bus, HONDA_N_TX_MSGS, sizeof(HONDA_N_TX_MSGS)/sizeof(HONDA_N_TX_MSGS[0]));
}
if (relay_malfunction) {
tx = 0;
}
// disallow actuator commands if gas or brake (with vehicle moving) are pressed
// and the the latching controls_allowed flag is True
int pedal_pressed = brake_pressed_prev && honda_moving;
bool unsafe_allow_gas = unsafe_mode & UNSAFE_DISABLE_DISENGAGE_ON_GAS;
if (!unsafe_allow_gas) {
pedal_pressed = pedal_pressed || gas_pressed_prev || (gas_interceptor_prev > HONDA_GAS_INTERCEPTOR_THRESHOLD);
}
2019-06-12 21:12:48 -06:00
bool current_controls_allowed = controls_allowed && !(pedal_pressed);
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
// BRAKE: safety check
if ((addr == 0x1FA) && (bus == 0)) {
honda_brake = (GET_BYTE(to_send, 0) << 2) + ((GET_BYTE(to_send, 1) >> 6) & 0x3);
if (!current_controls_allowed) {
if (honda_brake != 0) {
tx = 0;
}
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
}
if (honda_brake > 255) {
tx = 0;
}
if (honda_fwd_brake) {
tx = 0;
}
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
}
// STEER: safety check
if ((addr == 0xE4) || (addr == 0x194)) {
if (!current_controls_allowed) {
bool steer_applied = GET_BYTE(to_send, 0) | GET_BYTE(to_send, 1);
if (steer_applied) {
tx = 0;
}
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
}
}
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
// GAS: safety check
if (addr == 0x200) {
if (!current_controls_allowed) {
if (GET_BYTE(to_send, 0) || GET_BYTE(to_send, 1)) {
tx = 0;
}
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
}
}
// FORCE CANCEL: safety check only relevant when spamming the cancel button in Bosch HW
// ensuring that only the cancel button press is sent (VAL 2) when controls are off.
// This avoids unintended engagements while still allowing resume spam
int bus_pt = (honda_hw == HONDA_BH_HW)? 1 : 0;
if ((addr == 0x296) && !current_controls_allowed && (bus == bus_pt)) {
if (((GET_BYTE(to_send, 0) >> 5) & 0x7) != 2) {
tx = 0;
}
}
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
2017-04-28 10:56:01 -06:00
// 1 allows the message through
return tx;
2017-04-06 19:11:36 -06:00
}
static void honda_nidec_init(int16_t param) {
UNUSED(param);
controls_allowed = false;
relay_malfunction_reset();
honda_hw = HONDA_N_HW;
honda_alt_brake_msg = false;
}
static void honda_bosch_giraffe_init(int16_t param) {
controls_allowed = false;
relay_malfunction_reset();
honda_hw = HONDA_BG_HW;
// Checking for alternate brake override from safety parameter
honda_alt_brake_msg = (param == 1) ? true : false;
}
static void honda_bosch_harness_init(int16_t param) {
controls_allowed = false;
relay_malfunction_reset();
honda_hw = HONDA_BH_HW;
// Checking for alternate brake override from safety parameter
honda_alt_brake_msg = (param == 1) ? true : false;
}
static int honda_nidec_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_fwd) {
// fwd from car to camera. also fwd certain msgs from camera to car
// 0xE4 is steering on all cars except CRV and RDX, 0x194 for CRV and RDX,
// 0x1FA is brake control, 0x30C is acc hud, 0x33D is lkas hud,
int bus_fwd = -1;
if (!relay_malfunction) {
if (bus_num == 0) {
bus_fwd = 2;
}
if (bus_num == 2) {
// block stock lkas messages and stock acc messages (if OP is doing ACC)
int addr = GET_ADDR(to_fwd);
bool is_lkas_msg = (addr == 0xE4) || (addr == 0x194) || (addr == 0x33D);
2019-12-22 19:42:46 -07:00
bool is_acc_hud_msg = addr == 0x30C;
bool is_brake_msg = addr == 0x1FA;
bool block_fwd = is_lkas_msg || is_acc_hud_msg || (is_brake_msg && !honda_fwd_brake);
if (!block_fwd) {
bus_fwd = 0;
}
}
}
return bus_fwd;
}
2018-03-05 21:18:43 -07:00
static int honda_bosch_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_fwd) {
int bus_fwd = -1;
int bus_rdr_cam = (honda_hw == HONDA_BH_HW) ? 2 : 1; // radar bus, camera side
int bus_rdr_car = (honda_hw == HONDA_BH_HW) ? 0 : 2; // radar bus, car side
if (!relay_malfunction) {
if (bus_num == bus_rdr_car) {
bus_fwd = bus_rdr_cam;
}
if (bus_num == bus_rdr_cam) {
int addr = GET_ADDR(to_fwd);
int is_lkas_msg = (addr == 0xE4) || (addr == 0x33D);
if (!is_lkas_msg) {
bus_fwd = bus_rdr_car;
}
}
2018-03-05 21:18:43 -07:00
}
return bus_fwd;
2018-03-05 21:18:43 -07:00
}
const safety_hooks honda_nidec_hooks = {
.init = honda_nidec_init,
.rx = honda_rx_hook,
.tx = honda_tx_hook,
.tx_lin = nooutput_tx_lin_hook,
.fwd = honda_nidec_fwd_hook,
.addr_check = honda_rx_checks,
.addr_check_len = sizeof(honda_rx_checks) / sizeof(honda_rx_checks[0]),
};
const safety_hooks honda_bosch_giraffe_hooks = {
.init = honda_bosch_giraffe_init,
.rx = honda_rx_hook,
.tx = honda_tx_hook,
.tx_lin = nooutput_tx_lin_hook,
.fwd = honda_bosch_fwd_hook,
.addr_check = honda_rx_checks,
.addr_check_len = sizeof(honda_rx_checks) / sizeof(honda_rx_checks[0]),
};
const safety_hooks honda_bosch_harness_hooks = {
.init = honda_bosch_harness_init,
.rx = honda_rx_hook,
.tx = honda_tx_hook,
.tx_lin = nooutput_tx_lin_hook,
2018-03-05 21:18:43 -07:00
.fwd = honda_bosch_fwd_hook,
.addr_check = honda_bh_rx_checks,
.addr_check_len = sizeof(honda_bh_rx_checks) / sizeof(honda_bh_rx_checks[0]),
};