commit 5c02406428 upstream.
Otherwise a malicious user could (ab)use the "recalculate" feature
that makes dm-integrity calculate the checksums in the background
while the device is already usable. When the system restarts before all
checksums have been calculated, the calculation continues where it was
interrupted even if the recalculate feature is not requested the next
time the dm device is set up.
Disable recalculating if we use internal_hash or journal_hash with a
key (e.g. HMAC) and we don't have the "legacy_recalculate" flag.
This may break activation of a volume, created by an older kernel,
that is not yet fully recalculated -- if this happens, the user should
add the "legacy_recalculate" flag to constructor parameters.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Glockner <dg@emlix.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add the dm-clone target, which allows cloning of arbitrary block
devices.
dm-clone produces a one-to-one copy of an existing, read-only source
device into a writable destination device: It presents a virtual block
device which makes all data appear immediately, and redirects reads and
writes accordingly.
The main use case of dm-clone is to clone a potentially remote,
high-latency, read-only, archival-type block device into a writable,
fast, primary-type device for fast, low-latency I/O. The cloned device
is visible/mountable immediately and the copy of the source device to
the destination device happens in the background, in parallel with user
I/O.
When the cloning completes, the dm-clone table can be removed altogether
and be replaced, e.g., by a linear table, mapping directly to the
destination device.
For further information and examples of how to use dm-clone, please read
Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/dm-clone.rst
Suggested-by: Vangelis Koukis <vkoukis@arrikto.com>
Co-developed-by: Ilias Tsitsimpis <iliastsi@arrikto.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Tsitsimpis <iliastsi@arrikto.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
The verification is to support cases where the root hash is not secured
by Trusted Boot, UEFI Secureboot or similar technologies.
One of the use cases for this is for dm-verity volumes mounted after
boot, the root hash provided during the creation of the dm-verity volume
has to be secure and thus in-kernel validation implemented here will be
used before we trust the root hash and allow the block device to be
created.
The signature being provided for verification must verify the root hash
and must be trusted by the builtin keyring for verification to succeed.
The hash is added as a key of type "user" and the description is passed
to the kernel so it can look it up and use it for verification.
Adds CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG which can be turned on if root
hash verification is needed.
Kernel commandline dm_verity module parameter 'require_signatures' will
indicate whether to force root hash signature verification (for all dm
verity volumes).
Signed-off-by: Jaskaran Khurana <jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-and-Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
There are lots of documents that belong to the admin-guide but
are on random places (most under Documentation root dir).
Move them to the admin guide.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
The DM support describes lots of aspects related to mapped
disk partitions from the userspace PoV.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Mikulas Patocka