mm: thp: replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones

Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.

Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
  If not .svg:
    For each line:
      If doesn't contain `xmlns`:
        For each link, `http://[^# 	]*(?:\w|/)`:
	  If neither `gnu\.org/license`, nor `mozilla\.org/MPL`:
            If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
            return 200 OK and serve the same content:
              Replace HTTP with HTTPS.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix amd.com URL, per Vlastimil]

Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200713164345.36088-1-grandmaster@al2klimov.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

mm/huge_memory.c

@@ -2063,8 +2063,8 @@ static void __split_huge_pmd_locked(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
 	 * free), userland could trigger a small page size TLB miss on the
 	 * small sized TLB while the hugepage TLB entry is still established in
 	 * the huge TLB. Some CPU doesn't like that.
-	 * See http://support.amd.com/us/Processor_TechDocs/41322.pdf, Erratum
-	 * 383 on page 93. Intel should be safe but is also warns that it's
+	 * See http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/41322_10h_Rev_Gd.pdf, Erratum
+	 * 383 on page 105. Intel should be safe but is also warns that it's
 	 * only safe if the permission and cache attributes of the two entries
 	 * loaded in the two TLB is identical (which should be the case here).
 	 * But it is generally safer to never allow small and huge TLB entries