const int HYUNDAI_MAX_STEER = 255; // like stock const int HYUNDAI_MAX_RT_DELTA = 112; // max delta torque allowed for real time checks const uint32_t HYUNDAI_RT_INTERVAL = 250000; // 250ms between real time checks const int HYUNDAI_MAX_RATE_UP = 3; const int HYUNDAI_MAX_RATE_DOWN = 7; const int HYUNDAI_DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE = 50; const int HYUNDAI_DRIVER_TORQUE_FACTOR = 2; const int HYUNDAI_STANDSTILL_THRSLD = 30; // ~1kph const AddrBus HYUNDAI_TX_MSGS[] = {{832, 0}, {1265, 0}}; // TODO: do checksum and counter checks AddrCheckStruct hyundai_rx_checks[] = { {.addr = {608}, .bus = 0, .expected_timestep = 10000U}, {.addr = {897}, .bus = 0, .expected_timestep = 10000U}, {.addr = {902}, .bus = 0, .expected_timestep = 10000U}, {.addr = {916}, .bus = 0, .expected_timestep = 10000U}, {.addr = {1057}, .bus = 0, .expected_timestep = 20000U}, }; const int HYUNDAI_RX_CHECK_LEN = sizeof(hyundai_rx_checks) / sizeof(hyundai_rx_checks[0]); int hyundai_rt_torque_last = 0; int hyundai_desired_torque_last = 0; int hyundai_cruise_engaged_last = 0; int hyundai_speed = 0; uint32_t hyundai_ts_last = 0; struct sample_t hyundai_torque_driver; // last few driver torques measured static int hyundai_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) { bool valid = addr_safety_check(to_push, hyundai_rx_checks, HYUNDAI_RX_CHECK_LEN, NULL, NULL, NULL); bool unsafe_allow_gas = unsafe_mode & UNSAFE_DISABLE_DISENGAGE_ON_GAS; if (valid && GET_BUS(to_push) == 0) { int addr = GET_ADDR(to_push); if (addr == 897) { int torque_driver_new = ((GET_BYTES_04(to_push) >> 11) & 0xfff) - 2048; // update array of samples update_sample(&hyundai_torque_driver, torque_driver_new); } // enter controls on rising edge of ACC, exit controls on ACC off if (addr == 1057) { // 2 bits: 13-14 int cruise_engaged = (GET_BYTES_04(to_push) >> 13) & 0x3; if (cruise_engaged && !hyundai_cruise_engaged_last) { controls_allowed = 1; } if (!cruise_engaged) { controls_allowed = 0; } hyundai_cruise_engaged_last = cruise_engaged; } // exit controls on rising edge of gas press if (addr == 608) { bool gas_pressed = (GET_BYTE(to_push, 7) >> 6) != 0; if (!unsafe_allow_gas && gas_pressed && !gas_pressed_prev) { controls_allowed = 0; } gas_pressed_prev = gas_pressed; } // sample subaru wheel speed, averaging opposite corners if (addr == 902) { hyundai_speed = GET_BYTES_04(to_push) & 0x3FFF; // FL hyundai_speed += (GET_BYTES_48(to_push) >> 16) & 0x3FFF; // RL hyundai_speed /= 2; } // exit controls on rising edge of brake press if (addr == 916) { bool brake_pressed = (GET_BYTE(to_push, 6) >> 7) != 0; if (brake_pressed && (!brake_pressed_prev || (hyundai_speed > HYUNDAI_STANDSTILL_THRSLD))) { controls_allowed = 0; } brake_pressed_prev = brake_pressed; } // check if stock camera ECU is on bus 0 if ((safety_mode_cnt > RELAY_TRNS_TIMEOUT) && (addr == 832)) { relay_malfunction_set(); } } return valid; } static int hyundai_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send) { int tx = 1; int addr = GET_ADDR(to_send); int bus = GET_BUS(to_send); if (!msg_allowed(addr, bus, HYUNDAI_TX_MSGS, sizeof(HYUNDAI_TX_MSGS)/sizeof(HYUNDAI_TX_MSGS[0]))) { tx = 0; } if (relay_malfunction) { tx = 0; } // LKA STEER: safety check if (addr == 832) { int desired_torque = ((GET_BYTES_04(to_send) >> 16) & 0x7ff) - 1024; uint32_t ts = TIM2->CNT; bool violation = 0; if (controls_allowed) { // *** global torque limit check *** violation |= max_limit_check(desired_torque, HYUNDAI_MAX_STEER, -HYUNDAI_MAX_STEER); // *** torque rate limit check *** violation |= driver_limit_check(desired_torque, hyundai_desired_torque_last, &hyundai_torque_driver, HYUNDAI_MAX_STEER, HYUNDAI_MAX_RATE_UP, HYUNDAI_MAX_RATE_DOWN, HYUNDAI_DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE, HYUNDAI_DRIVER_TORQUE_FACTOR); // used next time hyundai_desired_torque_last = desired_torque; // *** torque real time rate limit check *** violation |= rt_rate_limit_check(desired_torque, hyundai_rt_torque_last, HYUNDAI_MAX_RT_DELTA); // every RT_INTERVAL set the new limits uint32_t ts_elapsed = get_ts_elapsed(ts, hyundai_ts_last); if (ts_elapsed > HYUNDAI_RT_INTERVAL) { hyundai_rt_torque_last = desired_torque; hyundai_ts_last = ts; } } // no torque if controls is not allowed if (!controls_allowed && (desired_torque != 0)) { violation = 1; } // reset to 0 if either controls is not allowed or there's a violation if (violation || !controls_allowed) { hyundai_desired_torque_last = 0; hyundai_rt_torque_last = 0; hyundai_ts_last = ts; } if (violation) { tx = 0; } } // FORCE CANCEL: safety check only relevant when spamming the cancel button. // ensuring that only the cancel button press is sent (VAL 4) when controls are off. // This avoids unintended engagements while still allowing resume spam if ((addr == 1265) && !controls_allowed) { if ((GET_BYTES_04(to_send) & 0x7) != 4) { tx = 0; } } // 1 allows the message through return tx; } static int hyundai_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_fwd) { int bus_fwd = -1; int addr = GET_ADDR(to_fwd); // forward cam to ccan and viceversa, except lkas cmd if (!relay_malfunction) { if (bus_num == 0) { bus_fwd = 2; } if ((bus_num == 2) && (addr != 832)) { bus_fwd = 0; } } return bus_fwd; } const safety_hooks hyundai_hooks = { .init = nooutput_init, .rx = hyundai_rx_hook, .tx = hyundai_tx_hook, .tx_lin = nooutput_tx_lin_hook, .fwd = hyundai_fwd_hook, .addr_check = hyundai_rx_checks, .addr_check_len = sizeof(hyundai_rx_checks) / sizeof(hyundai_rx_checks[0]), };