commit 9fa68f6200 upstream.
Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key
has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and
will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default.
However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using
"hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash
via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow.
A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash
transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places
in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by
name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it
is really unkeyed. Examples of this include:
- KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension
- dm-verity
- dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support
- dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given
- drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device)
This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no
privileges to call.
Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the
->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform
still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and
digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed.
The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was
previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a208fa8f33 upstream.
We need to consistently enforce that keyed hashes cannot be used without
setting the key. To do this we need a reliable way to determine whether
a given hash algorithm is keyed or not. AF_ALG currently does this by
checking for the presence of a ->setkey() method. However, this is
actually slightly broken because the CRC-32 algorithms implement
->setkey() but can also be used without a key. (The CRC-32 "key" is not
actually a cryptographic key but rather represents the initial state.
If not overridden, then a default initial state is used.)
Prepare to fix this by introducing a flag CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY which
indicates that the algorithm has a ->setkey() method, but it is not
required to be called. Then set it on all the CRC-32 algorithms.
The same also applies to the Adler-32 implementation in Lustre.
Also, the cryptd and mcryptd templates have to pass through the flag
from their underlying algorithm.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a16e772e66 upstream.
Since Poly1305 requires a nonce per invocation, the Linux kernel
implementations of Poly1305 don't use the crypto API's keying mechanism
and instead expect the key and nonce as the first 32 bytes of the data.
But ->setkey() is still defined as a stub returning an error code. This
prevents Poly1305 from being used through AF_ALG and will also break it
completely once we start enforcing that all crypto API users (not just
AF_ALG) call ->setkey() if present.
Fix it by removing crypto_poly1305_setkey(), leaving ->setkey as NULL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fa59b92d29 upstream.
When the mcryptd template is used to wrap an unkeyed hash algorithm,
don't install a ->setkey() method to the mcryptd instance. This change
is necessary for mcryptd to keep working with unkeyed hash algorithms
once we start enforcing that ->setkey() is called when present.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 841a3ff329 upstream.
When the cryptd template is used to wrap an unkeyed hash algorithm,
don't install a ->setkey() method to the cryptd instance. This change
is necessary for cryptd to keep working with unkeyed hash algorithms
once we start enforcing that ->setkey() is called when present.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cd6ed77ad5 upstream.
Templates that use an shash spawn can use crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
to determine whether the underlying algorithm requires a key or not.
But there was no corresponding function for ahash spawns. Add it.
Note that the new function actually has to support both shash and ahash
algorithms, since the ahash API can be used with either.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5c6ac1d4f8 upstream.
In case buffer length is a multiple of PAGE_SIZE,
the S/G table is incorrectly generated.
Fix this by handling buflen = k * PAGE_SIZE separately.
Signed-off-by: Robert Baronescu <robert.baronescu@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bb30b8848c upstream.
The user space interface allows specifying the type and mask field used
to allocate the cipher. Only a subset of the possible flags are intended
for user space. Therefore, white-list the allowed flags.
In case the user space caller uses at least one non-allowed flag, EINVAL
is returned.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c013cee99d upstream.
Ensure that the input is byte swabbed before injecting it into the
SHA3 transform. Use the get_unaligned() accessor for this so that
we don't perform unaligned access inadvertently on architectures
that do not support that.
Fixes: 53964b9ee6 ("crypto: sha3 - Add SHA-3 hash algorithm")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9a00674213 upstream.
syzkaller triggered a NULL pointer dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()
via a program that repeatedly and concurrently requests AEADs
"authenc(cmac(des3_ede-asm),pcbc-aes-aesni)" and hashes "cmac(des3_ede)"
through AF_ALG, where the hashes are requested as "untested"
(CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED is set in ->salg_mask but clear in ->salg_feat; this
causes the template to be instantiated for every request).
Although AF_ALG users really shouldn't be able to request an "untested"
algorithm, the NULL pointer dereference is actually caused by a
longstanding race condition where crypto_remove_spawns() can encounter
an instance which has had spawn(s) "grabbed" but hasn't yet been
registered, resulting in ->cra_users still being NULL.
We probably should properly initialize ->cra_users earlier, but that
would require updating many templates individually. For now just fix
the bug in a simple way that can easily be backported: make
crypto_remove_spawns() treat a NULL ->cra_users list as empty.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d76c68109f upstream.
pcrypt is using the old way of freeing instances, where the ->free()
method specified in the 'struct crypto_template' is passed a pointer to
the 'struct crypto_instance'. But the crypto_instance is being
kfree()'d directly, which is incorrect because the memory was actually
allocated as an aead_instance, which contains the crypto_instance at a
nonzero offset. Thus, the wrong pointer was being kfree()'d.
Fix it by switching to the new way to free aead_instance's where the
->free() method is specified in the aead_instance itself.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 0496f56065 ("crypto: pcrypt - Add support for new AEAD interface")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9abffc6f2e upstream.
mcryptd_enqueue_request() grabs the per-CPU queue struct and protects
access to it with disabled preemption. Then it schedules a worker on the
same CPU. The worker in mcryptd_queue_worker() guards access to the same
per-CPU variable with disabled preemption.
If we take CPU-hotplug into account then it is possible that between
queue_work_on() and the actual invocation of the worker the CPU goes
down and the worker will be scheduled on _another_ CPU. And here the
preempt_disable() protection does not work anymore. The easiest thing is
to add a spin_lock() to guard access to the list.
Another detail: mcryptd_queue_worker() is not processing more than
MCRYPTD_BATCH invocation in a row. If there are still items left, then
it will invoke queue_work() to proceed with more later. *I* would
suggest to simply drop that check because it does not use a system
workqueue and the workqueue is already marked as "CPU_INTENSIVE". And if
preemption is required then the scheduler should do it.
However if queue_work() is used then the work item is marked as CPU
unbound. That means it will try to run on the local CPU but it may run
on another CPU as well. Especially with CONFIG_DEBUG_WQ_FORCE_RR_CPU=y.
Again, the preempt_disable() won't work here but lock which was
introduced will help.
In order to keep work-item on the local CPU (and avoid RR) I changed it
to queue_work_on().
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7aacbfcb33 ]
Fix the way the length of the buffers used for
encryption / decryption are computed.
For e.g. in case of encryption, input buffer does not contain
an authentication tag.
Signed-off-by: Robert Baronescu <robert.baronescu@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ecaaab5649 upstream.
When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86
implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when
doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)',
because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized.
The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when
nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to
be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided.
The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one
call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly
divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization"
and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do.
Reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
int algfd, reqfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "skcipher",
.salg_name = "salsa20",
};
char key[16] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0);
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key));
}
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: eb6f13eb9f ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit af3ff8045b upstream.
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.
This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.
Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.
Here is a reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int algfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
};
char key[4096] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
}
Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044
CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d2890c3778 upstream.
In rsa_get_n(), if the buffer contained all 0's and "FIPS mode" is
enabled, we would read one byte past the end of the buffer while
scanning the leading zeroes. Fix it by checking 'n_sz' before '!*ptr'.
This bug was reachable by adding a specially crafted key of type
"asymmetric" (requires CONFIG_RSA and CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER).
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003501a708 by task keyctl/196
CPU: 1 PID: 196 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33
asn1_ber_decoder+0x82a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:328
rsa_set_pub_key+0xd3/0x320 crypto/rsa.c:278
crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline]
pkcs1pad_set_pub_key+0xae/0x200 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:117
crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline]
public_key_verify_signature+0x270/0x9d0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c:106
x509_check_for_self_signed+0x2ea/0x480 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:141
x509_cert_parse+0x46a/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:129
x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Allocated by task 196:
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3711 [inline]
__kmalloc_track_caller+0x118/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726
kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118
kmemdup ./include/linux/string.h:414 [inline]
x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106
x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Fixes: 5a7de97309 ("crypto: rsa - return raw integers for the ASN.1 parser")
Cc: Tudor Ambarus <tudor-dan.ambarus@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 54c1fb39fe upstream.
->pkey_algo used to be an enum, but was changed to a string by commit
4e8ae72a75 ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum"). But
two comparisons were not updated. Fix them to use strcmp().
This bug broke signature verification in certain configurations,
depending on whether the string constants were deduplicated or not.
Fixes: 4e8ae72a75 ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0f30cbea00 upstream.
Adding a specially crafted X.509 certificate whose subjectPublicKey
ASN.1 value is zero-length caused x509_extract_key_data() to set the
public key size to SIZE_MAX, as it subtracted the nonexistent BIT STRING
metadata byte. Then, x509_cert_parse() called kmemdup() with that bogus
size, triggering the WARN_ON_ONCE() in kmalloc_slab().
This appears to be harmless, but it still must be fixed since WARNs are
never supposed to be user-triggerable.
Fix it by updating x509_cert_parse() to validate that the value has a
BIT STRING metadata byte, and that the byte is 0 which indicates that
the number of bits in the bitstring is a multiple of 8.
It would be nice to handle the metadata byte in asn1_ber_decoder()
instead. But that would be tricky because in the general case a BIT
STRING could be implicitly tagged, and/or could legitimately have a
length that is not a whole number of bytes.
Here was the WARN (cleaned up slightly):
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 202 at mm/slab_common.c:971 kmalloc_slab+0x5d/0x70 mm/slab_common.c:971
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 202 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G B 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
task: ffff880033014180 task.stack: ffff8800305c8000
Call Trace:
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3706 [inline]
__kmalloc_track_caller+0x22/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726
kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118
kmemdup include/linux/string.h:414 [inline]
x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106
x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Fixes: 42d5ec27f8 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'v4.9.67' into 4.9-1.0.x-imx-fixes-stable-merge
This is the 4.9.67 stable release
Resolved conflicts:
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx-sdb.dts
drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c
drivers/mmc/core/host.c
drivers/usb/chipidea/otg.c
sound/soc/fsl/fsl_ssi.c
This merge also reverts commit 3a654a8593 ("dmaengine:
imx-sdma - correct the dma transfer residue calculation"). The
downstream kernel seems to use different structures and already
use buf_ptail in its calculation.
commit ee34e2644a upstream.
setkey can be called multiple times during the existence
of the transformation object. In case of multiple setkey calls,
the old key was not freed and we leaked memory.
Free the old MPI key if any.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ccd9888f14 upstream.
The "qat-dh" DH implementation assumes that 'key' and 'g' can be copied
into a buffer with size 'p_size'. However it was never checked that
that was actually the case, which most likely allowed users to cause a
buffer underflow via KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE.
Fix this by updating crypto_dh_decode_key() to verify this precondition
for all DH implementations.
Fixes: c9839143eb ("crypto: qat - Add DH support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 6145171a6b.
The commit fixes a bug that was only introduced in 4.10, thus is
irrelevant for <=4.9.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 441f99c904 upstream.
The IV buffer used during CCM operations is used twice, during both the
hashing step and the ciphering step.
When using a hardware accelerator that updates the contents of the IV
buffer at the end of ciphering operations, the value will be modified.
In the decryption case, the subsequent setup of the hashing algorithm
will interpret the updated IV instead of the original value, which can
lead to out-of-bounds writes.
Reuse the idata buffer, only used in the hashing step, to preserve the
IV's value during the ciphering step in the decryption case.
Signed-off-by: Romain Izard <romain.izard.pro@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 68a1fdbbf8 upstream.
The ASN.1 parser does not necessarily set the sinfo field,
this patch prevents a NULL pointer dereference on broken
input.
Fixes: 99db443506 ("PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type")
Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 12cb3a1c41 ]
Since the
commit f1c131b454
crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher
the XTS mode is based on ECB, so the mode must select
ECB otherwise it can fail to initialize.
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b61907bb42 upstream.
The shash ahash digest adaptor function may crash if given a
zero-length input together with a null SG list. This is because
it tries to read the SG list before looking at the length.
This patch fixes it by checking the length first.
Reported-by: Stephan Müller<smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bd6227a150 upstream.
During the change to use aligned buffers, the deallocation code path was
not updated correctly. The current code tries to free the aligned buffer
pointer and not the original buffer pointer as it is supposed to.
Thus, the code is updated to free the original buffer pointer and set
the aligned buffer pointer that is used throughout the code to NULL.
Fixes: 3cfc3b9721 ("crypto: drbg - use aligned buffers")
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixed differently upstream as commit 2d97591ef4 ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of duplicate code")
The SGL is MAX_SGL_ENTS + 1 in size. The last SG entry is used for the
chaining and is properly updated with the sg_chain invocation. During
the filling-in of the initial SG entries, sg_mark_end is called for each
SG entry. This is appropriate as long as no additional SGL is chained
with the current SGL. However, when a new SGL is chained and the last
SG entry is updated with sg_chain, the last but one entry still contains
the end marker from the sg_mark_end. This end marker must be removed as
otherwise a walk of the chained SGLs will cause a NULL pointer
dereference at the last but one SG entry, because sg_next will return
NULL.
The patch only applies to all kernels up to and including 4.13. The
patch 2d97591ef4 added to 4.14-rc1
introduced a complete new code base which addresses this bug in
a different way. Yet, that patch is too invasive for stable kernels
and was therefore not marked for stable.
Fixes: 8ff590903d ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations")
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 445a582738 upstream.
For asynchronous operation, SGs are allocated without a page mapped to
them or with a page that is not used (ref-counted). If the SGL is freed,
the code must only call put_page for an SG if there was a page assigned
and ref-counted in the first place.
This fixes a kernel crash when using io_submit with more than one iocb
using the sendmsg and sendpage (vmsplice/splice) interface.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 41cdf7a453 upstream.
When authencesn is used together with digest_null a crash will
occur on the decrypt path. This is because normally we perform
a special setup to preserve the ESN, but this is skipped if there
is no authentication. However, on the post-authentication path
it always expects the preservation to be in place, thus causing
a crash when digest_null is used.
This patch fixes this by also skipping the post-processing when
there is no authentication.
Fixes: 104880a6b4 ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD...")
Reported-by: Jan Tluka <jtluka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fec17cb223 upstream.
Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Suggested-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f3ad587070 upstream.
crypto_gcm_setkey() was using wait_for_completion_interruptible() to
wait for completion of async crypto op but if a signal occurs it
may return before DMA ops of HW crypto provider finish, thus
corrupting the data buffer that is kfree'ed in this case.
Resolve this by using wait_for_completion() instead.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a5dfefb1c3 upstream.
drbg_kcapi_sym_ctr() was using wait_for_completion_interruptible() to
wait for completion of async crypto op but if a signal occurs it
may return before DMA ops of HW crypto provider finish, thus
corrupting the output buffer.
Resolve this by using wait_for_completion() instead.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e68368aed5 upstream.
public_key_verify_signature() was passing the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG
flag to akcipher_request_set_callback() but was not handling correctly
the case where a -EBUSY error could be returned from the call to
crypto_akcipher_verify() if backlog was used, possibly casuing
data corruption due to use-after-free of buffers.
Resolve this by handling -EBUSY correctly.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CAAM uses DMA to transfer data to and from memory, if
DMA and CPU accessed data share the same cacheline cache
pollution will occur. Marking the result as cacheline aligned
moves it to a separate cache line.
Signed-off-by: Radu Solea <radu.solea@nxp.com>
commit 9933e113c2 upstream.
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d7 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2a2a251f11 upstream.
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Fixes: 400c40cf78 ("crypto: algif - add AEAD support")
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ef0579b64e upstream.
The ahash API modifies the request's callback function in order
to clean up after itself in some corner cases (unaligned final
and missing finup).
When the request is complete ahash will restore the original
callback and everything is fine. However, when the request gets
an EBUSY on a full queue, an EINPROGRESS callback is made while
the request is still ongoing.
In this case the ahash API will incorrectly call its own callback.
This patch fixes the problem by creating a temporary request
object on the stack which is used to relay EINPROGRESS back to
the original completion function.
This patch also adds code to preserve the original flags value.
Fixes: ab6bf4e5e5 ("crypto: hash - Fix the pointer voodoo in...")
Reported-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Tested-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e6534aebb2 upstream.
The algif_aead completion function tries to deduce the aead_request
from the crypto_async_request argument. This is broken because
the API does not guarantee that the same request will be pased to
the completion function. Only the value of req->data can be used
in the completion function.
This patch fixes it by storing a pointer to sk in areq and using
that instead of passing in sk through req->data.
Fixes: 83094e5e9e ("crypto: af_alg - add async support to...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6207119444 upstream.
With this reproducer:
struct sockaddr_alg alg = {
.salg_family = 0x26,
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_feat = 0xf,
.salg_mask = 0x5,
.salg_name = "digest_null",
};
int sock, sock2;
sock = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&alg, sizeof(alg));
sock2 = accept(sock, NULL, NULL);
setsockopt(sock, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, "\x9b\xca", 2);
accept(sock2, NULL, NULL);
==== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ====
one can immediatelly see an UBSAN warning:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/algif_hash.c:187:7
variable length array bound value 0 <= 0
CPU: 0 PID: 15949 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G E 4.4.30-0-default #1
...
Call Trace:
...
[<ffffffff81d598fd>] ? __ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive+0x13d/0x188
[<ffffffff81d597c0>] ? __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x1bc/0x1bc
[<ffffffffa0e2204d>] ? hash_accept+0x5bd/0x7d0 [algif_hash]
[<ffffffffa0e2293f>] ? hash_accept_nokey+0x3f/0x51 [algif_hash]
[<ffffffffa0e206b0>] ? hash_accept_parent_nokey+0x4a0/0x4a0 [algif_hash]
[<ffffffff8235c42b>] ? SyS_accept+0x2b/0x40
It is a correct warning, as hash state is propagated to accept as zero,
but creating a zero-length variable array is not allowed in C.
Fix this as proposed by Herbert -- do "?: 1" on that site. No sizeof or
similar happens in the code there, so we just allocate one byte even
though we do not use the array.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7d6e910502 upstream.
An ancient gcc bug (first reported in 2003) has apparently resurfaced
on MIPS, where kernelci.org reports an overly large stack frame in the
whirlpool hash algorithm:
crypto/wp512.c:987:1: warning: the frame size of 1112 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
With some testing in different configurations, I'm seeing large
variations in stack frames size up to 1500 bytes for what should have
around 300 bytes at most. I also checked the reference implementation,
which is essentially the same code but also comes with some test and
benchmarking infrastructure.
It seems that recent compiler versions on at least arm, arm64 and powerpc
have a partial fix for this problem, but enabling "-fsched-pressure", but
even with that fix they suffer from the issue to a certain degree. Some
testing on arm64 shows that the time needed to hash a given amount of
data is roughly proportional to the stack frame size here, which makes
sense given that the wp512 implementation is doing lots of loads for
table lookups, and the problem with the overly large stack is a result
of doing a lot more loads and stores for spilled registers (as seen from
inspecting the object code).
Disabling -fschedule-insns consistently fixes the problem for wp512,
in my collection of cross-compilers, the results are consistently better
or identical when comparing the stack sizes in this function, though
some architectures (notable x86) have schedule-insns disabled by
default.
The four columns are:
default: -O2
press: -O2 -fsched-pressure
nopress: -O2 -fschedule-insns -fno-sched-pressure
nosched: -O2 -no-schedule-insns (disables sched-pressure)
default press nopress nosched
alpha-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1136 848 1136 176
am33_2.0-linux-gcc-4.9.3 2100 2076 2100 2104
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 848 848 1048 352
cris-linux-gcc-4.9.3 272 272 272 272
frv-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1128 1000 1128 280
hppa64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1128 336 1128 184
hppa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 644 308 644 276
i386-linux-gcc-4.9.3 352 352 352 352
m32r-linux-gcc-4.9.3 720 656 720 268
microblaze-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1108 604 1108 256
mips64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1328 592 1328 208
mips-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1096 624 1096 240
powerpc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1088 432 1088 160
powerpc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1080 584 1080 224
s390-linux-gcc-4.9.3 456 456 624 360
sh3-linux-gcc-4.9.3 292 292 292 292
sparc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 992 240 992 208
sparc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 680 592 680 312
x86_64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 224 240 272 224
xtensa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1152 704 1152 304
aarch64-linux-gcc-7.0.0 224 224 1104 208
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 824 824 1048 352
mips-linux-gcc-7.0.0 1120 648 1120 272
x86_64-linux-gcc-7.0.1 240 240 304 240
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.4.7 840 392
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.5.4 784 728 784 320
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.6.4 736 728 736 304
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.7.4 944 784 944 352
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.8.5 464 464 760 352
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 848 848 1048 352
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-5.3.1 824 824 1064 336
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-6.1.1 808 808 1056 344
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 824 824 1048 352
Trying the same test for serpent-generic, the picture is a bit different,
and while -fno-schedule-insns is generally better here than the default,
-fsched-pressure wins overall, so I picked that instead.
default press nopress nosched
alpha-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1392 864 1392 960
am33_2.0-linux-gcc-4.9.3 536 524 536 528
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 552 552 776 536
cris-linux-gcc-4.9.3 528 528 528 528
frv-linux-gcc-4.9.3 536 400 536 504
hppa64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 524 208 524 480
hppa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 768 472 768 508
i386-linux-gcc-4.9.3 564 564 564 564
m32r-linux-gcc-4.9.3 712 576 712 532
microblaze-linux-gcc-4.9.3 724 392 724 512
mips64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 720 384 720 496
mips-linux-gcc-4.9.3 728 384 728 496
powerpc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 704 304 704 480
powerpc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 704 296 704 480
s390-linux-gcc-4.9.3 560 560 592 536
sh3-linux-gcc-4.9.3 540 540 540 540
sparc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 544 352 544 496
sparc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 544 344 544 496
x86_64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 528 536 576 528
xtensa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 752 544 752 544
aarch64-linux-gcc-7.0.0 432 432 656 480
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 616 616 808 536
mips-linux-gcc-7.0.0 720 464 720 488
x86_64-linux-gcc-7.0.1 536 528 600 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.4.7 592 440
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.5.4 776 448 776 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.6.4 776 448 776 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.7.4 768 448 768 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.8.5 488 488 776 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 552 552 776 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-5.3.1 552 552 776 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-6.1.1 560 560 776 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 616 616 808 536
I did not do any runtime tests with serpent, so it is possible that stack
frame size does not directly correlate with runtime performance here and
it actually makes things worse, but it's more likely to help here, and
the reduced stack frame size is probably enough reason to apply the patch,
especially given that the crypto code is often used in deep call chains.
Link: https://kernelci.org/build/id/58797d7559b5149efdf6c3a9/logs/
Link: http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/WhirlpoolPage.html
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=11488
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=79149
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1c68bb0f62 upstream.
Running with KASAN and crypto tests currently gives
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __test_aead+0x9d9/0x2200 at addr ffffffff8212fca0
Read of size 16 by task cryptomgr_test/1107
Address belongs to variable 0xffffffff8212fca0
CPU: 0 PID: 1107 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 4.10.0+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.1-1.fc24 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x63/0x8a
kasan_report.part.1+0x4a7/0x4e0
? __test_aead+0x9d9/0x2200
? crypto_ccm_init_crypt+0x218/0x3c0 [ccm]
kasan_report+0x20/0x30
check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
memcpy+0x23/0x50
__test_aead+0x9d9/0x2200
? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
? alg_test_akcipher+0xf0/0xf0
? crypto_skcipher_init_tfm+0x2e3/0x310
? crypto_spawn_tfm2+0x37/0x60
? crypto_ccm_init_tfm+0xa9/0xd0 [ccm]
? crypto_aead_init_tfm+0x7b/0x90
? crypto_alloc_tfm+0xc4/0x190
test_aead+0x28/0xc0
alg_test_aead+0x54/0xd0
alg_test+0x1eb/0x3d0
? alg_find_test+0x90/0x90
? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
? __wake_up_common+0x70/0xb0
cryptomgr_test+0x4d/0x60
kthread+0x173/0x1c0
? crypto_acomp_scomp_free_ctx+0x60/0x60
? kthread_create_on_node+0xa0/0xa0
ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffff8212fb80: 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
ffffffff8212fc00: 00 01 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fa
>ffffffff8212fc80: fa fa fa fa 00 05 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
^
ffffffff8212fd00: 01 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fa
ffffffff8212fd80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 05 fa fa fa fa fa fa
This always happens on the same IV which is less than 16 bytes.
Per Ard,
"CCM IVs are 16 bytes, but due to the way they are constructed
internally, the final couple of bytes of input IV are dont-cares.
Apparently, we do read all 16 bytes, which triggers the KASAN errors."
Fix this by padding the IV with null bytes to be at least 16 bytes.
Fixes: 0bc5a6c5c7 ("crypto: testmgr - Disable rfc4309 test and convert test vectors")
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Because the old rfc4543 implementation always injected an IV into
the AD, while the new one does not, we have to disable the test
while it is converted over to the new AEAD interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fabio Estevam